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Glossary 
 
Diyat                             blood money for bodily injuries or death 
Hadd                             punishment for offences for which limits have been 
                                     defined in the Quran and Sunnah  
Haraba                          crime of brigandage 
Qatal                            Homicide    
Qadhf                           False accusation of unchastity   
Qazi/qadi                      judge 
Qisas                            equality, retribution, 
Shariah/shariat             Islamic Law 
Sunnah                         practices of the prophet Muhammad 
Tazir                            a class of criminal penalties that are defined by the state          
Ulema                          scholars of Islamic religion and Law 
Wali                              guardian                                   
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Chapter 1 
Capital Punishment in South Asia: A Legal Analysis 
 
1.1 Abstract 
Despite the inexorable global trend towards abolition, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
have not embraced the abolitionist movement and still fail to accept capital 
punishment as a human rights issue. The application of capital punishment in the 
Indian subcontinent is not only a violation of international human rights law but is 
also contradictory to the domestic constitutional provisions that guarantee the right to 
life, the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of torture. This research identifies the 
glaring gaps in the substantive and procedural laws of these countries that lead to 
arbitrary application of the death penalty. Law Commissions’ reports and the case law 
of these countries reflect: the investigating agencies use torture to extract confession; 
the indigent accused facing capital charges do not get legal assistance at the state’s 
expense; and issues related to witnesses cause undue delay in criminal proceedings 
and an escape route to terrorist and the powerful from prosecution. Simultaneously, 
the special courts have heightened the risk of arbitrary and subjective application of 
capital punishment by adopting special procedures that lower fair trial standards and 
due process guarantees. These special procedures include special powers of arrest and 
detention, validity to confessions made under police custody and reversing the 
presumption of innocence. The thesis explains that the scope of capital punishment as 
enunciated in the primary sources of Islamic jurisprudence (the Quran and the 
Sunnah) is not only limited but is also entwined with stringent evidentiary 
requirements and due process guarantees. It helps to dispel the notion that sharia is an 
impediment to restrict the scope of  the application of capital punishment in Pakistan. 
This dissertation explores the legal and physical problems of one third of the world’s 
death row prisoners who have been languishing in cells for many years under the 
conditions of solitary confinement in contravention to guidelines of the domestic 
courts and law commissions. The pain of death row in the Indian subcontinent is 
exacerbated due to the denial of fundamental rights to prisoners in the name of 
safekeeping. As part of a comprehensive approach, the research provides compelling 
legal grounds to strengthen the criminal justice system by focusing on the process of 
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evidence and investigation in order to prosecute the powerful and terrorists to 
promote justice rather than revenge. 
 1.2 Background 
This research topic is important on three levels: international, regional and the 
researcher’s personal career. 
Sangmin Bae writes: ‘Punishing people with death has a history as old as society 
itself, and it was not considered a human rights violation until the last decades of the 
twentieth century’.1 It is usually believed that the modern abolition movement 
emerged in Europe with the Cesare Beccaria’s treatise Dei delitti et delle pene, (On 
Crimes and Punishment).
2 Capital Punishment, Beccaria declared, was both inhuman 
and ineffective: ‘an unacceptable weapon for a modern enlightened state to employ 
and less effective than the certainty of imprisonment’.3 The abolitionist movement 
grew during the nineteenth century rallying the support of such important English 
jurists such as Jeremy Bentham and Samuel Romilly.
4
 After the Second World War, 
the subject of international human rights gained prominence and reinforced the 
abolition movement on the ground of two fundamental human rights norms, the right 
to life and the protection against cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments.
5
 These 
two rights have been enshrined in two fundamental international human rights 
instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and  Political Rights.
6
  
Over the past few decades, the abolition movement has gained momentum across the 
globe. Roger Hood explains: ‘The recognition of the death penalty as a human rights 
issue, combined with the development of international human rights law and the 
political weight that has been given to the campaign led by European institutions to 
get rid of capital punishment completely, is the main explanation for the surge in 
                                                 
1
 Sangmin Bae, When the State No Longer Kills: International Human Rights Norms and Abolition of 
Capital Punishment (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), p.1. 
2
 Cesare Beccaria, An Essay On Crimes and Punishments (Albany: W.C. Little, 1872), pp.51-55. 
3
 Ibid, p.54. 
4
 Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750: The 
Movement for Reform, 1750-1833 (Vol. 1) (Oxford: Macmillan, 1948), pp.389-91.  
5
 William A. Schabas, ‘International Legal Aspects’ in Hodgkinson, P. & Rutherford, A. (eds.) Capital 
Punishment: Global Issues and Prospects Volume II (Winchester: Waterside Press, 1996), pp.17-44, 
p.18. 
6
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) U NGA Res 217 A (III) 
(UDHR), arts.3, 5; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 6(1), arts 6, 7. 
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abolition over the past quarter of a century’.7 Another major development in the 
abolition movement at the dawn of the twenty-first century was the Rome Statute of 
International Criminal Court which currently has 124 States Parties
8
. This Statute 
excludes the death penalty from the punishments which the International Criminal 
Court is authorized to impose,
9
 despite the court’s jurisdiction over extremely grave 
crimes such as crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. William Schabas 
considers this development as ‘a significant benchmark in an unquestionable trend 
towards universal abolition of capital punishment’.10  
According to the Report of the UN Secretary General ‘more than 150 of the 193 
Member States of the United Nations have abolished the death penalty or introduced a 
moratorium, either in law or in practice’.11 The report also endorses the fact that ‘ the 
international community as a whole is moving towards the abolition of the death 
penalty in law or practice’.12 The publication of the United Nations Human Rights 
Office of the High Commissioner shows the trend towards the abolition of the death 
penalty and it  recorded that only 22 countries implemented executions in 2015.
13
 
Since 2007, the General Assembly in a series of its five resolutions adopted in 2007,
14
 
2008,
15
 2010,
16
 2012
17
 and 2014
18
 respectively, calls for international moratorium on 
the executions. On November 19, 2016,  the General Assembly passed  its  sixth 
resolution for moratorium on capital punishment.
19
 A total of 115 countries supported 
                                                 
7
 Roger Hood & Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 31. 
8.
ICC,.<https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20
the%20rome%20statute.aspx > accessed 24 December,2016. 
9
 Rome Statute, Article 77(1) 
10
 William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death  Penalty in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 258. 
11
 Question of the Death Penalty, (I July 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/24/18, p.4  
12
 Ibid, p.1. 
13
 Ivan Simonovic, Moving Away from the Death Penalty: Arguments, Trends and Perspectives (New 
York: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2015), p.282. 
14
 Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, UNGA Res/62/149(14 Dec 2007) (adopted by 104 
votes to 49; 31abstentions) 
15
 Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, UNGA Res/63/168(18 Dec 2008) (adopted by 106 
votes to 48;34 abstentions)  
16
 Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, UNGA Res/65/206 (21 Dec 2010) (adopted by 109 
votes to 41; 35 abstentions) 
17
 Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, UNGA Res/ 67/176 (20 Dec 2012) (adopted by 111 
votes to 41;34 abstentions) 
18
 Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, UNGA/Res/69/186 (18 December 2014) (adopted by 
117 votes to 38;34 abstentions) 
19
 UNGA, 71st Session, Recorded Vote on A/C.3/71/L.27 Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, 
Nov. 17, 2016 < http://www.un.org/en/ga/third/71/docs/voting_sheets/L.27.pdf> accessed on 24 
December 2017. 
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the resolution, 38 countries voted against and 31 abstained.
20
 The  annual report of 
Amnesty International on ‘Death Sentences and Executions 2015’ reflects that 102 
countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes whereas this figure was only 
16 in 1974.
21
 It is obvious that the world is moving away from the death penalty. In 
this context, there are two compelling reasons why the debate on capital punishment 
in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh is important.  
Firstly, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh still retain capital punishment. In these three 
countries the persons charged with certain crimes are not only sentenced to death but 
also executed. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh always voted against UN General 
Assembly resolutions on moratorium on the use of the death penalty. According to 
Amnesty International, Pakistan and Bangladesh are among those countries in the 
world where the most people were sentenced to death during the year 2014.
22
 The 
report further reveals that these three countries are included in the list of 22 countries 
of the world that carry out executions.
23
 There is no official data or statistics on the 
executions in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The data collected by international and 
national human rights organizations including Reprieve, Amnesty International, The 
Death Penalty Project and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reflects that the 
year 2015 saw the execution of 326 persons and  332 since the end of a six year 
moratorium on executions in December 11, 2014.
24
 On the contrary, India and 
Bangladesh have executed one person each in 2015. The dream of abolition of capital 
punishment across all the jurisdictions in the world is difficult to achieve without 
making the most populous region of the world to realize that the death penalty is an 
inhuman and degrading punishment as well as a violation of human rights. 
Secondly, the discourse’s global dimension shows that almost one third of the world’s 
population of death row prisoners is confined in various prisons in Pakistan, India and 
Bangladesh. Some of these death row prisoners have been sentenced to death charged 
                                                 
20
 General Assembly of the United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/resolutions.shtml > accessed 
on 8 September 2016. 
21
 Amnesty International, Death Sentences and Execution in 2015 (London: Amnesty International, 
2016), p.4. 
22
 Amnesty International, Death Sentences and Execution in 2014 (London: Amnesty International, 
2014), p.6. 
23
 Ibid, p.5. 
24
 Death Penalty Worldwide, <http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-
post.cfm?country=Pakistan > accessed on 8 September 2015; Amnesty International, Death Sentences 
and Execution in 2015(London: Amnesty International, 2016), p.6. 
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with various non-lethal offences in violation to article 6(2) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Furthermore, the mental agony of the death 
row prisoners, languishing in overcrowded prison cells for many years, is intensified 
in the absence of an effective mechanism of legal aid at the state’s expense and the 
hard physical conditions of living in prison.  
At the regional level, despite the diversity in South Asia, India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh not only share common historical similarities in constitutional and 
statutory texts as former British colonies but also common stance on the application 
of capital punishment to combat terrorism and heinous crimes. In the name of security 
and the war on terrorism, these three countries have been applying capital punishment 
in the special courts constituted under special laws that bypass the under resourced 
and inefficient criminal justice systems in order to combat terrorism and other heinous 
offences. These extraordinary measures to counter terrorism have multiplied the risk 
of arbitrary application of the death penalty because special laws lower the general 
standards of due process and provide special powers of arrest and detention, validity 
to confession under police custody and reverse the presumption of innocence- the 
accused is guilty until his/her innocence is proven. 
In addition to terrorism, these countries have enacted special legislation to stem 
heinous crimes like gang rape and acid throwing. On the night of 16 December 2012, 
a brutal gang rape took place in a moving bus on the streets of Delhi. It was a crime 
that sparked nationwide protests and forced the government into enacting a stringent 
anti-rape law that prescribes nonfatal rape as liable to capital punishment.
25
 Similarly, 
to curb a rise in acid attacks on women, the Bangladeshi Government enacted the 
Acid Crime Control Act in 2002. Under the law the alleged attackers may be tried by 
special tribunals and may face a maximum penalty of death.
26
  
In addition to special courts, military courts in Pakistan have multiplied the risk of 
arbitrary application of the death penalty. Pakistan lifted a six-year long moratorium 
on civilian executions and established military courts as part of the National Action 
Plan against terrorism in the wake of the horrific attack by Taliban terrorists on Army 
Public School Peshawar on 16 December, 2014 that claimed 145 lives, including 132 
                                                 
25
 The Criminal Law(Amendment), Act, No.13 of 2013, sec. 376(A). 
26
 Bangladesh Acid Crime Control Act, Act No.2 of 2002, sects. 4 & 5(a). 
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school children. The 21st Constitutional Amendment amended Article 175 of the 
Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to provide military courts with justification, for a period 
of two years, to try civilians for terrorism related offences.
27
 According to the 
Pakistan Army’s press wing, 11 military courts convicted 274 persons on the ground 
o confession before the magistrate and the trial court- 161out of the 274 convicted 
persons were awarded death sentences.
28
 
There is also a deeply personal reason for choosing this topic of research. This project 
was conceived during my time working as Superintendent of Jail (Prison Governor) at 
District Jail Sheikhupura, State of Punjab, Pakistan. I witnessed the physical 
hardships of the death row prisoners faced while confined in cell blocks, 8 to 11 
inmates in each cell, during the hot weather. Upon perusal of the judicial record, I 
came to know that there were more than 70 death row prisoners whose appeals were 
pending in the Lahore High Court for more than seven years. During my two-year 
deployment as a Corrections Advisor at the United Nations Mission in Liberia, I also 
witnessed the legal and physical problems of prisoners under the sentence of death 
confined in Monrovia Central Prisons, Monrovia. Working as Chief Executive officer 
in four different prisons in Pakistan over 10 years, I had to supervise the executions of 
7 prisoners to discharge my duties. In addition to the pain and miseries of the death 
row prisoners and their families and friends, I can understand the stress and strain on 
prisons staff due the execution process.  
This research broadened my knowledge of the criminal justice system, penology and 
human rights law. Through this research I will be able to contribute to the humane 
working of criminal justice systems in accordance with international human rights 
standards either working as an important functionary of the Pakistan criminal justice 
system or through a possible assignment in the rule of law, Department of 
Peacekeeping Operation, in the United Nations. 
                                                 
27
 Constitution (Twenty First Amendment) Act, 2015, sec.2. 
28
 Inter-Services Public Relations, Press Release No.PR2/2017-ISPR, (31 December 2016 ) available 
on <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=3659 > accessed on 3 January, 
2017. 
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 1.3 The Statement of Research Aims 
(1) To analyze the issues that have affected the criminal justice systems of India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh since Ancient India and also lead to the arbitrary and 
discriminatory application of capital punishment. 
(2) To explore how capital punishment in the Indian subcontinent is a violation of 
International Human Rights law. It will identify the areas of the criminal justice 
systems that are not in consonance with international legal frameworks on the 
protection of rights of those who are facing the death penalty. These countries are 
required in order to achieve greater conformity with contemporary international 
norms and the obligations of state parties to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. In this 
regard, the scope of the death penalty needs to be reduced, mandatory death sentences 
need to be abolished, and procedural guarantees in the trial and appeal processes need 
to be ensured. 
(3) To evaluate the risk of arbitrary application of the death penalty in India, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh under special courts, and military courts to counter terrorism, heinous 
crimes and religious militancy. 
(4) To investigate the status of capital punishment under Sharia and why the Quran 
and Sunnah are related to regulate capital punishment in Pakistan. Further, to answer 
the question of whether Shariah is an obstacle or a pretext against restricting or 
abolishing the death penalty in Pakistan. 
(5) This research aims to explore the legal and physical problems of one third of the 
death row population of the world confined in overcrowded prisons of these countries. 
The death row phenomenon has become a complicated issue due to an increase in its 
number each year, the pendency of cases in appellate courts and the miserable living 
conditions in overcrowded prisons cells. The death row inmates in India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, are confined for up to twenty-two hours a day in cells measuring 6 feet 
by 8 feet. Having been segregated from the general prisons population, they are only 
allowed restricted family visits and a limited access to educational, recreational and 
treatment facilities. 
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1.4 Reasoned Description of Proposed Research Methods 
The research employed socio-legal theory and critical legal theory of law. The socio-
legal aspect of the issue is very important. With the help of socio-legal theory, the 
thesis envisages to understand the norms and values of society that have a profound 
influence on country’s legislation. As Emile Durkheim says ‘law is an index of a 
social formation’.29 In South Asia, the tradition of avenge is embedded in the fabric of 
the society, the family feud is a cherished value and the practice of honor killing is 
very common. The socio-legal approach analyzed how these countries’ governments 
make special legislation to incorporate capital punishment for various offences. 
The critical legal theory questions the absolute finality of the traditional jurisprudence 
and ‘it describes law as a weapon of the powerful to execute the poor’.30 The 
protagonists of the abolition movement argue that the death penalty is a manifestation 
of the power of the state. The powerful elite’s influence on the police work and 
functionality is usually criticized by human rights organizations, the media and some 
political leaders of these countries. The critical legal theory, as a research approach, 
help explain how the trial process in ‘the criminal justice system is unable to 
prosecute the powerful’.31 
Prisons Statistics 
There is no official data or statistics regarding executions in India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh. The prisons are administered by the province or the state in India and 
Pakistan. The Inspectorate/Directorate of Prisons in each state/province maintains the 
record of the number of executions conducted each year but this is not published. In 
the absence of official data, this research has relied on the figures collected by 
different national and international NGOs working on the subject of the death penalty. 
The Ministry of Interior in Pakistan and the National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry 
of Home Affairs, India, publish prison population figures including the number of 
prisoners held under sentence of death. The official website ‘Bangladesh Jail’ does 
not reflect the number of prisoners under the sentence of death.
32
 The researcher used 
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the statistics compiled by Odikar, The Death Penalty Project and Amnesty 
International on death row prisoners confined in various prisons in Bangladesh. In 
India, Centre on the Death Penalty, established at National Law University in August 
2014, is an important source of information regarding the death row prisoners. The 
Centre is an extension of the Death Penalty Research Project at National Law 
University Delhi that interviewed death row prisoners 5 confined in various prisons in 
India between June 2013 and January 2015.
33
 
 1.5 Original Contribution 
Capital punishment is a vast topic that has attracted the attention of a host of scholars 
in other parts of the world but this debate is relatively new in South Asia and not 
much research has been conducted on the topic. In South Asia there is no 
criminologist or author like Cesare Beccaria in Europe who wrote On Crimes and 
Punishment and vehemently opposed capital punishment. In India, some valuable 
books and reports have been published on capital punishment. In the case of 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, no research has been published or conducted on capital 
punishment except for the reports of National and International NGO’s working for 
the abolition of the death penalty in these countries. 
In 2008, Amnesty International published ‘Lethal Lottery’ which analyzed Indian 
Supreme Court Judgments from 1950 to 2006.
34
 This report is a great contribution, 
exposing the vagaries of judicial arbitrariness in imposing the death penalty in India. 
In 2013, Professor Roger Hood and Surya Deva edited Confronting Capital 
Punishment in Asia. Three out of fourteen chapters of the book discuss the issue of 
the death penalty in India.
35
 In one of the chapters, Bindal and Raj Kumar discuss the 
legal, constitutional and human rights dimension on the abolition of the death 
penalty.
36
 Deva provides a critique on the doctrine of ‘rarest of rare’ by analyzing 86 
cases (January 2000 to October 2011) decided by the Indian Supreme Court. He 
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concludes that the principle of awarding the death sentence in the ‘rarest of rare’ case 
has outlived its utility and that the application of Bachan Singh’s rarest of rare 
guidelines is applied quite inconsistently and arbitrarily. 
On the death row phenomenon in India, Prisoners Voices from Death Row: Indian 
Experience, empirical research based upon the interviews of 111 death row prisoners 
confined in 16 prisons from six federal states and their families, exposes inhuman and 
degrading treatment of the death row prisoners.
37
 In the context of Pakistan, Isabel 
Buchanan’s Trials: On Death Row in Pakistan is the first book on the issue of  death 
row in Pakistan. Buchanan, a twenty-three years old Scottish lawyer, explores the 
miseries of death row and flaws of the criminal justice system through her death row 
cases while working with national NGO, Justice Project Pakistan. The book is a 
beautiful narrative of her personal experience but not a formal research on the death 
penalty in Pakistan. 
This thesis is the first research on capital punishment that covers the jurisdiction of 
three countries India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. By tracing the common legal history, 
common provisions under the penal laws (Indian Penal Code 1860, the Code of 
Criminal Procedure 1898, the Evidence Act 1872 and the Prison Act, 1898), the thesis 
evaluates the legal and constitutional issues surrounding capital punishment in these 
countries. 
The research also covers the status of the death penalty in Sharia and its application in 
Pakistan. The thesis explains that the scope of capital punishment in the Quran and 
the Sunnah is very limited as it is generally misunderstood. It helps to dispel the 
notion that Shariah is an impediment to restrict or abolish capital punishment in 
Pakistan. 
 1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The dissertation has been divided into eight (8) chapters. Chapter 1 includes the 
following content: abstract, background, significance of research, research methods, 
originality and structure. Chapter 2 provides the historical overview of capital 
punishment in South Asia. Furthermore, this chapter, comprising of three parts, 
evaluates the criminal justice system especially focusing on capital punishment 
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prevalent during the three important phases of history of South Asia namely Ancient 
India, Medieval India and British India. Owing to lack of knowledge of the day-to-
day administration of the ancient Indian Kingdom, the thesis has gleaned information 
from religious texts and travel accounts of early Greek, Chinese and Muslims 
travelers. The first part of the chapter articulates the caste system in the society and its 
impact upon the system of crime and punishment especially on the death penalty. 
Further, it also discusses the philosophy of severe punishment (danda) embedded in 
ancient religious text. The second part of the chapter explores the roots of the Islamic 
Criminal Justice System in the region especially the law of murder (Qisas and Diyat). 
Despite Muslim rulers’ claims of adhering to the high values of justice as enunciated 
in Islam, in many cases they imposed capital punishment in ways that were wholly 
opposed to the spirit of the Sharia. The third part of the chapter helps to understand 
common historical similarities in constitutional and statutory texts of South Asian 
countries as former British colonies. The second chapter contributes to knowledge by 
investigating the origin of four major issues that still affects the criminal justice 
system namely the use of torture to extract confession, a system of punishment based 
upon caste and creed, the Islamic law of murder, and the use of prisons as the chief 
form of punishment.  
Chapter 3 explains the legal rationale for the emergence of capital punishment as a 
violation of human rights under international law. The chapter further enumerates the 
treaty obligations of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as states parties to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child regarding the application of the death penalty. The reports of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child(CRC) and the Universal Periodic Reviews of 
these countries in the Human Rights Council call on these countries to comply with 
their treaty obligations regarding the application of the death penalty. In Chapter 4, a 
complete analysis of the process of capital trials demonstrates that due process is 
simply not followed, and there is no due diligence in the process of evidence 
collection, access to legal counsel and independent witnesses. The reports of law 
commissions, police commissions, and national and international NGO’s reveal that 
investigating agencies frequently use torture to extract confessions. The study of the 
relevant case law reveals that the courts’ guidelines on custodial accountability could 
not change the practices of torture to extract confession. 
 17 
Chapter 5 shows how special laws in these three countries have heightened the risk of 
arbitrary and subjective application of capital punishment by lowering the recognized 
standards of due process through special procedures. It has identified the glaring flaws 
such as confessions made to the police are admissible as evidence, there are 
insufficient safeguards for the principles of presumption of innocence, and there is 
incommunicado detention of the accused or restricted communication with legal 
counsel and relatives.  
Chapter 6 defines with the status and scope of capital punishment under Sharia (The 
Quran and the Sunnah) and its application in Pakistan. In this regard, research relies 
on the basic sources of Islamic Jurisprudence (the Quran and Sunnah). In order to 
examine the effects of grafting the Qisas and Diyat Law 1997 into secular penal laws 
of the country on the prosecution of the offence of murder, the research analyzed 
reported cases of the High Courts and the Supreme Courts. 
Chapter 7 explores death row prisoners’ mental anguish and suffering due to 
protracted periods on death row coupled with de facto solitary confinement under 
harsh physical conditions of life in the overcrowded prisons of India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. In the absence of an independent monitoring mechanism, it is not less 
than a herculean task to know the legal and physical problems of death row prisoners 
confined in various prisons in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The case law and the 
reports of law commissions in these countries portray the situation of solitary 
confinement and physical hardships of life on death row. 
Chapter 8 concludes with two suggested topics to conduct further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Historical Overview of Capital Punishment in South Asia 
Before going into the substance of the chapter it is essential to define the term ‘South 
Asia’. 
Definition of South Asia  
South Asia, Indian Sub content and India are in origin geographical expressions that 
connote, taken in its widest sense, for all the contagious territories in Asia, which 
were directly or indirectly subject to British rule, lies between 8 and 37 north latitude, 
and 66 and 99 east longitude. The term India for the region is of much older origin 
and South Asia is a relatively new term that may be ‘unfamiliar but it is neutral and 
inoffensive’1 South Asia is a more recent construction-only six decades old- which 
today according to the United Nations geographical region classification
2
 
encompasses eight very diverse sovereign states of very different sizes: India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri lanka, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan and the Maldives. Since 
1985, these eight countries are working under the banner of a regional organization 
named the South Asian Association for the Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which 
aims ‘to promote the welfare of the people of south Asia’.3 In this dissertation, the 
term South Asia has been treated under the dictates of international and regional 
classification 
Introduction 
This chapter, comprising of three parts, evaluates the criminal justice system 
especially focusing on capital punishment prevalent during the three important phases 
of history of South Asia namely ancient India, medieval India and British India. It is 
pertinent to mention that ‘South Asia not only carries the weight of its people, 23 
percent of the world population, but also of their ancient history stretching back five 
                                                 
1
 Bertram Hughes Farmer, An Introduction to South Asia (London: Methuen, 1983), p.1 
2
 ‘United Nations Geoscheme’ <http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm > 
accessed 8 April 2014. 
3
 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Charter, Article 1. 
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millennia’.4 From Aryan to British rule the region saw the rise and fall of various 
indigenous and foreign rulers that had left profound footprints on the civilization and 
system of administration. Henry Beveridge has reflected in these words: 
Wave upon wave, the sea of hostile invasion has inundated the land. Its capitals have 
been shaken by revolution time and again; new rulers have risen in sudden strength 
and old dynasties have disappeared as dew before the sun.
5
 
The first part of the chapter traces the origin of caste system in the society and its 
impact upon the system of crime and punishment especially on the death penalty. 
Further, it also reveals the philosophy of severe punishment (danda). The second part 
of the chapter explores the roots of Islamic Criminal Justice system in the region 
especially the law of Murder Qisas and Diyat Law. The third part of the chapter helps 
to understand common historical similarities in constitutional and statutory texts of 
South Asian countries as former British colonies. One of the lasting legacies of the 
British rule is the Indian Penal Code 1860 that introduced system of courts, prisons 
and punishments. India benefited from early ‘progressive experiments with judicial 
discretion in capital cases, and since the early colonial period judges were permitted 
to substitute life imprisonment or banishment to a penal colony in place of Death’.6 
 2.1 Capital Punishment in Ancient India  
One of the major challenges in studying the criminal justice system in ancient India is 
the lack of original written sources to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the 
contemporary legal and political system. According to Professor A. L Basham, 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London: 
We have for ancient India no lengthy theoretical texts on political philosophy 
comparable to Plato’ Republic and the same time our knowledge of the day to 
day administration of ancient Indian Kingdom is lamentably inadequate. Hence, 
theoretical texts have too often been used as evidence of practice, and 
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sometimes an underlying theory has been wrongly inferred from what evidence 
we have on governmental institutions.
7
 
Most of the classical texts, many of whose authors are anonymous or of doubtful 
identity were transferred from one generation to another and teacher to student by oral 
tradition. Drapkin calls the authenticity of available texts in question in these words, 
‘the oral recitation through many generations undoubtedly changed and reshaped the 
original, and the resulting texts were recorded centuries after their oral circulation’.8  
Simultaneously ‘chronologically accurate records for early Indian history are 
evidently lacking’.9 The majority of dates in Indian history have been established 
upon the evidence of early Greek and Chinese travelers and later Muslim merchants, 
Buddhist pilgrims and European writer. 
 In this backdrop, ‘Indian history prior to the twelfth century A.D. had to be compiled 
from scattered allusions in religious and literary works’.10 Indian history is inexorably 
linked with the religion. Consequently, historians divide the age into four periods 
based upon the specific religious beliefs: the Vedic, Brahminic, Buddhist, and New 
Brahmanic (Hinduism). The date of the Vedic literature cannot be fixed with 
accuracy.
11
 The Vedic age, from about 1500 to 600 BC was based on the great 
religious encyclopedia known as the Vedas. Subsequently this Vedic literature 
became the origin of the teachings of New Brahiminism (Hinduism). 
Two religions namely Buddhism and Hinduism were significantly influential in 
shaping the administrative and legal systems in ancient India.  
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Buddhism 
Buddhism originated in India in the sixth century BCE but did not reach its peak until 
between the second century BCE and the second Century AD.
12
  Buddhism was born 
out of the teachings of a man named Siddhartha Gautama, who later became known as 
Buddha. The majority of historians of India consider the year 563 BC as being the 
birth year of Buddha and also the earliest assured date in Indian history.
13
 Buddha’s 
teachings were recorded in Pali (धम्म),14 Indian literary language, during the first 
century BC. The entire collection of Buddha’s teachings, or Tipitaka, consisted of 
three sections: ‘the Sutta’(dhamma), the Vinaya(the rules of discipline) and the 
Adhidhamma.
15
  Buddha did not claim that he created the world. Rather, Buddha 
taught individuals ‘to rediscover the universal law of nature (Dhamma) and 
consequently to relieve their own suffering (Duhkha)’.16 
2.1.2 Buddhism and System of Punishments 
The doctrine of Buddhism is not a system of philosophy in the western sense, but is 
rather a path towards enlightenment. It does not propose a specific system of 
government or legal administration. In the light of Buddhist teachings, ‘cruelty, 
torture, revenge in meeting out punishment or as a deterrent to crime possesses a 
limited impact on the spread or growth of crime’.17 Punishment was never 
‘retaliatory’, it was always meant to act as a ‘method for cleansing the soul through 
mental or physical suffering’.18 Buddhists would favor rehabilitation using the path to 
enlightenment, which would enable even the most dangerous convicted killer to find 
his or her Buddha-nature.
19
 During the Buddhist age, confessions played an important 
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role in determining punishments and those individuals who confessed to their crimes 
usually received less punishment. 
Capital Punishment and Buddhism 
Buddha never spoke on the issue of the death penalty but if we evaluate it in 
perspective of the “Five Precepts” or training rules- all individuals must abstain from 
taking a life, taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, false speech, and 
intoxicants. Some authors have noted that ‘the first percept restrains Buddhists from 
killing any living being, and the death penalty would be inconsistent with this 
belief’.20 Buddhism preaches non-violence and peace. Verse 130 under Canto X of 
the Dhammapada, one of the most widely read and best known Buddhist scriptures, 
prohibits killing, upamam katva na haneyya na ghataye ‘one should neither slay nor 
cause to slay’. 21   
Banerji maintains that ‘the religion of Buddha does not appear to have made much 
impression on the ruling class or the nobles during his life time’.22 218 years after 
Buddha’s death, the people of South Asia had good reason to bless the name of 
Bhudda, ‘when one of their most bloodthirsty kings, Ashoka, a fratricide and the 
wanton slayer of thousands of his subjects, embraced Buddhism, and became as mild 
and peaceful a monarch as he had formerly been cruel and reckless’.23 Amongst other 
things, Ashoka greatly ‘restricted the use of capital punishment’ as part of his 
emphasis on non-violence (ahimsa) making his kingdom ‘one of the first jurisdictions 
in the world to significantly curtail the use of death as a criminal sanction’.24  
Furthermore, he took various measures for the welfare of inmates including ‘unjust 
torture and imprisonment should cease’.25  Chinese Buddhist monk visited India in the 
fifth century AD and he remained in there for twelve years and he reflected in his 
travel account ‘the king governs without decapitation or corporal punishment and 
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criminals are simply fined, lightly or heavily according to circumstances’.26 The very 
influence of Buddhism could not survive for a long time. In the following centuries, 
both the death penalty and harsh punishments were the main features of the criminal 
justice system in South Asia. 
Hinduism and Ancient Indian Jurisprudence 
The jurisprudence of Ancient India, which was essentially Hindu-ruled based upon 
the collections of ancient hymns and prayers, known by the names of Vedas. There 
are four Vedas which are the chief sacred books of Hindus: Rig Veda( the science of 
praise), Atharwa Veda(the science of magic), Yajur Veda(the science of sacrifices), 
and Sama Veda(the science of melodies).The diversity of Vedas, both of style and 
contents, shows that they are production of  different periods, between which a 
considerable interval must have elapsed’.27 
The literary traditions of the Vedas are one of the major sources of compilation of 
Dharmashastra. Dharmashastra, are ancient Sanskrit works prescribing the rules of 
Dharma. In short, they are the ‘rules of conduct of man, a narration of do’s and 
don’ts’.28 These codes which have been recognized as authoritative are said to be 
twenty in number, each being called a Samhita or a treatise composed or compiled by 
a holy Brahmin held in high esteem by all and sundry. Amongst the authors of the 
Dharmashastra, Manu is accepted as the eldest, and the authoritativeness of his code 
surpasses that of others. Later sages have uniformly acknowledged his superiority, 
and ‘have often referred to him for lending support to their own sayings’.29 Mohin 
Das also maintains that ‘the Manusmrti occupies a unique position in the Hindu 
Dharmashastra literature’.30 It is difficult to date the laws of Manu with any precision. 
Drapkin estimates that ‘they were put into writing between the first century BC and 
the fourth century AD.’31 The extent to which the Dharmasastra was an applied 
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source of jurisdiction in the pre-modern judicial and legal procedure in South Asia has 
puzzled and troubled many scholars of classical Hindu Law. 
 2.1.3 Crimes and Punishments in Ancient India 
Manu speaks of four forms of punishments, (1) Vakdanda (admonition), (2) 
Dhikdanda (censure), (3) Dhanadanda (pecuniary punishment such as a fine or 
forfeiture of property, and (4) Badhadanda (all sorts of physical punishments 
including the death penalty).
32
The different varieties of Badhadanda or physical 
punishments recommended by the authors are: (1) tadanam (beating),
33
(2) severance 
of limbs,
34
 (3) branding (imprinting marks on  visible parts of the offender’s body, 
indicating that he or she is convicted,
35
(4) capital punishment,
36
 and (5) pouring 
heated oil into the offender’s earhole.37 According to Rama Parsad, ‘the Jus talion 
which is so universally represented in archaic legislations becomes especially 
conspicuous in these punishments’.38 
In ancient India, the system of punishment was dictated by three factors namely trial 
by ordeal, danda (rod of punishment) and the caste system. 
(A)Trial by Ordeal 
The knowledge regarding the procedure adopted in deciding cases in the courts is 
unfortunately very little.
39
 However, many authors of ancient history confirm that 
‘trials by ordeal were frequently resorted to’.40 Ordeals as a feature of Indian law 
extended as far back as the Atharva Veda and the Upanishads and contains through all 
of later ancient Indian legal texts.
41
 The laws of Manu prescribe a number of trials by 
ordeal, particularly in cases where witnesses were not available or were considered 
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unreliable.
42
 The belief in ordeals does not seem contradictory in a society where 
religion was a great binding force. 
 Among other ordeals, ordeals by fire and water were frequently employed to prove 
the innocence of the accused because both water and fire occupy an important place 
in the Hindu religion. It was believed that agni(fire), as one of gods enjoyed purifying 
qualities. The accused was ‘required to lick a red hot plough share with his tongue or 
pick a coin out of a pot of boiling liquid’.43 In another ordeal ‘an accused was 
required to hold in his hand a red hot iron wrapped in a leaf in order to establish his 
defense if his hands are not burnt he is innocent’.44 Water also played an important 
role in ordeals. An accused person was often thrown into the water if he was innocent 
he would not drown.
45
  
 In some cases, the accused was made to take a caustic drink (Bish). It was believed 
that if he spoke the truth the drink would do no harm to him.
46
 Ketosis, Greek 
historian of the fifth century BC, speaks of a more drastic form of ordeal. He 
mentions a fountain from which he says the water coagulates like cheese. If a person 
drinks he becomes delirious and confesses everything he has done.
47
  
(B) The Philosophy of Danda (Rod of Punishment) 
The philosophy of Danda (stick) was a key weapon to suppress crime and award 
severe punishments.  The religious text advocates that the only way that a man might 
be kept pure and righteous was by the fear of danda and the whole race of men is kept 
in order by punishment.
48
 In varying contexts it may be translated as military force, 
coercion and severe punishment. This world is brought to righteousness through 
danda, the rod of punishment; hence ‘the science of kingship is called dandaniti (the 
administration of force)’49. Manu says in order to reinforce the ‘power of the king’ 
and make it effective in protecting the people ‘the creator simultaneously created 
danda from his own body’.50 Law is nothing but danda itself.51 The laws of Manu, the 
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Arthashastra of Kautilya Chanakya, and the Mahabharata
52
 all state that danda must 
be wielded with maximum discretion by the King to uphold justice. In Indian 
jurisprudence dispensing justice and awarding punishment was one of the primary 
attributes of sovereignty. The King was also the chief of judiciary of the State.
53
 
(C) Caste Ridden System of Punishments 
Max Weber elucidates that ‘the caste system was the basis of Hindu society and 
state’.54 It is thus no wonder that it played an important part in Hindu criminal law. 
While in the laws of many ancient and medieval states a distinction was drawn 
between the noble and the commons, ‘in India this distinction took a different shape-
viz., that of caste’.55 
Hindu society as described by the writers of the period consisted of four castes(varna 
or colours) and a number of non-caste groups, the Brahmins or the priests, the 
Kshattryas or the warriors, the Vaishas or the businessmen and the Sudras or the 
slaves.  Ghoshal says that the doctrine of creation of these casts is embedded in 
Rigveda - a hymn of the last book (mandala) of the Rigveda, namely the celebrated 
purushasukta.
56
  Manu advocates the supremacy of Brahmin in these words, 
‘whatever things exist on earth, belong to the Brahmins; (that is to say), everything on 
earth is (theoretically) dedicated to him because, by superiority of birth he is made 
superior to all’.57 
 
 Appointment of judges and the punishments for various crimes were dictated by the 
classification of society based upon birth. Brahmins not only effectively controlled 
much of the court system in ancient India but they, as a class, monopolised legal 
learning and the judicial posts, and ruled as an oligarchy.
58
 All the law books that 
mention the matter required the chief judge to be a Brahmin. In exceptional 
circumstances, ‘it is permissible to appoint a Ksatriya or a Vaisya, but never Sudra be 
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appointed’.59 If the king should appoint a Sudra as his judge, then ‘Dharma would 
come to ruin as a cow sinks into the mud’.60 It is rightly depicted that ‘Hindu law was 
dependent on dynamics of power and authority of various elites, especially the king 
and the Brahmin’.61 
‘Discriminatory justice’ founded on the theory of the ‘relative superiority and 
inferiority’ of different caste groups has been introduced in penal law prescribing 
varying degrees of punishment, in cases of several offences, depending on whether 
the offender belongs to a higher or a lower caste.
62
 The lawgivers repeatedly 
emphasize that there is no corporal punishment for the Brahmin. To us this exemption 
of the Brahmin from corporal punishment seems to be an unfair and unreasonable 
advantage. It goes against the modern canon of justice that ‘a particular class of 
people should be exempted from the severe punishments even when guilty of worst 
offences, while others are sometimes brutally punished for comparatively light 
offences’.63 
Capital Punishment and the Caste System 
Capital punishment was not only common throughout much of Indian history; it was 
closely connected to caste and class.
64
 India’s sacred texts prescribed different 
punishments for the same crime depending on the offender’s position in the prevailing 
hierarchy. Amongst other distinctions, a Sudra(farmer, servant, or foot soldier) who 
insulted a Brahmin (priest) faced the death penalty, whereas a Brahmin who murdered 
a Sudra was given the same light penalty(usually a fine) as he would have received 
for killing a dog or a cat.
65
 ‘If the murderer was a Brahman’, says Al Beruni, ‘and the 
murdered person a member of another caste, he was only bound to do expiation 
consisting of fasting, prayers and almsgiving’.66 Brahmin in general enjoyed 
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immunity from capital punishment.
67
 Das Gupta condemns capital punishment based 
upon discrimination: 
It must be admitted that in the case of the Sudras capital punishment or mutilation has 
sometimes been prescribed for even trivial offences for which men of other castes 
were more leniently treated. This is however a great blot on the Hindu criminal law 
and civilization.
68
 
 2.1.4 Offences Punishable with Death 
 In ancient jurisprudence, a wide range of offences were punishable by death. Capital 
punishment for ‘murderers, robbers, incendiaries, forgers, bridge-breakers, and for 
those who pilfer rice during weighment (the quantity being more than what would fill 
ten pitchers’.69 Capital offences based upon class and caste include: a non-
Brahmin(intentionally) insulting a Brahmin by audaciously calling him by name or 
vilifying his caste
70
 a non-Brahmin violating chastity of a Brahmin woman,
71
 a Sudra 
intentionally inflicting hurt on a Brahmin,
72
and an antyaja (casteless tribal) 
committing sexual intercourse with a woman of Aryan stock.
73
 Corrupt practices by ‘a 
public servant having three previous convictions’ was also a capital offence.74 
Pickpocketing was a capital offence if it was committed for the third time as Manu 
says ‘on the third, he shall suffer death’.75 Theft of Mahapashu( elephant, horse, etc.) 
was also liable to the death penalty.
76
 
The list reflects that trivial and caste based offences were liable to capital punishment. 
Like other ancient civilizations in the world the capital offences in India were 
numerous and petty in nature. 
 2.1.5 Methods of Executions 
There were different ways by which a death sentence could be executed with 
‘picturesque ingenuity’.77 Jolly( Sanskrit scholar) expresses his opinion that ‘capital 
punishment in various aggravated forms, such as impaling on a stake, trampling to 
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death by an elephant, burning, roasting, cutting to pieces, devouring by dogs, and 
mutilations, were also frequently inflicted even for comparatively light offences’.78 
The other forms of executions are narrated in Manu: (a) by causing the offender to be 
burnt to death,
79
 (b) by thrusting a red-hot iron into the offender’s mouth, 80and (c) by 
getting the offender devoured by hunting dogs.
81
 
 Kamandaka subdivided capital punishment into two varieties, namely public and 
secret. Public executions were conducted when the criminal was hated by the people 
or was an enemy of the state whereas secret execution were intended for those whose 
public execution would arouse discontent and anger of the people. According to 
Kamandaka, ‘a secret execution could be carried out with the help of poison, secret 
appliances, weapons or even ointments’.82 
The Jataka gives us greater details. A special ‘execution drum (vajjabheri)’ 
announced the event.
83
 With dust on his head, a garland of red flowers around his 
neck and his hands tied behind his back, the condemned person was beaten with 
whips as he made his way to the place of execution.
84
 The executioner, dressed in 
yellow and also wearing a garland of red flowers followed the procession armed with 
an axe and a rope. The Criminal was placed in a circle at the ‘place of execution’ 
(aghatam), while the executioner was made ready. Neither was allowed to speak to 
the other and ‘the axe did its deed’.85 
No one will deny that judged by modern standards the methods of capital punishment 
in ancient India were cruel and brutal.
86
 
Prisons System in Ancient India 
Very little information is given in the Hindu texts concerning the length of prison 
sentences or the crimes for which offenders were sentenced. It may be discerned from 
the Vedic text that prisons were not used as general form of punishment until around 
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800 BC.
87
 Manu mentions imprisonment as one of three methods of restraining the 
wicked and the other two are fetters and corporal punishment.
88
 Kautilya implies that 
a fairly ‘well organized system was in use’.89 Buddhist Jatakas is also full of allusions 
to contemporary prisons system. 
There seems to little doubt that the life of a prisoner was very hard and troublesome. 
He was often bound in chains of irons (sankhalika-bandhanam) and suffered much.
90
 
He was not allowed to take a bath or rinse his mouth or perform any bodily ablutions, 
until he was reduced to a miserable plight.
91
 In other words the severity of life in 
prisons was equal if not greater in terms of harshness to many corporal punishments. 
 2.1 Capital Punishment in Medieval India (1206-1806A.D)  
During the Medieval period various Muslim dynasties ruled the subcontinent. 
Generally, historians subdivide the period into Sultan of Delhi 
92
(1206-1545) and 
Mughal Rule 
93
(1526-1806).Muslim rule in India was firmly established in the 
thirteenth century and flourished until the beginning of the eighteenth century.
94
   The 
Sultanate of Delhi ushered in a period of Indian cultural renaissance.
95
 India’s ancient 
culture did not perish before the onslaughts of the Muslims, as did that of Persia. In 
the opinion of Basham ‘in general the Muslims were reasonably tolerant and at all 
times Hindu chiefs continued to rule in outlying parts of India, paying tributes to their 
Muslim overlords’.96  
Administration of Justice  
A) Monarchy 
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The justice system introduced by the Muslim rulers enjoyed some similarities with the 
Hindu legal system. Both systems laid emphasis on the trial of cases by the ruler 
himself and on his duty to select good men to act as judges. This period was a 
continuity of ancient India’s system of monarchy with a new element of the Islamic 
system of crimes and punishment. The King was the head of the executive, the 
legislative and the judiciary. He made laws and issued administrative ordinances 
which had the force of law, although the principles of Shariate were generally adhered 
to.  Banerjee points out that ‘there was no constitutional machinery, such as a 
legislative body or an independent judiciary to control the emperor actions’.97 The 
medieval Indian state remained autocratic in character throughout, and represented in 
India the western ideal of L’ Etat c’est moi of the French monarchs. The domain of 
legislation, as was the case in medieval Europe, did not belong to the people. 
Different sets of people all looked upon the King as ‘the fountain of justice and were 
content to be thankful if he was strong enough to maintain an efficient 
administration’.98 
 
B) The Royal Court  
 
The Muslim kings attributed paramount importance to justice. The emperor was ‘the 
highest court of appeal and sometimes acted as a court of first instance as well’.99 
William Hawkins who visited India during Jahangir’s reign (1608-13) remarked that 
the Indian kings sat ‘daily in justice every day’.100 The Muslim emperors are known 
in history due to their ways of conducting the court. Humayun introduced a ‘drum of 
justice’ and Akbar administered justice personally in open court ‘every morning at the 
Jharokha-i-Darshan’.101 In Jahangir’s reign a chain of gold was hung from the balcony 
of his Jharokha-i-Darshan to a pole fixed outside the Agra fort to which suitors could 
tie their petitions.
102
 It is debatable whether this system was effective in redressing 
‘acts of gross injustices’ committed against the poor who were living away from the 
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capital and could not get access to the court in fear of local authorities, long distances 
and unsafe roads.
103
 
(C) Jurisprudence and Working of Courts 
 The contemporary Persian authorities, as well as foreign travelers, have distinctly 
referred to Courts of Justice and the ‘Qazis of those times’104, and to the system of 
appeals
105
 and punishment, and also to the exercise of the Royal prerogative by the 
medieval rulers. Next to the emperor was ‘the Chief Qazi (Qazi-Ul-Quzat)’ who held 
the office of chief sadr- Sadr-Us-Sudur as well.
106
 There was proper hierarchy of the 
courts and they were divided into civil and criminal in their jurisdiction. At the district 
level two different branches were headed by two independent Qazis. Banerjee notes 
that ‘in the rural areas justice was administered by the panchayats (village council) in 
conformity with customary law and caste usage’.107 The procedures of courts were 
administered under the authoritative works on the Muslim Law as the Hidayah, the 
Fiqh e Firoz Shahi or the Fatawa e Alamgiri.
108
 Hidayah was written by Burhan 
Uddin al-Farghani al-Marghinani in 1197 AD.  It was generally accepted as the 
leading authority in the Turkish courts and in practically the whole of Muslim India, 
until replaced by the Fatawa e Alamgiri about 1670 AD  
The judicial system, in terms of modern system, may be ‘crude and capricious’ but 
not ‘tedious’.109 Terry, a European missionary attached to the Staff of Sir Thomas 
Roe, confirms that trials were ‘quick’ and procedures ‘simple’.110 Bernier enumerates 
the ‘advantages of despotic’ governments in these words: ‘they have few lawyers, and 
fewer law suits, and those few are more speedily decided’.111 This Persian proverb 
reflects the spirit of the court system: Na-Haqqi Kutah bihtar az Haqqi Diraz-(speedy 
injustice is preferable to tardy justice) 
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 2.2.1.  System of Punishment 
During medieval India, the Muslim law of crimes had become the law of the land for 
the administration of criminal justice. Every violation of a public or a private right 
was punishable in four ways: Hadd'(unalterable punishment prescribed by Sharia), 
Qisas(retaliation means, in principle, life for life, limb for limb), Diyat(blood money) 
and Ta’zir(the punishments which are not mentioned in the Quran). Ta'zir places a 
special responsibility on the ruler and the judge. The kind and the severity of 
punishment were left entirely to the discretion of the judge. According to Ibn Hasan 
‘during the medieval period no effort was made to standardize punishment for 
offences under Ta’zir and no period was fixed for imprisonment’.112  
Despite claims of Muslim rulers about their adherence to Islamic principles of equity 
and justice they inflicted penalties based upon their personal whims. In fact, 
intermittent outbreaks of crime such as robbery and murder and the consequent 
restlessness amongst the subjects tended to increase the uneasiness of medieval rulers 
and induced them in ‘many cases to inflict penalties wholly opposed to the spirit, if 
not the letter, of the Shara’.113 In answer to the question of Muslim King Muhammad 
Tughliq, Zia Ud Dinn Berni, scholar of Islamic jurisprudence, replied that in the 
Quran three offences are liable to capital punishment –apostates, shedder of 
Mohammaden blood and double adulterers. The King said, ‘all this may be very true, 
but mankind has become much worse since those laws were made’.114 Retributive 
justice and harsh punishments were two salient features of system of punishment. 
2.2.2 Capital Offences 
The death sentence was usually passed in offences of murder, treason, theft from 
royal treasury, adultery by a married person and oppression of riots by officials, 
robbery and theft.
115
 In this context, Ibn Hasan collected twenty five cases of capital 
punishment tried and decided during the period of three Mughal emperors. Of these, 
thirteen belong to the reign of Akbar, twelve to Jahangir and one to Shah Jahan. The 
number of cases and their respective number of offences are given below: 
                                                 
112
 Ibn Hasan, Central Structure of the Mughal Empire and Its Practical Working Up to The Year 1657 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press,1936), p. 336. 
113
 Abdul Qadir Al-Badaoni(n 104), p. 239. 
114
 Muhammad Qasim Firišta, History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India, Till the Year AD 
1612, Vol.1, Translated by John Briggs (London:  A. & R Spotiswoode, 1829), p.436. 
115
 John Fryer, A New Account of East India and Persia: Being Nine Years' Travels, 1672-1681, Edited 
by William Crooke (London: Hakluyt Society, 1912), p.244. 
 34 
Eleven charged with murder, seven charged with open revolt, including desertion to 
enemy, one charged with theft committed in the royal treasury, one charged with 
highway robbery, one charged with plunder of an enemy’s camp by soldiers without 
order, on committed adultery by a married man, one (1) charged with shiqdar for 
oppressing the raiyyat, one charged with  obstructing in the royal hunt , one was 
charged with selling dog’s flesh for goat’s meat during the famine under Shan Jahan( 
fourth year of the reign).
116
 
This list shows that capital punishment was in vogue for crimes of petty nature. Last 
but not least, the Muslim rulers never made attempt to reduce the range of capital 
offences in consonance with the injunctions of Sharia. 
Treason 
During the medieval period treason (ghadr) was looked upon as an offence against 
God and religion. The accused of treasons was executed mercilessly without due 
process of law in gross violation of spiritual and temporal dictates. Dow writes that 
‘in the majority of these cases the punishment inflicted was death unless the ruler 
chose to exercise his prerogative of mercy’.117 No distinction was made between 
Muslims and Non-Muslims in awarding sentence or between highly placed persons 
and ordinary subjects. Gheias-ud- Deen Bulbin put to death ‘every member of the 
rebel’s family and order the execution of a hundred holy mendicants together with 
their chief Kullunder’.118 During the reign of Muhammad Bin Tughliq, Bahaud-d Din 
was convicted of treason and ‘the flesh of the accused was roasted with rice, some 
was sent to his children and his wife and the remainder was thrown to the elephants to 
be devoured’.119  
 2.2.3 Methods of Execution 
It seems that with regards to methods of executions no uniform standard was adhered 
to during the times of medieval India. Ibn Hassan says that ‘it depended mostly upon 
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the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the case’.120 The death penalty 
could be inflicted by way of hanging, beheading, and impaling. ‘Of the twenty-five 
cases of capital punishment, studied by Ibn Hasan during the reign of three Mughal 
Kings, five were trampled under the feet of elephants, one was strangled, and the rest 
were either beheaded or hanged’.121  
The common method of execution was to get the criminals trampled under the feet of 
elephants. The various Kings used to keep elephants for the execution of 
‘malefactors’.122 Jahangir(1605-26) took interest in seeing condemned prisoners torn 
to pieces by elephants. Terry depicts the horrible scene of torture of being trampled on 
by elephants as ‘the elephant will break his bones by degrees, as men are broken upon 
the wheel, as first his leg, then his thighs, after that bones in his both arms’.123  
The accounts of European travelers reflect that unspeakable methods of execution 
were in vogue during the reigns of some Muslims rulers. It was also in the reign of 
Jahangir a dacoit, with seven previous convictions, was torn limb after limb till he 
died. Terry asserts that, ‘among other forms of punishment, malefactors were stung to 
death by snakes’.124 Manucci reports that Shahjan used to punish ‘any official who 
had failed to administer justice’ by poisonous snakes.125 Shahjahan ordered corrupt 
Kotwal( Muhammad Sa'id)to be bitten by a cobra capello in his presence in  the open 
court, and then ordered that ‘the body should lie two days in front of his court-
house’.126 Execution could take place by throwing a man down from the roof. 
To serve as deterrence, the executions used to be conducted in public. During the 
reign of Muhmmad Bin Tughliq, the persons condemned  were executed outside the 
first gate of the court ‘where their bodies lay exposed for three days and their relatives 
were not allowed to give a decent burial’.127 
 
 Minimize Arbitrariness of Capital Punishment 
Mughal rulers took some measures to minimize the arbitrariness of the capital 
punishment. During the times of Mughal India provincial governors and other 
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executive officers were not allowed to inflict capital punishment in an arbitrary 
manner. A Farman of Akbar (order) adopted in 1582 ‘forbade the provincial 
governors to award the punishment of death without his permission’.128 Jahangir had 
reserved to himself the authority of awarding capital punishment. In Hindustan, 
especially in the province of Sylhet, it was customary for the people of those parts to 
turn some of their sons into eunuchs and to give them to the governor in place of 
revenue (mal-wajibi). Jahagir banned the ‘abominable custom of the making of 
eunuchs and declared it a capital offence’.129 Thevenot, who visited India in 1666 AD, 
observed that neither the civil nor criminal judge can put anyone to death. That power 
was reserved by the King to himself. The case of a criminal deserving death was 
‘referred to the King through a special messenger and the punishment was executed 
only on receipt of his confirmation’.130  
Prisons system  
The accounts recorded by European travellers, as well as the scattered cases in the 
chronicles, show that there were no regular jails in the modern sense.
131
  To 
incarcerate ordinary criminals and political offenders, two different kinds of 
confinements were employed. Monserrate, who visited India during the reign of 
Akber, writes in his account that ordinary criminals were kept under guard in irons, 
but not in prison. Princes sentenced to imprisonment were sent to the jail at Goaleris 
(Gwaliar) where they rotted away in chains and filth.
132
 Noble offenders are handed 
over to other nobles for punishment, but the base born either to the captain of the 
dispatch runners or to the chief executioner.
133
 Dr.Sangar enumerates three castles- 
one at Gwalior, second at Ranthambor and the third at Rohtas’ that worked as noble 
prisons.
134
 For ordinary prisoners there were bandikhanas at the headquarters of 
Subahs, Sarkars, and parganas.
135
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The condition of the prisoner was generally miserable.
136
 It was binding upon the 
Qazis, under the Muslim law, to visit the prisons and inquire into their conditions and 
to release those who showed signs of repentance but usually they neglected their 
duty.
137
 In this regard, Aurangzeb took special interest and issued instructions to the 
Kotwals to take the prisoners to the Qazi on the expiry of their term of 
imprisonment.
138
 
 
2.3 Capital Punishment in British India (1760-1947) 
There were two phases of the criminal justice system during the British colonial 
period in South Asia. In the early phase, two different court systems functioned 
namely English and Mofussal under the administration of the East India Company. 
Under the charter granted by the British crown in 1726
139
, English courts had been 
working in the presidency towns of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa where the company’s 
factories had been established. In 1765, the puppet Moghul emperor recognized 
British jurisdiction over Bengal, which had been under de facto British control since 
1757.
140
 Consequently, in 1772, Warren Hastings, the Company's Governor in 
Bengal, established a system of civil courts (Dewani Adalat) and criminal courts 
(Faujdari Adalat) governing all inhabitants outside of the Presidency Towns (an area 
called the Mufassal), ‘wherein Kazee and mooftee were allowed to perform their 
duties as expounders of the law’.141 The second phase of the administration of justice 
commenced with the promulgation of the Indian Penal Code in 1860 after a complete 
administrative control of the British over India in 1858 AD. 
 
The First Phase of the British Administration of Justice (1765-1860) 
A notable feature of the Indian judicial system before 1862 was the existence of two 
parallel systems of courts-the supreme courts in the presidency towns
142
 and the 
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adalat in the territory known as the Mofussal outside the Presidency Towns (Bengal, 
Bihar and Orissa). 
The two systems differed in many respects. In the Presidency Towns, the judicial 
system was developed primarily to cater to the needs of the Englishmen residing there 
and, therefore, it was a replica of the English judicial system.
143
 In the Mofussal a 
significant proportion of the population was indigenous, and General Hasting, East 
India Company Governor in the province of Bengal, realized that it would not work if 
a foreign system was imposed on them.
144
 Accordingly, the adalat system was 
developed there which adjudicated the cases under ‘the indigenous Hindu and Muslim 
laws dealing equal justice on fixed principles to all alike’.145 In accordance with the 
Hasting Judicial Plan 1772, ‘in all suits regarding inheritance, marriage, caste, and  
other religious usages and institutions, the laws of the Koran with respect to 
Mahommendans and those of shaster[ Shastra] with respect to Gentoos’ were 
ordained to be applied with the aid of such Moulvis and Pandat’.146 The Adalat 
system maintained this characteristic throughout the course of its existence. In 1862, 
the disparate judicial systems existing in the Presidency Towns and the Mofussil were 
unified and the High Courts were created.
147
 
 2.3.1 ‘Mofussal’ Courts and the Evolution of Anglo-Muslim Criminal Law 
In 1772, the East India Company assumed the responsibility of administering criminal 
justice in presidency towns the Muslim law of crimes was ‘enforced throughout the 
country’.148 The British policy was initially based upon non-interference in criminal 
justice matters, for fear of stirring up resistance.
149
 However, as British power was 
consolidated, the sharia was progressively undermined.
150
 In the light of the policy of 
gradual change, Governor Hastings assumed only indirect control over criminal law 
proceedings in 1772, leaving native judges nominally in charge of the criminal courts. 
After Hastings, the process of repealing and amending the Muslim law and 
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supplementing the same with principles of English law through government enacted 
regulations
151
 started in right earnest from the time of Lord Cornwallis (Governor-
General,1786-93) in 1790 and continued unabated until 1860 when the Indian Penal 
Code finally ‘superseded whatever did remain of the traditional Muslim criminal law 
by that time’.152  
 The systematic attempt to modify the existing Islamic criminal law started with the 
amendment of the law of murder. Under Islamic criminal law, as compared to British 
law at that time, there were relatively few capital offences.
153
 It is pertinent to 
mention that under the prevalent system ‘the penal law of Islam was applied to all 
Indians, Hindus and Muslims alike’.154 The British changed existing Islamic criminal 
law, especially the law of murder based upon Qisas and Diyat, because many of its 
principles were ‘repugnant to the notion of natural justice’ and common sense.155  
Under the prevalent Qisas and Diyat law the legal heir of a slain person had the right 
to exercise the option of Qisas ص  اصق  (retaliation) or Diyyat ةيد (blood money). The 
right of legal heirs to pardon by taking Diyat was meshed with many social and legal 
complications. On 3
rd
 December, 1790 Lord Cornwallis observed: 
The evil consequences, and the crimes which hereby escape punishment, are so 
manifest and frequent, that to take away the discretion of relations seems absolutely 
requisite to secure an equal administration of justice and will constitute a strong 
additional check on the commission of murder, and other crimes, which are now no 
doubts often perpetrated, under the idea of an easy escape through the notorious 
defect of the existing law, which at first perhaps was confined to appeals, private 
prosecutions, by the next of kin and no application to public prosecutions in the name 
of the sovereign.
156
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The law of murder did not address all situations. For instance the law was silent in 
cases where the deceased had more than one legal heir, and one legal heir forgives the 
killers while the other(s) demand(s) Qisas; or if one of the legal heirs of the murdered 
person is a minor, or if all legal heirs are minors.
157
 Moreover as per the law, the 
probability of the execution of a Brahmin was remote because ‘in most of the cases it 
cannot be expected that any Gentoo will ever desire, or be consenting to the death of a 
Brahmin’.158 To secure equal administration of justice the right of the victim's next of 
kin to pardon a murderer, long established in Islamic law
159
 was amended in 1790.
160
 
The amendment enacted the principle that ‘the relatives be debarred from pardoning 
the offender in future instances and that the law be left to take its course’.161 
The prevalent Islamic criminal law maintained a difference between willful murder 
(Qatal-e- Amad) and culpable homicide based on the mode of commission of murder 
in accordance with the interpretation of Imam Abu Hanifa (a Muslim jurist of the 
eighth century). Minutes of Marquis Cornwallis recorded on 1st December 1790, 
reveal that ‘murder is not liable to capital punishment if he commits the act by 
strangling, drowning, poisoning, or with a weapon, such as a stick or club on which 
there is no iron; or by such an instrument as is not usually adapted to the drawing of 
blood’.162  Lord Cornwallis vehemently proposed a change in definition of 
premeditated homicide.
163
 This proposed amendment was materialized initially under 
the regulation passed in 1790
164
 that directed the courts to ensue the opinion of two 
disciples of Abu Hanifa namely Muhammad al Shaybani and Abu Yousaf with 
regards to the criterion for determining whether or not a killing had been willful. The 
regulation enunciated that an ‘instrument of perpetration must not constitute the rule 
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for determining the punishment of crime of murder’.165 This provision was enforced 
in the province of Benares in 1795.
166
 The amended law introduced more appealing 
and rationalized interpretation of the act of premeditated murder. 
Another complexity in the law of murder or homicide was that it was not prosecuted 
as an offence against God or the state but against the individual (hakk Admi).
167
 The 
legal heirs of the murdered person could stop the trial at any stage by reaching 
compromise with the alleged murderer. It means that prosecution was a private affair. 
To rectify this glaring gap, the Governor General in Council passed a regulation 
according to which ‘in the case of murder the refusal by the relations of the deceased 
to prosecute the offenders be no longer considered as a bar to the trial and 
condemnation of the offenders’.168 
 In addition to amendments introduced in the law of murder, the British brought 
various procedural and substantive changes to the existing criminal justice. The 
Muslim law did not permit a Hindu to testify against a Muslim accused. The British 
regarded this rule as ‘an odious distinction’.169 In 1792 the law of evidence was 
modified.
170
 Following the amendment the law provided that ‘the religious tenets of 
witnesses be no longer considered as a bar to the conviction or condemnation of a 
prisoner’.171 One of the prerequisites of a witness under the prevalent law of evidence 
was that he or she should enjoy a good reputation but this ‘qualification of witness 
was also exempted’.172 
The British showed concerned about the inhumane nature of the punishment of 
mutilation. Under the proceedings of Governor General in Council dated 10
th 
October 
1791, the punishment of mutilation was commuted by rigorous imprisonment and 
                                                 
165
 Regulation1793/9 sec 75, in in James Edward Colebrook, A Digest of the Regulations and Laws 
Enacted by the Governor General in Council for the Civil Government of the Territories under the 
Presidency of Bengal Arranged in Alphabetical Order vol. I (Calcutta: n. p. ,1807), p.533. 
166
 Regulation1795/16 Sec 22, in John Herbert Harington (n 162), p. 312. 
167
 George Claus Rankin, Background to Indian law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), 
p.164. 
168
 Regulation of 13
th
 April 1792, sect 1, Extract from the Proceedings of Governor General in Council, 
in James Edward Colebrook, Op. Cit., p.161. 
169
 Jörg Fisch, Cheap Lives and Dear Limbs: The British Transformation of the Bengal Criminal Law, 
1769-1817(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983), p. 47. 
170
 Norman Anderson (n 140) pp.22-23; Also see George Claus Rankin, Background to Indian Law 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 171. 
171
 Regulation of 1792 sec 1, in James Edward Colebrook (n 165), p.161. 
172
 Regulation 1793/9 sec 56, in James Edward Colebrook (n.165), Digest, vol. I, p. 529 
 42 
each limb counted for seven years.
173
 This spirit of humanism could not work on other 
inhuman punishments including the death penalty. Jörg Fisch has rightly wondered 
‘why the loss of a limb is more cruel or inhuman than the loss of liberty or even the 
loss of life’.174 In 1832, another amendment was introduced to promote equity in the 
criminal justice system. This year saw the end of the Muslim criminal law as a 
general and compulsory system of law applicable to all, Muslim and Non- Muslim 
alike.
175
  As late as 1852 the position was described by Sir George Campbell in the 
following words: ‘The foundation of our criminal law is still the Mohammedan code 
but so altered and added to by our regulations that it is hardly to be recognized’.176 
All the various reforms introduced in Bengal, in the Muslims criminal law, were  
mutatis mutandis introduced in Banaras and other territories as well through various 
regulations.
177
 On a few matters, however, some special legislation was adopted in 
Banaras.
178
 The most typical example of this was the privilege extended to ‘the 
Brahmins of Banaras of not being punished with death’ rather transportation for life 
substituted for the capital sentence for them.
179
 But this exemption was ‘rescinded, as 
being contrary to the principles of equality and justice in 1817’.180 The promulgation 
of the Indian Penal Code in 1860 merged different systems into one uniform judicial 
system that could help bring some unity out of the traditional racial, social and 
political discord of colonial India. Furthermore the authors of the code ‘conferred 
upon the state the sole power of punishment and pardon’.181 
 
2.3.2 Codification of Indian Law 
 
The Need for Codification 
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In 1833 the attention of the British parliament was directed to three short comings in 
the frame of the Indian Criminal Justice System. Firstly, ‘the defects were in the laws 
themselves’, secondly, ‘in the authority of making them’ and thirdly ‘in the manner of 
executing them’.182Criminal law was a mixture of numerous sources of jurisprudence 
namely Muslim Law, Hindu law, the regulations of the East India Company, as well 
as a version of the common law. To address the residuary subjects, Sir Elijah Impey, 
as the sole Judge of the Sadar Diwani Adalat, had it prescribed through a regulation 
that ‘in all cases, for which no specific directions are hereby given, the Judges of 
Sadar Diwani Adalat should act according to justice, equity and good 
conscience’.183In the absence of a specific body of law, the maxim of ‘equity, justice, 
and fair play’ varied from judge to judge.184 The inevitable result of such a flexible 
state of law was bound to be confusion and uncertainty in the country legal system.
185
 
Macauly’s Speech in Parliament on 10thJuly1833  depicted ‘the existing legal system 
in India as no system at all, but rather as a jumble of laws derived from multiple 
sources of authority: Hindu, Muslim, Parsee and English’.186 In the House of 
Commons debate, Mr. Rickards most accurately described this state of things, when 
he said ‘we have already seen that, in these tribunals, justice was but the mockery of 
the term’.187 
 
The Indian Penal Code 1860 
Against this backdrop, Act 1833, section 59 envisaged a general system of judiciary, 
police and a code of laws that may be applicable in commons to all classes of the 
inhabitants of India. In 1860, the Indian Penal Code, based on the draft proposed by 
Macaulay’s commission and revised by Mr. Bethune, the legal member of council, 
and Sir Barnes Peacock, was passed.
188
 In the words of Stokes ‘their basis is the law 
of England, strips of its local peculiarities, and modified with regard to the conditions, 
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institutions and climate of India’.189 Much of the substance was borrowed from 
English Law. It is simplified, intelligible and precise. In the view of Rankin the code 
is ‘far from the complexity of English law’. 
Assessing the merits of the Code Sir Fitzjames Stephen, a valiant Benthamite till 
death, devoting himself largely to drafting or revising codes for India on various 
subjects  described the Code ‘as the criminal law of England freed from all 
technicalities and superfluities, systematically arranged and modified in some few 
particulars to suit the circumstances of British India’.190 The nomenclature and 
classification of offences, which was the whole touchstone of a system of penal law, 
was on the natural and not the technical system. Eric Stokes reckons the most striking 
feature of Macaulay’s Code to be the employment of illustrative examples ‘to exhibit 
the law in full action and show what its effects will be on the events of common 
life’.191 
In spite of its great success, it is not immune to criticism. The constituent elements of 
mens rea motive, intention, and consciousness are certainly held in view, but ‘the 
clear distinction which Bentham wished to make between motive and intention, in 
order to avoid the ambiguous term voluntary’ is not preserved.192 It has been 
criticized as the weakest part of the code. Stephen also criticizes the definition of 
culpable homicide and murder as ‘obscure, culpable homicide is first defined, but 
homicide is not defined at all, except by way of explanation to culpable homicide’.193 
Under the Code, culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, while deprived of 
the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the 
person who provoked him.
194
 The provision has been invoked to award a lighter 
sentence to men who committed ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ in 
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defense of their family’s honor,195 as defense of the family honor is generally 
regarded as an excuse for homicide.
196
 
Indian Penal Code allowed judge to consider the circumstances of a crime and select a 
death sentence or sentence of life imprisonment though death was the rule and life 
imprisonment the exception. The code of Criminal Procedure 1898 required a judge to 
provide ‘special reasons’ for not making the choice of death penalty. Code of 
Criminal Procedure Act no.5 of 1898, sec.367(5). Section 303 of Indian Penal Code 
1860 prescribed mandatory death sentence for life-term prisoners who committed 
murder while incarcerated.
197
 
The Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code authorized mandatory death penalty for the 
murder committed by life-term prisoner.   
 Another criticism of the code is that ‘it is draconian in its severity as regards to 
punishments’.198 
 
2.3.3 Punishments and Capital Offences 
The code enumerates six kinds of punishments death, transportation for life, penal 
servitude, imprisonment with or without hard labor, forfeiture of property and a fine 
to which offenders are liable under the code as passed.
199
 Whipping was inflicted not 
under the Code, but under the provisions of an act passed in 1864.
200
 Both whipping 
and transport for life are inhumane punishments. Henry Maine perceived ‘flogging 
was incapable of remission and once administered, it could not be taken back’.201  
Two grounds are traced for introducing these severe punishments. Firstly, the British 
system of punishment had ‘eliminated some of the more sanguinary punishments 
prescribed by indigenous law, such as mutilation, and had reduced the number of 
cases in which capital punishment was applicable’.202 Secondly, the ideas of the 1838 
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Committee on Prison Discipline were also crafted to fit the imperatives of the 
growing colonial system. Thus the report speaks of ‘severe imprisonment’ without 
much of the voice of humanitarianism.
203
 Overemphasis is on discipline and there is 
less stress upon reformation or rehabilitation.
204
 It reflected a notable contrast to the 
intense and heated disputations dividing English prison reforms from Bentham 
onwards over the 'twin aims of deterrence and reformation'. Such differences 
originating in ‘discipline and punishment under the British Raj were inextricably 
linked to the regime's strategies of power and rule’.205 
Another kind of painful punishment was shipment of Indian Convicts to Sumatra, 
Singapore, Mauritius and the Andaman to get rebels and others out of the country. In 
India, as in England, it was aimed at attaining the penal objectives of removing 
criminals from their local societies, of ‘deterring others from committing crimes- 
deterrence’.206 Owing to the peculiar Indian cultural currency of this punishment, it 
was to be appraised differently in India than in England. In light of the 
recommendation of the Prison Committee, British officials considered transportation 
to be ‘a weapon of tremendous power’.207 In other words, transportation was said to 
‘pack an extra punitive punch because of its negative cultural and religious 
implications’.208 Clearly transportation was seen as being more painful and more of a 
deterrent for Indians than it was for English criminals who were shipped to Australia 
during the same period’.209 
 
Capital Offences 
In the Indian Penal Code the capital offences were: (1) waging war or attempting or 
abetting war against the Queen,
210
(2) murder,
211
(3) robbery with murder,
212
(4) a party 
to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death.
213
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Thomas Babington Macaulay, as a follower of Benthamism, was against the excessive 
use of capital punishment, as it is reflected in his minutes recorded on 
December14,1835 ‘Death is rarely inflicted in this country at present, and it certainly 
must be the wish of the government and the Law Commission that it should be 
inflicted more rarely still’. Edward Livingston prepared the penal code in the 
Benthamite tradition, for the state of Louisiana in1826 and he argued ‘fear of death is 
not a more powerful preventive of crime than other punishments’. 214  It is noteworthy 
that unlike Livingston he (Macauly) retained capital punishment and he confined it to 
only two offences- murder and treason. It was a great departure from the 
contemporary common law that ‘was for practical, not humanitarian reasons’.215 
 3.3.4 Methods of Execution 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the British administration in India resorted 
‘to make executions less public and put them under wraps’.216 It was partly under the 
influence of Common law at that time. Before the Act of Parliament 1868, executions 
in England were conducted in public ‘to be an essential part of the deterrent value of 
the death penalty’.217 At the same time, public rituals of punishment, such as the 
pillory and the procession to the gallows, carried multiple risks.
218
 Public punishment 
in a colonial society was even more politically risky than it was in England.
219
 In 
times of extreme political tension, such as the Mutiny of 1857-8, ‘the British India in 
fact resorted to public vengeance; images of rebels being hanged from trees and 
prisoners being blown from the mouths of cannon quickly became part of the political 
folklore of India’.220 Once the emergency had passed, however, the state could not 
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endure such public punishment. As in England, punishment in India after the Mutiny 
retreated behind prison walls or to the overseas penal colonies.
221
 
Against this backdrop, executions were conducted in prisons under the method 
specified in the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 ‘he be hanged by the neck till he is 
dead’.222 Whenever death was inflicted, it was meant to be a ‘simple privation of life 
by hanging’223 and the body was usually delivered to the surviving relatives of the 
deceased. Furthermore, a complete standard procedure was described for execution.
224
 
 3.3.5 Prisons System 
 Thomas Babington Macaulay, the head of the Indian Law Commission, reinforced in 
his minutes recorded on December14, 1834 that 'the best Criminal Code can be of 
very little use to the community unless there be a good machinery for the infliction of 
punishment’.225 Thus, imprisonment, ‘the chief form of punishment’ had to be made a 
'terror to wrong-doers'.
226
 In this context, when George Campbell took over as the 
lieutenant-governor of Bengal in 1871 and he implemented the policy of ‘making the 
prisoner feel the pain and torment of incarceration’.227 
In light of the policy, within the macro-structural punitive institution of the jail ‘newer 
forms of micro-structural penalties were invented by the jail authorities to extend the 
pain of his/her original sentence’.228 The motif of disciplining the prisoners was based 
on adopting two kinds of methods- firstly the prohibitive measures including the 
denial of basic rights, and secondly corporal punishments including physical torture. 
Fetters, the system of chain gang, whipping, solitary confinement, and denial of food, 
were some of the forms of punishment that were to be followed in Alipore, 
Presidency and other jails of Calcutta all through the nineteenth century.
229
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 In addition to prisons labor and physical restraints, solitary confinement in cellular 
prisons or within a prison was another technique to exacerbate the pain of prisoners. 
To punish the ‘guilty of breaches of jail discipline’ a range of solitary cells were in 
operation; in which offenders might be confined in darkness and silence.
230
 ‘Solitary 
confinement’ was the extreme form of such segregation.231 This was a penalty that 
was not invented for Indian prisoners alone, but was being experimented with even in 
European Jails, where the cell system was introduced to move certain types of 
criminals to total isolation. The European prison with which comparisons arise most 
easily is London’s Pentonville. Ignatieff has stressed the dehumanizing nature of the 
Pentonville system by referring to the prison as ‘the new discipline of solitude and 
silence’ and its daily routine as a ‘machine’.232 
On the model of Pentonville, the cellular jail in Port Blair, the capital of the Andaman 
and Nicobar (known as Blackwater-Kala Pani) was designed to function as a machine 
in the process of punishment and reform. To serve the purpose, huge buildings of 
prisons with cellular cells, were built during the British regime across the 
subcontinent. The new punishment and the new prison, whether it was Pentonville 
Port Blair or Indaman, aimed to correct the criminal through combinations of 
segregation, surveillance, labor and medicine.
233
The kind of treatment of offenders 
especially punishments were ‘cruel and incompatible with human dignity’.234 
 
Conclusion 
South Asia has a long history of using death as a criminal punishment, and the 
execution of offenders was a normal punishment from Ancient India to the colonial 
regime. The retributive justice, deterrence and calculus of terror were associated with 
the system of crime and punishment during various periods of history in the Indian 
subcontinent. 
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The jurisprudence of ancient India was based upon Hindu religious scripture that 
characterizes the society into four different castes, the Brahmins, or the priests, the 
Kshattryas or the warriors, the Vaishas or the businessmen and the Sudras or the 
slaves. Discriminatory justice founded on the theory of relative superiority and 
inferiority of different caste groups had been introduced in penal law prescribing 
varying degrees of punishment, in the cases of several offences, depending on 
whether the offender belonged to a higher or a lower caste. The travel accounts of 
foreign travellers and the religious text (Dharmasastra or Laws of Manu) portray that 
Brahmin as a class was exempted from capital punishment. To us this exemption of 
the Brahmins from capital punishment seems to be an unfair and unreasonable 
advantage. 
 
Amidst the caste ridden society, Siddharta Gautam, the founder of Buddhism, was 
born in 563BC in the royal family of Kapilavasto currently situated in Nepal. Buddha 
raised his voice against the tyrannies of the prevailing caste system and preached 
nirvana.  218 years after Buddha’s death, the people of South Asia had good reasons 
to bless the name of Buddha as Ashoka, a fratricide and the wanton slayer of 
thousands of his subjects, embraced Buddhism. He restricted the use of capital 
punishment as part of his emphasis on non-violence (ahimsa) making his kingdom 
one of the first jurisdictions in the world to significantly curtail the use of death as a 
criminal sanction. Subsequently, no philosopher or political regime supported the 
abolition of the death penalty in the region.  On the whole, as in other ancient 
civilizations around the world, capital offences in ancient India were numerous and 
petty in nature and their punishment was based upon the Jus talionis which is so 
universally represented in archaic legislations. 
 
The period of medieval India (1206-1806 A D) was a continuity of the ancient India’s 
system of monarchy with a new element of the Islamic system of crimes and 
punishment. In the absence of legislature and constitutional machinery, the domain of 
legislation, as was the case in medieval Europe, did not belong to the people. 
Consequently, the medieval Indian state remained autocratic in character throughout 
and represented in India the western ideal of  L’ tetat c'est moi of the French 
monarchs.  In this scenario, the different sets of people in India were thankful to the 
King, as a fountain of justice, if he took effective measures to dispense justice. In this 
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context, some Mughal rulers took measures to minimize the arbitrariness of the 
capital punishment by prohibiting the provincial governors from inflicting capital 
punishment without the approval of the king. However, the methods of executions 
were still inhuman and barbaric. 
Against this backdrop, the British implemented the Indian Penal Code, ‘in the liberal 
spirit of reducing archaic forms of discretionary authority and differences in status in 
order to make the rule of law more effective in a culturally diverse society’.235 It 
introduced a comprehensive criminal justice system- a hierarchical network of courts 
spread throughout the country, a system of appeals, codified and uniform laws, and a 
sole power of state to prosecute and pardon. It is appreciable that the code did away 
with inhuman indigenous punishments like the public display of a criminal on the 
back of an ass, mutilation and leaving the condemned to be trampled by elephants. It 
introduced the ‘most humane method of execution’ that ensured ‘all executions might 
be carried out in a becoming manner without risk of failure or miscarriage in any 
respect’.236  
 
Under the influence of English utilitarian’s Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, 
architects of the Indian Penal Code, confined capital punishment to only two 
offences- murder and treason, however, the imperative of British sovereignty and the 
gulf between colonizers and colonized inevitably eclipsed the utilitarian project of 
modern universal reforming legislation. The colonial regime used imprisonment with 
hard labor, punishment of flogging and transportation for life as a calculus of terror. It 
is a bitter fact that imprisonment, ‘the chief form of punishment’237 was employed as 
a 'terror’ to malefactors by employing the techniques of segregation in cells and hard 
labor. At the same time, the punishments of whipping and transporting offenders 
overseas for life was enforced to tame and discipline the natives of colonial India. 
Ironically, this emphasis meshed with the rhetoric that sought a moral high ground by 
espousing the replacement of harsh Islamic punishments with the civilized and 
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civilizing regime of colonial discipline and punishment. There is no sound argument 
why the loss of a limb was more cruel or inhuman than the loss of liberty or even the 
loss of life itself. Again the brutal and brutalizing punishment of whipping finds no 
justification in a civilized and humane criminal justice system. 
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Chapter 3 
The Impact of the International Legal Framework on 
Capital Punishment in South Asian Countries  
Introduction 
The chapter consists of two parts. The first part analyzes the substantive and 
procedural arguments in favor of the abolition of capital punishment under 
international law. The second part deals with how international law influences 
domestic jurisprudence to abolish or restrict the capital punishment in South Asian 
countries including India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
3.1 Capital punishment and International Human Rights Law 
The ‘International Law is strongly anti-death penalty’.1 As an issue of international 
law and human rights, the death penalty is associated with two fundamental human 
rights norms, the right to life and protection against cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishments.
2
 On the basis of the two rights, the comity of nations has signed many 
treaties and instruments that outlaw the capital punishment. By the turn of the twenty 
first century the abolition of capital punishment emerged as an international norm.  
 3.1.1 Capital Punishment as Violation to the Right to Life? 
The first legal argument in international human rights law for the abolition of capital 
punishment is found in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) that says ‘everyone has right to life’.3 
The declaration is not binding in nature but it paved the way for the legal binding 
treaty, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In this context, Article 
6(1) of the Covenant ensures that ‘every human being has the inherent right to life. 
This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’.4  
                                                 
1Russell G. Murphy and Eric J. Carlson, ‘Like Snow [Falling] on a Branch...: International Law 
Influences. on Death Penalty Decisions and Debates in the United States’ 2009(38) Denver Journal of 
International Law & Policy, pp-115-160, p.125. 
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Under the ICCPR the right to life is one of the rights that cannot be derogated by a 
state party even in case of emergency.
5
 Owing to the paramount importance of the 
right to life, it has been incorporated in a variety of regional human rights 
instruments
6
. 
An examination of the provisions on the right to life in international declarations, 
treaties and regional human rights instruments shows that, only in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the right to life ‘stands alone, unblemished by any 
limitation’.7According to Professor William Schabas, the subject of the death penalty 
arose at the document drafting sessions and it was not made explicit due to 
contemporary state practice.
8
  The summary record of the drafting committee reflects 
that Eleanor Roosevelt’s views against explicit reference to the death penalty in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
9
 were endorsed by Koretsky of the Soviet 
Union, Cassin of France, Santa Cruz of Chile and Wilson of the United 
Kingdom.
10
The International Covenant, the European Convention
11
 and the American 
Convention require the right to be protected by law
12
 while the African Charter calls 
for ‘the right to life of every human being to be respected’.13 The International 
Covenant, the American Convention and the African Charter forbid any ‘arbitrary 
deprivation’ of the right to life while the European Convention forbids any 
‘intentional deprivation’ of the right to life. The European Convention refers to 
certain instances in which deprivations may be permitted under the convention.
14
  
It is important to know how the right to life intersects the institution of capital 
punishment. The moot point is whether the state is authorized to take the life of the 
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person who breaches the right of life of his fellow human being. According to 
Professor Hugo Adam, one of the leading American abolitionists, ‘no theory of rights 
could be correct or complete without acknowledging a role for the concept of the 
forfeiture of right to life’.15 There are two main interpretation of forfeiture of right to 
life. In line with the traditional interpretation of ‘right to life’ ‘the murderer has 
forfeited his right to life by committing murder- by becoming a murderer. From Lock 
in 1690
16
 to W.D. Ross
17
 in 1930 philosophers who have stated or defended a natural 
right to life have also insisted that this right can be forfeited under certain conditions. 
Liberal thinker John Stuart Mill argued that by ‘taking the life of a man who has taken 
another’s life we show most emphatically our regard for it by the adoption of a rule 
that he who violates that right in other forfeits for it for himself’.18 The death penalty 
cannot be a violation of the right to life, so the argument goes, because that right has 
already forfeited by the criminal’s act of murder’. 19 
On the other hand, with the rise of the subject of human rights after World War II, the 
abolitionists argue that the right to life is an absolute right and the ‘execution by the 
state machinery is tantamount to premeditated and cold blooded killing by the state’.20 
Capital punishment is a violation to the right to life. This interpretation is endorsed by 
the UN Human Rights Committee, UN General Assembly Resolutions and the 
decision of various domestic courts in the world. 
 The Human Rights Committee is the body of 18 independent experts that monitors 
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by its state 
parties. In a general comment on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated: 
Article 6 refers generally to abolition (of the death penalty) in terms which 
strongly suggest that abolition is desirable. The Committee concludes that all 
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measures of abolition should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of 
the right to life...
21
  
Given its special position, it is distinctively protected in human rights jurisprudence
22
 
even in state of emergency. It is a right which should not be interpreted narrowly’.23 
The Human Rights Committee described the right to life found in Article 6 of ICCPR 
as ‘the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even  in time of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation…’24  
In addition to Human Rights Committee Comments, the death penalty has also been 
debated within the General Assembly of the United Nations.  It took up the issue of 
capital punishment for the first time in 1968, with a resolution observing that ‘the 
major trend among experts and practitioners in the field is towards the abolition of 
capital punishment’.25In resolution of 20th December 1971, the UN General 
Assembly in order to fully to guarantee the right to life under Article 3 of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights affirmed the ‘desirability of abolishing the 
death penalty in all countries’.26Subsequently, the General Assembly in its resolution 
of 8th December 1977 ‘confirmed the continuing interest of the  UN in the study of 
the question of capital punishment with a view to promoting  full respect for every 
one’s right to life’.27  
Since 2007 the General Assembly has passed five resolutions recalling the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and Convention on the Rights of the Child to call for international moratorium on the 
executions. In a series of five resolutions adopted in 2007
28
, 2008,
29
 2010
30
, 2012
31
, 
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and 2014
32
 respectively, the General Assembly urged States to respect international 
standards that protect the rights of those facing the death penalty, to progressively 
restrict its use and reduce the number of offences which are punishable by death. The 
UN General Assembly resolution of December 2014 on moratorium on the use of 
death penalty that has been supported by the record number of 117 countries in favor 
and 38 in opposition.  India Pakistan and Bangladesh have voted against the above 
mentioned UN General Resolutions. 
Reports of UN Rapporteurs have also reinforced the argument that capital punishment 
is a violation to the right to life. The special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions from 1992 to 1999, Bacre Waly Ndiaye took the view that 
international human rights law seeks the abolition of the death penalty. He has stated 
that ‘the abolition of capital punishment is most desirable in order to fully respect the 
right to life.’33According to Ndiaye: ‘Where there is a fundamental right to life,  there 
is no right to capital punishment’.34 
The judgment of various domestic courts are based upon the argument that capital 
punishment is a violation to the right to life: On 24 October 1990 the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court declared that the death penalty violates the ‘inherent right to life 
and human dignity as provided under Article 54 of the country's constitution’.35On 
June 6, 1995, the new Constitutional Court of South Africa, in a landmark judgment 
declared that ‘the death penalty is a violation to right to life’.36 The new 
Constitutional Court makes   several references to decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee,
37
and to judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
38
.  It is 
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noteworthy that ten out of the elven judges considered the death penalty as cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment and eight judges as a violation of the right to life.
39
 
It is argued that ‘the death penalty is morally wrong because it violates to right to 
life’. As international and European human rights law has moved towards the 
prohibition of the death penalty on the grounds that it is a violation of the right to life, 
3.1.2 The Prohibition of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Punishment  
The second argument for the abolition of capital punishment is based upon the 
prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 5 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Both of these International Human Rights 
instruments prohibit torture in the same words: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.40  In addition to this, 
there are numerous regional treaties that ‘prohibit degrading and inhuman 
punishment’.41 Owing to cruelty and torture associated with the death penalty ‘some 
European scholars suggest that time has come to recognize that Article 7 of ICCPR, 
which states categorically that ‘no one shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment’ should be interpreted to ban capital punishment’.42 Some have 
argued that ‘death sentence and humanity cannot be compatible’.43  A Report by Juan 
E Mendez, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, calls on States to seriously 
reconsider whether death penalty amounts to cruel, inhuman treatment.
44
  
The death penalty can be considered inhuman and degrading on two grounds.  Firstly 
the condemned prisoner undergoes a painful process lasting many years waiting for 
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his or her execution. This is generally known as the death row phenomenon. 
Secondly, the methods of executions can amount to inhuman treatments.  
(A)The Death Row Phenomenon  
Generally death row phenomenon refers to prolonged delay under the harsh 
conditions of death. European Court of Human Rights in the judgment of Soering v. 
United Kingdom separated these circumstances into two further categories: The harsh, 
dehumanizing conditions of imprisonment itself; the sheer length of time spent living 
under such conditions.
45
 The psychological repercussions on the condemned prisoner 
due to hard physical conditions and long period of detention on death row is called 
‘death row syndrome’.46  George Scott has rightly said that ‘the fear of death, during 
those tragic days, is productive of much greater suffering than the actual experience 
of death’.47  Albert Camus has portrayed the agony and suffering of death row 
prisoners in these words: ‘Man is undone by waiting for capital punishment well 
before he dies. Two deaths are inflicted on him, the first being worse than the 
second’. 48 
The death row phenomenon has been explicitly recognized as a violation of human 
rights by international and domestic tribunals ‘due to element of delay, harsh 
conditions of death row or the cumulative effect of both the element delay and harsh 
physical conditions at the death row.
49
 Moreover ‘the exact nature of the doctrine 
varies among the courts but the underlying concept remains the same’.50 In this 
context, the UN Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights and 
domestic courts of various countries maintain that death row phenomenon is a 
violation of human rights. 
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The Human Rights Committee 
The Human Rights Committee dealt with a large numbers of ‘capital punishment 
cases submitted by inmates detained on the death row in states parties to ICCPR, 
mostly in Caribbean region, who claimed that their rights under the Covenant had 
been violated’.51 Many of them had complained that ‘the length of their detention on 
death row constituted inhumane, cruel and degrading treatment, contrary to Article 7 
of the ICCPR’.52 
The Human Rights Committee takes an intermediate position on the death row 
phenomenon.  The committee in Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica does not accept delay 
in judicial proceedings alone as a violation to article 7 of ICCPR:  ‘In principle 
prolonged judicial proceedings do not per se constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment even if they can be a source of mental strain for the convicted prisoners. 
However, the situation could be otherwise in cases involving capital punishment and 
an assessment of the circumstances of each case would be necessary’.53 In other case 
Kelly v. Jamaica 
54
, the Committee held that the harsh conditions experienced on the 
death row in Jamaica, particularly those relating to medical care, did violate Article 
10 (all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person). The Committee continued its 
traditional stance that the prolonged periods of detention on death row do not per se 
constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in various cases including Barrett 
and Sutcliff v. Jamaica,
55
 Kindler versus Canada
56
  and Francis v.  Jamaica
57
. For the 
first time, in the  case of Francis v. Jamaica, the Committee recognized the death row 
phenomenon a violation of Article 7 and 10 of ICCPR due to  delay with the 
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combination of other factors including the role of the state in the delay,  the condition 
of imprisonment and  the mental condition of prisoner.
58
 
European Court of Human Rights 
On the other hand, the approach of the European Court of Human Rights is different 
from that of Human Rights Committee. The European Court of Human Rights takes a 
prolonged period of delay as cruel and inhumane.
59
 In the judgment of  Soering v. 
United Kingdom
60
  the court prohibited the extradition of Soering to the State of 
Virginia, where he had been charged with a capital offence, on the grounds of  the 
long delay in Virginia between the death sentence and execution and ‘the anguish and 
mounting tension of living in the ever present shadow of death’. 61 It is pertinent to 
mention that ‘it was not the death penalty itself that the court found offensive to the 
Convention, but rather the death row phenomenon the years-long wait for the scaffold 
under gruesome conditions, both physical and psychological’.62 This gave, as Hudson 
explains, ‘a seed of legitimacy for the doctrine [of death row phenomenon] in 
tribunals around the world’.63 Simultaneously the judgment worked as a precedent 
and guideline for the court itself for its future decisions. 
Domestic Courts 
Since the 1980s, several courts and the highest domestic appellate instances have had 
the opportunity to address the issue of the death row phenomenon and its 
compatibility with national constitutional provisions or international human rights 
standards. For the present study, the positions of the judicial committee of Privy 
Council and the Supreme Court of India are particularly instructive. 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney 
General  of Jamaica et al. passed ruling as  the highest appeal court of the Caribbean 
States that ‘we regard it as an inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony of 
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execution over a long extended period of time’.64  In the same judgment, the Privy 
Council gave threshold period of five years on the death row as a strong ground for a 
violation of the right against inhuman or degrading treatment.
65
 To avoid overhasty 
executions, the Privy Council subsequently clarified in Guerra v. Baptiste that the 
period of five years was a guide ‘not a limit or yard stick’.66 In Henfield v. Attorney 
General of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, the Privy Council observed that 
where international courts were not approached a period of three and half years was 
‘in all the circumstances be so prolonged a time as to render execution cruel or 
inhuman punishment’.67  
The Supreme Court of India has discussed the issue of death row ‘in many cases but 
with different results’.68 In February 1983, in Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu 
observed that ‘delay in executing the death sentence was cruel and inhuman and 
therefore violates the constitution’.69 In February 1989, a five judge bench completely 
rejected the notion that ‘delays in the judicial capital sentences could lead to 
constitutional violation’.70 In the case of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, a 
three-judge bench of the Indian Supreme Court delivered a landmark judgment on the 
death penalty: holding, in particular, that an excessive delay in carrying out the death 
sentence was an essential mitigating factor in a plea for commutation: 
we are of the cogent view that undue, inordinate and unreasonable delay in 
execution of death sentence does certainly attribute to torture which indeed is in 
violation of Article 21 and thereby entails as the ground for commutation of 
sentence.
71
 
In the Devender Pal Singh Bhullar case the Supreme Court of India gave two 
different opinions. On 12 April, 2013 the Court declined to commute Bhullar's death 
sentence to life imprisonment on the ground that ‘he was convicted under the 
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Terrorism and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA)’.72 But in Shatrughan Chauhan v. 
Union of India the Court held: ‘There is no good reason to disqualify all terrorism 
cases as a class from  relief on account of delay in execution of death sentence’.73 
 
(B) Methods of Executions 
The execution itself is a ‘manifestation of cruelty and torture’.74 Many degrading and 
inhumane methods including ‘hanging, fed to crocodiles, trampled by elephants feet, 
thrown over cliff, submerged in rivers, burial alive, beating to death and impalement 
were in vogue in different annals of history across the world’.75 Since ancient times it 
has been debated which method of execution is more dignified or less painful? The 
axe and the sword were the main instruments of capital punishment from the earliest 
times. At the same time, ‘the history of gallows is as old as humanity’.76 Among the 
old methods of executions ‘the sword was considered to be a less degrading 
instrument than the axe’.77 The Romans, like the Greeks, considered beheading 
honorable.
78
 From time immemorial, hanging has been considered a more disgraceful 
form of death than beheading or shooting.
79
 
The public execution multiply the magnitude of torture and terror involved in 
different methods of execution. Until the second half of the nineteenth century ‘the 
most public places were selected to implement the executions’.80  The purpose of 
public spectacle was to deliver a moral message through a dreadful example of the 
cost of sin and crime.
81
  At the same time ‘rituals surrounding these punishments 
further magnified the reality of the unlimited extent of state power’.82  By the end of 
the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, ‘the gloomy festival of 
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punishment started dying’.83 In the second half of the nineteenth century, both in the 
United States of America and in Europe ‘public executions were attacked as 
cruel’.84Since the promulgation of the Capital Punishment Amendment Act 1868, 
public executions were shifted behind the prison
85
 walls in the United Kingdom. This 
paradigm shift was due to two main reasons: Firstly, ‘it was arguably because the 
state’s consolidation and bureaucratic competence rendered symbolic displays of 
might even less necessary than hitherto and less intelligible as well’.86  Secondly, ‘old 
penal languages and techniques came to be seen as cruel’.87 Moreover, the functions 
of the old penal ceremony were no longer understood.
88
 In the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, the British administration replicated the method of execution in 
India and put them behind the prisons walls. 
After the Second World War, with the development of international human rights law, 
the efforts were launched by the UN human rights machinery ‘to develop 
international consensus for the most humane method of execution’.89 In this regard, in 
1984, the UN Economic and Social Council declared that ‘[w]here capital punishment 
occurs it shall be carried out so as to inflict the minimum possible suffering’.90 
Professor Manfred Nowak says: ‘Article 7 of International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights underlines the need for humane methods of execution and protects 
against aggravated methods of execution, such as stoning to death or death on the 
wheel’.91The Human Rights Committee spelled out a general guideline on the method 
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of execution in its General Comment on torture: ‘the death penalty…must be carried 
out in such a way as to cause the least possible physical and mental suffering’.92 
The real challenge is to identify which method of execution causes less degree of 
pain. That is why the Committee had serious difficulties in defining which methods of 
execution cause the least possible physical and mental suffering in individual 
complaints against Canada involving extradition to the United States in capital 
punishment cases. The Committee in Kindler v. Canada and Keith Cox v. Canada 
arrived at the conclusion that execution by means of lethal injection was found to be 
below the threshold of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.
93
 This position of the 
Human Rights Committee has been endorsed by Harold Hillman’s study of the 
physiology and pathology of seven different methods of execution namely shooting, 
hanging, stoning, beheading, electrocution, gassing and intravenous injection in 
different countries of the world. This study concludes:  ‘All of the methods used for 
executing people, with the possible exception of intravenous injection, are likely to 
cause pain’.94  
Another inhuman aspect of the process of execution is the botched executions. It is 
true that since the twentieth century, executions have been highly controlled, carefully 
planned procedures but the probability of botched execution cannot be ruled out.
95
 A 
botched execution involves a significant departure from the protocol of killing 
someone sentenced to death. Such departures include, among other things, inmates 
catching fire while being electrocuted, being strangled during hanging, and being 
administered the wrong dosages of specific drugs for lethal injections. These 
departures can ‘turn specified state-controlled rituals into torture, and solemn 
spectacles of sovereign power into spectacles of horror’.96 
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It is a fact that pain, violence and inhumanity cannot be completely dissociated from 
known methods of judicial execution
97
 as reflected in the dissenting opinion of 
Andreas Mavromattes and Waleed Sadi in the Charles Chitat Ng v. Canada decision 
of the UN Human Rights Committee.
98
 Juan E Mendez, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Torture in Report of 2012 concludes that ‘states cannot guarantee that there is a 
pain-free method of execution’.99As Jurgen Martschukat rightly summarized: ‘Killing 
with kindness is an oxymoron’.100That is why it is argued that ‘execution be avoided 
because of how horrible it is to be executed’.101 
3.1.3 Emergence of the Prohibition of Capital Punishment as an International Norm 
International and European Human Rights law has moved towards the prohibition of 
the death penalty ‘on the grounds that it is a violation of the right to life and cruel and 
inhuman punishment’.102 The obligation to abolish capital punishment has gained the 
status of an international norm that is reflected in the international and regional 
treaties that abolish capital punishment, and the emergence of an international 
criminal justice system without sentence of death.  
International and Regional Treaties that Prohibit Capital Punishment 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not completely prohibit 
capital punishment. The Second Optional Protocol' to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) abolished the capital punishment in all its forms
103
 
and 81 countries are its States Party.
104
  It is pertinent to mention that optional 
protocol to a Treaty is an instrument of independent character and subject to 
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independent ratification.
105
  Besides, there are three Protocols that commit signatories 
to end the use of the death penalty but their jurisdiction is limited to certain regions. 
The regional protocols include: Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty
106
 ratified by 46 countries of Council of Europe,
107
 Protocol No.13 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances,
108
 ratified by 44 
Countries of Council of Europe
109
 and Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty
110
 ratified by thirteen countries of 
Organization of American States.
111
  
Another international instrument that prohibits capital punishment is the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child that states: ‘Neither capital punishment nor life 
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed 
by persons below eighteen years of age’. 112The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child has been ratified by 194 countries
113
 except the United States, Somalia and 
South Sudan.  
International Criminal Justice System and the Penalty of Death 
Another indicator of the progress of the abolition of capital punishment is the death 
penalty does not conform to the values of international criminal justice system that 
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has emerged since 1990.
114
 Earlier models of international justice considered capital 
punishment to be appropriate for the war crimes and genocides.
115
 In this context, the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal authorized the Nuremberg court to 
impose upon a convicted war criminal ‘death or such other punishment as shall be 
determined by it to be just’.116 Consequently, under the provision, the twenty –four 
men condemned to death
117
 by the Tribunal.  The sentencing provisions of the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Tribunal) were 
similar to those adopted for the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals.
118
  
None of the mechanisms of international criminal justice that has been established 
since 1990 enjoy the power to impose the death penalty instead the ‘maximum 
sentence is usually life imprisonment’.119  During the last decade of twentieth century, 
the United Nations Security Council, acting under its powers pursuant to Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter
120
 established two ad hoc tribunals namely International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute the perpetrators of heinous crimes committed during the 
conflicts in the Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
121
 Unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military 
Tribunals, the statutes of ICTY and ICTR did not have power to impose the death 
penalty.
122
This trend has continued with the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court as the Rome Statute, has only provision for awarding imprisonment 
for the most heinous crimes including crimes against humanity.
123
 In 2000, the 
quinquennial report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on capital 
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punishment noted it ‘as a significant development’.124 It is pertinent to mention that 
exclusion of the death penalty from the Rome Statute does not affect the application 
of punishments under the domestic laws of the State Party.
125
 
In this context, instruments such as the international conventions, protocols and 
treaties enable us to affirm that the attempt to abolish the death penalty has gained a 
‘kind of universal moral consensuses’. 
3.2 The Impact of International Law on Domestic Jurisprudence to 
Abolish or Restrict Capital Punishment  
Unlike domestic law, international law is a horizontal rather than a vertical legal 
system. It lacks a supreme centralized authority
126
 and is instead governed by a 
multitude of horizontal agreements and principles creating binding obligations 
between states. Under international law, treaties are not binding on states unless they 
choose to be bound. It means ‘the effects of treaties depend on who agrees to be 
bound’.127 One of the overreaching principles of international law is the principle of 
good faith. This principle corresponds to the binding nature of international 
agreements, known as pacta sunt servanda(meaning agreements must be 
respected).
128
Article26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that 
‘every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith’.129 This includes the rule that a party to a treaty cannot invoke 
provisions of its domestic law to escape the performance of its treaty obligations.
130
  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties prohibits the states parties to make the 
reservation that is ‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty’.131 
This includes the rule that a party to a treaty cannot invoke provisions of its domestic 
law to escape the performance of its treaty obligations.
132
 The Advisory Opinion of 
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Permanent Court of Justice in Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other
133
 and Article 
III of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts reinforce the rule that constitutional mandate is not 
an excuse for a treaty violation.
134
 Amongst the constitutions of the three countries 
under study, only the Indian Constitution, under Article 51(c), obliges the state to 
‘foster respect for international law and treaty obligation’. 
In this context, except Nepal all other south Asian countries are neither to party nor 
signatory to the Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR aiming at the abolition of capital 
punishment. As States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, South Asian Countries have 
some obligations on the application of capital punishment in their respective 
jurisdictions. 
As States Parties to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights these 
countries are bound to restrict the use of capital punishment and to observe some 
safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty. As 
discussed in Section 1, Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) is phrased in a language aiming finally at the abolition of capital 
punishment. It does not completely abolish the capital punishment but it stipulates a 
number of conditions and limitations on the law authorizing the death penalty. India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh  have to fulfill their international obligations as states parties 
to the ICCPR especially in the following areas: (a) Reduce the scope of capital 
punishment to ‘most serious crimes’;135 (b) No arbitrary deprivation of life;136 (c) No 
retrospective legislation for capital punishment.
137
  As States Parties to the ICCPR 
and Convention on the Rights of  the Child, South Asian countries are bound to 
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abolish the death penalty for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of 
age.
138
 
3.2.1. International Human Rights Law and the Interpretation of the Phrase ‘Most Serious 
Crimes’  
Article 6(2) of the ICCPR states that ‘in countries which have not abolished the death 
penalty, sentence of death may only be imposed for the most serious crimes (…)’. 
Since the ICCPR entered into force in 1976, the interpretation of the phrase ‘most 
serious crimes’ has been ‘refined and clarified by a number of UN human rights 
bodies in an effort to limit the number of offences for which a death sentence can be 
pronounced’.139 In 1982, the UN Human Rights Committee declared in its General 
Comment 6: ‘the expression most serious crimes must be read restrictively to mean 
that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional measure’.140  
Two years later, for the first time, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
attempted to define the phrase ‘most serious crimes’. ECOSOC reiterated that the 
countries which have not abolished the death penalty may impose it only for the ‘most 
serious crimes’ which means ‘intentional crimes with lethal or other extremely grave 
consequences’.141 The Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those 
Facing the Death Penalty were later adopted by the UN General Assembly.
142
 In 
1995, the fifth quinquennial report of the UN Secretary General on capital punishment 
talking about the   ‘most serious crime’ and international crimes with lethal or other 
extremely grave consequences noted that  the application of the death penalty be 
limited to  the crime of murder.
143
 
The Human Rights Committee has reached conclusions regarding the principled 
content of the ‘most serious crimes’ provision that are consistent with and give further 
refinement to, those expressed in the safeguards and the comments of the Secretary 
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General. Firstly it has constantly rejected the imposition of a death sentence for 
offences that do not result in the loss of life.
144
 Secondly the death penalty may not be 
mandatory even for murder.  The Committee suggests that ‘a most serious offence 
must involve, at a minimum, intentional acts of violence resulting in the death of a 
person’.145 The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, Philip Alston, summarized the interpretation of ‘most serious crimes’ in 
these words: ‘The death penalty can only be imposed in cases where it can be shown 
that there was an intention to kill which resulted in the loss of life’.146 
Despite the clear interpretation of the phrase ‘most serious crimes’ by the human 
rights treaty bodies, the penal laws of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are loaded with 
the capital offences that do not meet the thresh hold of the definition of the most 
serious crimes. Pakistan made the reservation on Article 6 of the ICCPR: The 
provision will be implemented to the extent that it is not repugnant to the injunction of 
Islam.
147
 Currently the list of 27 capital offences in Pakistan Penal Code is not in 
accordance with the injunctions of Shriah. Under the Islamic jurisprudence capital 
offences are not more than three. The Holy Quran mentions two offences namely 
premeditated murder
148
 and war against God
149
 which are liable to capital 
punishment. The punishment for adultery is flogging
150
 not stoned to death. Besides, 
the punishment for adultery is difficult to implement due to its stringent evidentiary 
requirement.
151
 (The detailed analysis of Islamic law of murder is under an 
independent chapter of the dissertation). 
In its 1997 Concluding Observations regarding India’s compliance with the ICCPR, 
the Human Rights Committee recommended ‘the scope of death penalty be reduced 
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leading to the abolition of the death penalty altogether’.152 In the region India is the 
only country which has made some futile measures to reduce the scope of the death 
penalty. Following the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Bachan 
Singh v. State of Punjab from May 9, 1980, Indian Law provides that the death 
penalty may be imposed in the ‘rarest of rare’ cases only. On the contrary, the scope 
of death penalty has been increasing in India. A 2013 report of the Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial and Summery or Arbitrary executions reveals that ‘certain legislative 
provisions in India provide for offences that do not comply with the most serious 
crimes provision under international law, for example, for such offences as 
kidnapping not resulting in death, sabotage of oil gas pipelines and drug related 
offences’.153 The Human Rights Council, in its 2009 Universal Periodic Review of 
human rights in Bangladesh recommended to restricting the scope of the death 
penalty.
154
 
 Currently the penal laws of South Asian countries are loaded with capital offences 
related to terrorism, sex, narcotics, military and religion that do not meet the threshold 
of the interpretation of ‘most serious crimes’. 
Terrorism-Related Offenses Not Resulting in Death 
The Human Rights Committee suggests that the offences related to a broad definition 
of terrorism
155
 and attacks against the internal security of the state
156
 do not fall under 
the definition of the ‘most serious crimes’. In Pakistan, terrorism related offences that 
do not result in death include airplane hijacking or assisting a hijacking
157
 and attempt 
to harm railway passengers such as by explosion or derailment.
158
 In India using any 
special category of explosives to cause an explosion likely to endanger life or cause 
serious damage to property is punishable by death.
159
 Under Special Laws of 
Bangladesh it is a capital offence to ‘intentionally destroy or damage any property, 
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whether movable or immovable, belonging to the government’160 and ‘to create, alone 
or in a group, fear, terror, confusion or anarchy by ostentatiously displaying force or 
power at any place’.161 On 5 May 2015, the Supreme Court in the case of  Bangladesh 
Legal Aid and Services Trust and others v. the State and others  defended capital 
punishment for the heinous offences against women and children: ‘To protect the 
illiterate girls, women and children from the onslaught of greedy people deterrent 
punishment should be retained. Therefore it is difficult to lip chorus with the activists 
regarding the opinion of abolition of death sentence’.162 The government of 
Bangladesh defended capital punishment by stating that the death penalty is an 
‘exemplary punishment for heinous  crimes such as the throwing of acids, acts of 
terrorism, planned murder, trafficking of drugs, rape,  and abduction of women and 
children’.163  
 
Rape Not Resulting in Death 
The Human Rights Committee has also objected to imposition of the death penalty for 
offences related to sex including homosexual act,
164
 adultery
165
 and illicit sex
166
. India 
is the latest country that has incorporated non-fatal rape as a death eligible offence. In 
this context, under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, repeat offenders of 
gang rape or rape that causes coma shall be sentenced to death.
167
Under the penal 
laws of Bangladesh, to commit an offence of rape
168and ‘to kidnap a child under the 
age of 10 for the purpose of sexual exploitation’169 are liable to capital punishment. In 
Pakistan the sex related capital offences include assault on a woman, intentional 
display of her body in public domain,
170
 rape,
171
 and abduction of a person to submit 
an unnatural lust
172
. Pursuant to its 2008 Universal Periodic Review of human rights 
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in Pakistan, throughout the Council’s final report, member nations expressed serious 
concern over the application of the death penalty in Pakistan, referencing its ‘use to 
punish blasphemy and religious violations such as all non-marital consensual sex’.173 
Drug Trafficking Not Resulting in Death  
The Human Rights Committee do not approve that drug offences meet the threshold 
of ‘most serious crimes’.  In its 2005 concluding observations on Thailand, the 
Committee noted that drug trafficking does not fall under the most serious 
crimes.
174Affirming the stance of the Committee’ the two UN Special Rapporteurs on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions in their respective reports in 1997 
and 2007 respectively say that the death penalty should be eliminated for economic 
and drug related offences.
175
 Besides, the Report of Special Rapporteur on Torture in 
2009 says that ‘the imposition of the death penalty on drug offenders amounts to a 
violation of the right to life’.176 In this regard, the UN Human Rights Committee has 
criticized the states that apply capital punishment to drug offenders including India
177
 
and Sri Lanka. In its Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka in 1995, the Committee 
specially listed drug related offences among those that do not appear to be the most 
serious offences under Article 6 of the Covenant.
178
  
In contravention to international guidelines, drug related offences are liable to capital 
punishment in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Pakistan illegal trafficking of ‘more 
than one kilogram of a drug is punishable by death’.179  In India, if someone commits 
an offense related to the ‘production, manufacture, trafficking, or financing of certain 
types and quantities of narcotic and psychotropic substances, he or she can be 
sentenced to death’.180 In June 2011, the Bombay High Court, in Ghulam Muhammad 
Malik v. Union of India, invalidated  mandatory sentencing under Section 31 and 
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found it repugnant to the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution 
of India.
181
 But the court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the death penalty was 
disproportionate to drug trafficking offences because the crime did not result in death 
and was thus not among the rarest of [the] rare.
182
 According to the Court, an offense, 
‘relating to a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance is even more heinous than 
culpable homicide, because the latter affects only an individual, while the former 
affects and leaves its deleterious effect on society, besides crippling the economy of 
the nation as well’.183The Court clearly disregarded international human rights norms 
in determining that drug trafficking could be a ‘most serious’ crime.  
Under the penal laws of Sri Lanka, the death penalty may be applied for trafficking, 
importing/exporting or possession of only 2g of heroin.
184
 In Bangladesh and Pakistan 
capital punishment is prescribed for possession of 25g
185
and 100g
186
 respectively. 
Amnesty International has named ‘Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Afghanistan in the list of 
countries those awarded death sentences for offences related to drug in the year 
2014.
187
 Figures released by Anti-Narcotics Force Pakistan indicate that at least 530 
persons had been convicted of drug related offences during the year 2016.
188
 Harm 
Reduction International report indicates 100 death row prisoners charged with drug 
related offences were confined in various prisons in Pakistan.
189
 
Military Offenses Not Resulting in Death  
The Human Rights Committee has suggested that ‘offences related to evasion of 
military responsibility do not meet the threshold of most serious crimes’.190 Yet 
offences related to Military, Air Force and Navy are punishable by death in South 
Asian penal laws. Under Pakistan Penal Code ‘abetting a successful mutiny is 
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punishable by death’.191 Under the laws of Pakistan Army, giving up military 
passwords or intentionally using unassigned military passwords
192
, insubordination
193
 
and cowardice
194
 are punishable by death. In India, the following offenses, if 
committed by a member of the Army, Navy, or Air Forces, are punishable by death: 
committing, inciting, conspiring to commit, or failing to suppress mutiny
195
, desertion 
and aiding desertion. On the same pattern, in Bangladesh, offences committed by 
military personnel such as cowardice
196
, espionage
197
, aid to the enemy,
198
 treacherous 
or cowardly use of a flag of truce,
199
 false alarm in time of war
200
 and desertion in 
war
201
 may be punished by death. No official data is available on the number of army 
personnel charged with the above mentioned offences and awarded capital 
punishment. 
Offences Related to Religion not Resulting in Death 
The Human Rights Committee has confirmed that apostasy
202
 and blasphemy do not 
meet the threshold of most serious crimes. In India, Pakistan and Bangladesh only one 
offence related to religion namely blasphemy is liable to capital punishment. The laws 
condemning blasphemy have existed for nearly a century in South Asia under Indian 
Penal Code 1860 under independent chapter XV dealing with offences related to 
religion.  Section 295, Chapter XV, prohibits the defiling of sacred places with the 
intention of wounding the religious sensibilities of different communities and its 
maximum punishment was two years imprisonment, a fine or both.
203
 The blasphemy 
law is still part of the Penal Codes of South Asian countries including Bangladesh
204
, 
Pakistan and India under the same section as it was under Indian Penal Code 1860 but 
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with different quantum of punishment for the offence. In 1991, India increased ‘the 
period of punishment from two to 10 years’.205 
In Pakistan, under the wave of Islamization during the regime of General Zia Ul Haq 
(1977-1988) the offence of Blasphemy was incorporated as a capital offence under 
section 295C. Section 295C relates to derogatory remarks in respect of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Under the original version of the Blasphemy Law, this offence entailed 
capital punishment or life imprisonment. The Federal Shariat Court
206
, on October 30, 
1990, in its unanimous decision declared that punishment of life imprisonment is 
‘repugnant to injunctions of Islam and alternative clause for life imprisonment be 
deleted from 295C’.207In 1992, the decision of the court was affirmed by both the 
houses of the parliament, the National Assembly and the Senate.
208
 
The mandatory death penalty for the offence of blasphemy is not in line with 
international guideline on capital punishment because it does not leave any option for 
the judge to consider the mitigating circumstances of the accused. That is why 
mandatory death penalty provisions even for the offence of murder are disapproved 
by the Human Rights Committee,
209
  the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
210
 
the Supreme Court of the United States of America,
211
 the Indian Supreme Court
212
 
and the Constitutional Court of Uganda.
213
 
There have been constant demands for the ‘scraping of the blasphemy Law from 
religious minorities in Pakistan, national and international human rights 
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organizations
214
 due to following unsavory facts: (a) since its implementation the law 
has been misused against the religious minorities; (b) in many cases the law was 
invoked to deal with a business rival, to grab property or to settle a personal score. 
The UN Human Rights Council working group on the Universal Periodic Review has 
adopted the position that ‘the death penalty for blasphemy is disproportionate and 
works to the detriment of religious minorities’. 215 Pakistan partially admitted this in 
its reply submitted to the Human Rights Council: ‘There are instances of misuse of 
the Blasphemy Law but it is a misunderstanding that this law is used to target 
minorities only’. 216 The Human Rights Council in its second Universal Periodic 
Review of Pakistan recommended ‘to derogate or to repeal the blasphemy law’.217  
 3.2.2 ‘No Arbitrary Deprivation of Life’ and ‘Minimum Guarantees of a Fair Trial’  
Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains three 
important statements: Firstly every human being has an inherent right to life
218
; 
secondly this right will be protected by law
219; thirdly ‘no one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life’.220 Ramcharan writes that ‘the inherency of the right to life 
coupled with the primordial nature of the value protected requires that the most 
stringent criteria must be applied, irrespective of the country, situation or context 
concerned’.221 Daniel Nsereko suggested that deprivation of life is arbitrary if it is 
made without due regard to the rules of natural justice or the due process of law, if it 
is made in a manner contrary to the law, or ‘if it is made in pursuance of a law which 
is despotic, tyrannical and in conflict with international human rights standards or 
international humanitarian law’.222  
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Whether a deprivation of life is arbitrary or not must be determined ultimately by 
reference to international human right law. The concept of arbitrariness must be 
judged in accordance with the standards and guarantees laid down in Article 6, 14 and 
15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
223
 The United Nations 
Human Rights Committee has consistently held that if Article 14 of ICCPR is violated 
during the trail then Article 6 of the ICCPR is also breached. In Carlton Reid V. 
Jamaica the Human Rights Committee held that: ‘Since the final sentence of death 
was passed without having met the requirements for a fair trial set forth in Article 14  
that is violation to right of life’.224 The UN Human Rights Committee in Kelly v 
Jamaica gave a remedy entailing the release of the applicant. The Committee 
observed that in capital punishment cases, States parties have an imperative duty to 
observe rigorously all the guarantees for a fair trial set out in Article 14 of the 
Covenant.
225
 
In 2007, in its General Comment 32, the Human Rights Committee ‘reaffirmed 
imposition of a sentence of death upon conclusion of a trial, in which the provisions 
of Article 14 have not been respected, constitutes a violation of the right to life’.226 
Draft General Comment 36 defines arbitrary deprivation of life : 
A deprivation of life may be authorized by domestic law and still be arbitrary. 
The notion of “arbitrariness” is not to be equated with “against the law”, but 
must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, 
injustice, lack of predictability, and due process of law as well as elements of 
reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality. 
227
 
The Reports of UN Special Rapporteurs also substantiate the stance of the Human 
Rights Committee on arbitrary deprivation of life. In this regard, in 1983, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions said: ‘where a government 
has imposed a death penalty but failed to comply with the procedural safeguards 
presented in international law, it has violated international law and has arbitrarily 
deprived a person of his life’.228 In 1996, the Special Rapporteur on Extra Judicial, 
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Arbitrary or Summary Executions reiterated that ‘proceedings leading to the 
imposition of capital punishment must confirm to the highest standards of 
independence, competence, objectivity and impartiality of judges and juries in 
accordance with the pertinent internal legal instruments’.229  Again in 2001, the 
Special Reporter on Extra Judicial and Summary Executions underlined the 
requirement of fair trial for capital cases: ‘It is imperative that legal proceedings in 
relation to capital offences conform to the highest standards of impartiality, 
competence, objectivity and independence of the judiciary, in accordance with the 
pertinent international legal instruments’.230  
In addition, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) passed three 
resolutions
231
 prescribing safeguards regarding the application of the death penalty for 
those countries which have not abolished it yet. Safeguard 5 clearly expresses: 
Capital punishment may only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment 
rendered by a competent court after legal process which gives all possible 
safeguards to ensure a fair trial, at least equal to those contained in Article 14 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the right of 
anyone suspected of or charged with a crime for which capital punishment may 
be imposed to adequate legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings.
232
  
 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, as States parties, have an imperative duty to observe 
rigorously all the guarantees for a fair trial set out in article 14 of the Covenant. The 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, at the time of ratification, declared that ‘the provisions 
of Articles 3, 6, 7, 18 and 19 shall be so applied to the extent that they are not 
repugnant to the Provisions of the Constitution of Pakistan and the Sharia laws’. 233  
The Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 24 explained that ‘the 
reservations that offend peremptory norms would not be compatible with the object 
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and purpose of the Covenant’.234 The Committee further elaborates that state has no 
right to engage in ‘to arbitrarily deprive persons of their lives’. At the same time, 
Articles 6, 7 and 18 of the Covenant are among the provisions from which no 
derogation is allowed, according to Article 4 of the Covenant.  Objecting to 
reservation of Pakistan for Articles 6, 7 and 18, many states parties especially 
Belgium, Canada, Estonia, France and Greece said that this reservation is “vague, not 
specified and general in nature’. 
To sum up, capital punishment is an exception to the right to life as long as it is not 
arbitrarily imposed. If a state executes a person without meeting the highest standard 
of fair trial is violation of right to life and arbitrary deprivation of life. 
3.2.3 The Law in Force at the Time of Commission of the Crime 
The phrase ‘in accordance with the law in force of the time of the commission of the 
crime’ is merely a specific expression of the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena 
sine lege stated in Article 15 of the Covenant. The prohibition of punishment under 
retroactive legislation is an accepted principle of international jurisprudence under 
human rights law,
235
 humanitarian law
236
 and international criminal law.
237
 Moreover, 
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR) states 
that ‘no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he 
has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of each country’.238  
In this regard, a glaring example of violation of the ‘principle of non-retroactivity’ of 
criminal law is the execution of Abdul Qauder Mollah, a leader of the Jamaat-e-
Islami party in Bangladesh. After the conclusion of his trial by International Crimes 
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Tribunal established under the International Crimes Act 1973,
239
 the Supreme Court 
converted the life imprisonment sentence awarded by the trial tribunal
240
 into the 
death penalty using the retroactive legislation. This glaring violation of international 
law has been criticized by national and international human rights organizations. 
Christof Heyns, UN Special Rapporteur on summary executions said: ‘Capital 
punishment may be imposed only following a trial that complied with fair trial and 
due process safeguards’.241 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi 
Pillay said that ‘the trial had not met stringent international standards for the death 
penalty’.242  
 3.2.4 Prohibition of Juveniles’ Executions under International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and Convention on the Rights of the Child 
As states parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, South Asian countries have 
some obligations regarding the administration of juvenile justice. Both the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
243
 and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child
244
 prohibit capital punishment of persons 
under18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime.  Article 37 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: ‘No child shall be subjected to 
torture or other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital 
punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for 
offences committed by person below eighteen years’. 
Despite the fact, South Asian countries are parties to the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, juveniles are sentenced to death and executed in their respective 
jurisdictions. The Human Rights Committee, the UN Human Rights Council and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child have shown concern regarding the compliance 
to the treaty law by these countries.  
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In its Concluding Observations regarding India’s compliance with the ICCPR, the 
Human Rights Committee recommended to ‘abolish the death penalty for juvenile’.245 
In the light of a recommendation made by the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child in 2000,
246
 the Indian Government promulgated the Juvenile Justice (Care and 
Protection of Children) Act which abolished the death penalty for individuals under 
the age of 18 at the time of the commission of crime.
247
 On May 18, 2015, the Indian 
Parliament reviewed and amended the juvenile law enforced in the country. Under the 
amended Juvenile Law ‘the person between the age of 16 and 18 shall be tried as 
adults for the offences of rape and murder’.248 The amendment was introduced against 
the backdrop of the widespread outrage over the lighter punishment awarded to one of 
the culprits of  the Delhi rape case due to his age, seventeen and a half, at the time of 
the commission of the crime. The provision of trying a juvenile as an adult 
contravenes the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires all 
signatory countries like India to treat every child under the age of 18 years as equal. 
Pakistan as a state party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child passed Juvenile 
Justice System Ordinance 2000 (JJSO 2000) that defines the child in line with 
international standards as a person below 18 years of age.
249
 Juvenile Justice System 
Ordinance 2000 states unequivocally that ‘no child shall be awarded punishment of 
death’.250 This is clearly in line with Article 37 of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. 
Although the promulgation of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000 was a 
landmark for the protection of child rights in Pakistan but there are many steps to be 
taken to stream line the juvenile justice system in concordance with the international 
standards. In this context, three major issues need to be addressed: Firstly, the legal 
status of the law itself; secondly the application of the law in all parts of the country; 
and thirdly the effective implementation of the law. 
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Firstly, the legal status of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000 has been in 
limbo since 2005. On December 6, 2004 a full bench of the Lahore High Court, 
announced in its unanimous judgment that Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000 is 
‘unreasonable, unconstitutional and impractical’.251 The Lahore High Court argues 
that the JJSO creates an incentive for juvenile to commit serious crimes ‘with an 
understanding and assurance that they will get away with lesser sentences [which] 
poses a great threat and (…)grim peril to the lives of citizen at large’. 252 The High 
Court makes assertion that capital punishment is ‘most suitable deterrence’.253 In 
February 2005, the Supreme Court of Pakistan after admitting appeals against the 
Lahore High Court judgment passed a stay order and restored the Juvenile Justice 
System Ordinance 2000.The appeal of the Government has been pending before the 
Supreme Court since 2005. The Government of Pakistan must pursue the case 
actively in the Supreme Court to judge the real worth of the arguments of Lahore 
High Court against the Juvenile Ordinance.  Once the Supreme Court of Pakistan 
decides the fate of JJSO 2000, it should be presented to Parliament to be transformed 
into legislation. 
Secondly the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000 ‘remained inapplicable in some 
parts of the country’.254 The 8th quinquennial report of the UN Secretary General on 
Capital Punishment reveals that ‘Pakistan’s Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000 
requires to be implemented in all parts of the country’.255 Although the JJSO 2000 
states unequivocally in its first section that it ‘extends to the whole area of 
Pakistan’.256  It has not been implemented to other areas of Pakistan including the 
Northern Areas and designated tribal areas.
257
 The Criminal Code of Pakistan does 
not apply to the tribal areas and Article 247(7) of the Constitution of Pakistan ‘debars 
the jurisdiction of the country’s High Courts and the Supreme Court from the tribal 
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area’.258 The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901 is the basic law in force in 
the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). The FCR is blind to child rights. As 
a result children are treated on par with adults in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Area. However, international human rights treaties ratified by Pakistan are binding on 
the state in respect of all regions and all persons under its jurisdiction. It is therefore 
obligatory for the state to take all necessary legislative, administrative and other 
measures to ensure that the rights contained in the treaty are enjoyed by all within the 
state. 
The third issue involves the effective implementation of the Juvenile Justice System 
Ordinance 2000 specially to determine the actual age of the accused.  The ordinance 
empowers the juvenile court ‘to constitute a medical board to determine the age of an 
accused at the time of the commission of offence’.259 But, there is a wide gap between 
the law in theory and practice on the ground. Recently the European Union has shown 
its concern over the execution of Aftab Masih in Pakistan in these words: ‘His 
petition, alleging his juvenile status at the time of the crime and torture while in 
custody to extract a confession, was not given due consideration’.260 The national and 
international human rights organizations including the Justice Project Pakistan (JPP), 
Reprieve and Amnesty International believe that he was just 15 at the time of the 
commission of the offence.
261
 Defending the juvenility and innocence of another 
death row prisoner Shafqat Hussain, convicted for the offence of murder of a seven 
year old boy in 2004, the human rights organizations say that he was 14 years of age 
at the time of commission of crime and he made a confession due to police torture. On 
June 5,2015, the UN experts, Christof Heyns, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial executions, Benyam Mezmur, the Chairperson of the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, and Juan Mendez, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, ‘called on Pakistani authorities 
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to reverse a decision regarding the execution of Shafqat Hussain’.262 His execution 
was postponed for the fourth time due to controversy surrounding his age at the time 
of commission of the offence.
263
 Finally he was executed on August 4, 2015
264
 and 
Amnesty International declared it as ‘deeply sad day for Pakistan’.265 
Bangladesh ratified the Convention on the Rights of Child in 1990 but its juvenile 
justice system does not fully reflect or comply with its principles. In 2009, the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child remained concerned that some aspects of 
domestic legislation continue to be in conflict with the principles and provisions of 
the Convention and ‘regrets that there is no comprehensive law to domesticate the 
Convention’.266 The Children Act 1974 is the substantive law for juvenile offenders 
and their treatment. Article 51 of the Children Act 1974 excludes offenders under the 
age of 16 from the death penalty.
267
 There is no domestic law that fully excludes 
individuals below the age of 18 at the time of the crime. The Committee on the Rights 
of the Child has repeatedly expressed concern that Bangladesh law does not clearly 
preclude the death penalty for offenses committed under the age of 18, although 
Bangladesh asserts that in practice such individuals are not executed.  In 2003, the 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern that 16 or 17 year olds 
could be sentenced to death.
268
 In 2009, the UN Committee on the Rights of Child 
reiterated this concern and recommended to ‘clarify the definition of the child to 
include all persons under the age of 18’.269 
Conclusion 
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As an issue of international law and human rights, the death penalty is associated with 
two fundamental human rights, the right to life and protection against cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishments. These two fundamental rights are not only enshrined in 
two basic instruments of international human rights namely the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) but also incorporated in all regional human rights treaties such as 
European Convention on Human Rights, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, The American Convention on Human Rights and Arab Charter on Human 
Rights. With the rise of the subject of human rights after the Second World War, these 
two rights gained paramount importance and provided a sound legal rational to the 
UN human rights bodies and various domestic courts across the globe to consider 
capital punishment as a violation of human rights. The UN Human Rights Committee, 
the European Court of Human Rights, the Privy Council and domestic courts in 
various countries of the world have expressed their opinions in their respective 
judgments that capital punishment is inhuman and degrading and in violation of right 
to life.  
International and European human rights law has moved towards the prohibition of 
the death penalty ‘on the grounds that it is a violation of the right to life and cruel and 
inhuman punishment’.  On the basis of these two arguments, the community of 
nations has adopted four Protocols that commit state parties to end the use of the 
death penalty in their respective jurisdictions. One is worldwide in its scope; the other 
three are regional instruments. The Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aims at abolishing the death penalty in all 
cases and is international in its scope. Currently 81 countries in the world have 
ratified the Protocol.
270
 Another international instrument Convention on the Rights of 
the Child prohibits capital punishment for juveniles under the age of 18 at the time of 
commission of crime. It is noteworthy that the instrument has been signed and ratified 
by 194 countries. 
Besides, none of the mechanisms of international criminal justice that emerged after 
1990 including International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Court 
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have provisions in their statutes to impose the death penalty. Since 2007 the General 
Assembly has passed a series of five resolutions on international moratorium on 
capital punishment adopted in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. The resolution of 
December 2014 has been supported by the record number of 117 countries in favor 
and 38 in opposition. It is pertinent to mention that India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
have voted against moratorium in all UN General Assembly resolutions. 
In short, instruments such as the international conventions, protocols, regional 
treaties, emergence of new international criminal justice system and the UN General 
Assembly resolutions enable us to affirm that the attempt to abolish the death penalty 
has gained a kind of universal moral consensuses. 
Under international law, treaties are not binding on states unless they choose to be 
bound. In this context, except Nepal all other South Asian countries are neither party 
nor signatory to the Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR aiming at the abolition of 
capital punishment. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states 
that ‘every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith’.271 This includes the rule that a party to a treaty cannot invoke 
provisions of its domestic law to escape the performance of its treaty obligations.
272
 
As States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have some 
obligations on the application of capital punishment in their respective jurisdictions: 
 
(a) In the context of South Asian countries, the most important treaty provision 
relating to the death penalty is Article 6 of ICCPR that does not prohibit capital 
punishment, but restricts its application, and stipulates certain conditions and 
limitations on the law authorizing the death penalty.  Under Article 6(2) of the 
ICCPR, countries that have not abolished capital punishment may apply it for the 
‘most serious crimes’. The text of the treaty does not spell out or enumerate the most 
serious crimes. Over the past two decades, international jurisprudence, from a wide 
range of sources, has succeeded in bringing clarity to the question of which crimes 
can legitimately be classified as being the ‘most serious’. The phrase ‘most serious 
crimes’ has been interpreted unequivocally by the UN Human Rights Committee as 
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‘intentional crimes with the consequence of loss of life’. On the contrary, the criminal 
codes of these countries are overburdened with capital offences namely abduction 
without murder, evading military responsibilities, to damage railway property, illicit 
sex, apostasy, blasphemy and drug trafficking which do not meet the threshold of 
most ‘serious crimes’. In is pertinent to mention that Pakistan is the only country in 
the region that has made the reservation on Article 6 of the ICCPR: ‘The provision 
will be implemented to the extent that it is not repugnant to the injunction of 
Islam’.273 However, currently the list of 32 capital offences in Pakistan Penal Laws is 
not in accordance with the injunctions of Shariah.  
(b) Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits 
arbitrary deprivation of life. The concept of arbitrariness must be judged in 
accordance with the standards and guarantees laid down in Articles 6, 14 and 15 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This means deprivation of 
life is arbitrary if it is made without due regard to the rules of natural justice or the 
due process of law or to fair trial standards. The UN human rights treaty bodies 
including the Human Right Committee, the Committee on the Rights of the Child and 
the Committee against Torture have pointed out in their periodic reports the glaring 
deficiencies in the criminal justice systems in vogue in South Asian countries. That is 
why there is a high risk of arbitrary deprivation of life by the state in these countries. 
(c) Despite the fact, South Asian countries are parties to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, juvenile 
offenders below the age of eighteen are sentenced to death and executed. The Human 
Rights Committee, the UN Human Rights Council and the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child have shown their concern regarding the compliance of the treaty law by 
these countries. On the contrary to the U N Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
Indian Parliament has amended juvenile law enforced in the country in May 2015 that 
allows the juvenile offenders between the ages of 16 and 18, charged with the 
offences of rape and murder, to be treated as adults. Currently the European Union 
has shown its concern over the application of the death penalty in case of Aftab 
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Bahadur and has requested the Government of Pakistan to respect international human 
rights standard on application of capital punishment. 
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Chapter 4 
Criminal Procedure in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and 
Due Process of Law 
 
Introduction 
 Deprivation of life by the state apparatus tantamount to arbitrary if it is taken without 
observing the fundamental protections and guarantees attributed with due process of 
law, enshrined in Universal Declaration of Human Rights, namely prohibition of  
arbitrary arrest
1
 and  torture,
2
 the presumption of innocence,
3
 fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal
4
 and right for effective defense.
5
 
Subsequently in 1966, these guarantees and rights were reaffirmed and elaborated 
upon under Article 9, 14 and 15 of International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights that provide the essential legal framework for assessing the fairness of legal 
proceedings. During the last fifty years ‘a substantial jurisprudence has developed in 
elaborating and interpreting the right to a fair trial’.6 
The chapter aims at identifying the systematic failures to guarantee due process of law 
in capital cases in South Asian countries namely India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. To 
evaluate the fairness of criminal process, this study will refer to norms of 
undisputedly legal origin including the guarantees and protections provided in the 
domestic constitutions and the penal laws, the human rights treaties that have been 
ratified by these countries and norms of customary international law. The key 
question is whether the gaps between the absolute minimum conditions required and 
practices in South Asian countries are tantamount to breach of procedural norms of 
fair trial. This review focuses on three areas of criminal proceedings namely 
collection of evidence, free legal aid and issues related to witnesses. 
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Criminal Proceedings in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh  
India, Bangladesh and Pakistan inherited in from British colonial period several of 
existing laws notably the Indian Penal Code 1860, the Code of Criminal Procedure 
1898, and the Indian Evidence Act 1872. In these three countries, the model of 
criminal justice is the adversary system based on accusatorial method.
7
 The principle 
that the accused is presumed to be innocent unless guilt is proved beyond reasonable 
doubt is of cardinal importance in the administration of criminal justice.
8
  The burden 
of proving the guilt of the accused is upon the prosecution.
9
 The law also provides fair 
opportunity to the accused person to defend himself or herself. Professor R.V. Kelkar 
identifies some provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code that are reflective of the 
elements of the inquisitorial system.
10
 For instance, the prosecutor cannot withdraw 
the case without the consent of the court.
11
 The Court has been empowered to 
examine any person as a witness though such person has not been called by any party 
as a witness.
12
  
The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empowers police to investigate the crime. The 
distinction between cognizable and non-cognizable offences also demarcates the 
powers of the police in respect of criminal investigation.
13
 While the police officers 
have the power and also the duty to investigate into all cognizable offences,
14
 they are 
enjoined not to investigate the non-cognizable offences without the order of a 
competent magistrate.
15
 
The Supreme Court of India has said: ‘The police has the statutory right to investigate 
into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a 
magistrate and this statutory power of police to investigate cannot be interfered with 
by the exercise of power under section 439 of Criminal Procedure Code or under 
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inherent power of the court under section 561’.16 As observed by the Law 
Commission of India, a magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of police 
investigation but he is not authorized to interfere with the actual investigation or to 
direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted.
17
 In King Emperor v. 
Khwaja Nazir Ahmed the Privy Council has observed that ‘the functions of the 
judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping’.18 
 4.1 The Collection of Evidence and Use of Force  
Article 14(3)(g) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides 
that an accused may not ‘be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt’. 
In Berry v Jamaica the Human Rights Committee emphasized that the article ‘must be 
understood in terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or psychological 
pressure from the investigating authorities on the accused with a view to obtaining a 
confession of guilt’.19 In Conteris V. Uruguay, the Committee found that a confession 
obtained after ill treatment violated the accused’s right not to be compelled to confess 
guilt under Article 14(3)(g).
20
 The Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 
stated that when considering this provision Articles 7 and 10(1) must be kept in mind 
and state’s laws must incorporate the provision: ‘Evidence provided by means of such 
methods or any other form of compulsion is wholly unacceptable’.21 
The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 defines the objective of investigation 
and powers of the investigating officer: ‘To investigate the facts and circumstance of 
the case, and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the 
offender’.22 The aim of investigating officer is to collect evidence and not to create 
it.
23
 The Indian Supreme Court spelled out the duty of the investigating officer is not 
merely to boost the prosecution case with such evidence as may enable a court to 
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record a conviction but also to bring out the real universal truth.
24
 Deb underlines: ‘A 
heavy responsibility devolves on police of seeing that innocent persons are not 
charged on irresponsible or false implications’.25 It is not only illegal but highly 
unethical for an investigating officer to resort to concoction, padding and fabrication 
of evidence. 
On the contrary to international and domestic guidelines, investigating officers in the 
jurisprudence of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh do not build profile of investigation 
of crime on collecting evidence by employing different techniques but they resort to 
the third degree methods (torture) to extract confession. By the very nature of the 
activity, illegal violence by police is difficult to document scientifically. No official 
data or indicator is available to gauge the magnitude of the torture during the process 
of investigation. This study will employ work of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies to 
gauge the practice of torture prevalent in the three countries. In this context, reports of 
the Law Commissions and the Police Commissions constituted by the governments of 
these countries, and the periodic reports of human rights treaty bodies, contain enough 
information on the use of torture during the process of police investigation. 
 (A) Police Torture in Indian Sub-Continent- Relic of the Past  
In the Indian Sub-continent, the torture as a major technique of investigation had a 
long history.  Torture inflicted by the police on suspects has been a reality in all major 
phases of history- from the Vedic Age to the British Rule.
26
 In fact, torture had been 
endemic in India long before the British extended their power beyond a few trading 
posts, and even possibly before the Moghal conquests.
27
 In 1857, the Calcutta Review 
observed: ‘Torture in its real sense has always been resorted to in oriental countries, 
to obtain proof of guilt or recover stolen property’.28 Keeping in view the continuity 
of criminal justice system inherited from the British period in India, this study makes 
a detailed analysis of the use of torture during the course of police investigation in the 
period. 
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The use of torture and coercion in Indian society was not a novel introduction brought 
about by British Rule. It had a long history with individuals such as English authors 
depicted the prevalent practice of torture against political opponents and the 
accused.
29
 The proverbial cruelty of some of the Moghul rulers exercised a powerful 
hold on the European imagination.
30
 In 1765, the Mughal emperor recognized British 
jurisdiction over Bengal, which had been under de facto British control since 
1757.
31
Under the charter granted by the British crown in 1726
32
, English courts had 
been working in the presidency towns of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa where the East 
India Company’s factories had been established. In 1826, the Court of Directors33 
directed the Madras government to investigate reports of torture, which included one 
case in which the suspect had ‘a rough rope charged with powdered chilies and 
mustard seed, and moistened with a solution of salt…tightly bound his arms’.34 
Simultaneously the contemporary judicial letters from Bengal endorse the reports of 
the abuses of the police force in Bengal.
35
 
In 1832, the Parliamentary Select Committee on East India Affairs examined the issue 
of torture in British-administered India. Alexander Campbell, who had been the 
Registrar of the Sudder Diwani and Faujdari Adalat (the Supreme Civil and Criminal 
Court, respectively) admitted the practice of torture by native officers in these words: 
Under the native governments which preceded us at Madras the universal object 
of every police officer was to obtain a confession from the prisoner with a view 
to his conviction of any offence; and notwithstanding every endeavor of our 
European tribunals to put an end to this system, frequent instances have come  
before all our criminal tribunals of its use.
36
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It is pertinent to mention that an important government-backed study of the practice 
of torture by police in the history of modern India was the Madras Torture 
Commission Report of 1855. The recommendations of this report were incorporated 
in the Indian Penal Code1860, Police Act 1861 and Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. 
In 1854, the House of Commons was rocked by allegations of torture leveled against 
East India Company. Mr. Danby Seymour, MP, accused the Company of using torture 
and coercion to get ten shillings from a man when he only had eight.
37
 The revelations 
in Parliament and the press coverage that followed in 1854 made Madras Government 
to constitute
38
 a three member Commission
39
 to ‘conduct fullest and most complete 
investigation’.40Initially the mandate of the commission was to enquire into the ‘use 
of torture by the native servants of the state for the purpose of realizing the 
Government revenue’.41 However, the scope of inquiry was soon enlarged to include 
the alleged use of torture in extracting confessions in police cases’.42 The Commission 
worked for seven months and heard several hundred allegations from people who 
travelled from every part of the presidency.
43
 The Report found the term ‘torture’ as 
defined by Dr Johnson “pain by which guilt is punished or confession extorted” - to 
be applicable to the practices prevalent in the Presidency.
44
 
The findings of the Commission endorse the fact that torture employed by the Police 
and the Revenue authorities was a historical fact. Relying on ‘old authorities’, it noted 
the ‘historical fact’ that ‘torture was a recognized method of obtaining both revenue 
and confessions’ since pre-colonial times.45 Specifically with regard to the practice of 
torture for eliciting confessions, even the Government Order of the 19th of September 
1854, extending the Commission's enquiry to police matters, said: ‘So deep rooted, 
however, has the evil been found, and so powerful the force of habit, arising from the 
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unrestrained license exercised in such acts of cruelty and oppression under the former 
rulers of this country’.46 
It was noted in the report that between 1806 and 1852 as many as 10 circular orders 
were promulgated by the Faujdari Adalat (the Supreme Criminal Court) on the 
subject of extorting confessions.
47
 From the proceedings of the Foujdaree Adawlat on 
many cases brought to their notice by the Judges of Circuit, it is apparent that ‘in 
cases of confessions alleged to have been given before the Police Officer, there was 
scarcely one in which the prisoners did not declare that they had been beaten and 
compelled to confess’.48 The Commission says: 
….that personal violence practiced by the native revenue and police officials 
generally prevails throughout this presidency, both in the collection of revenue 
and in police cases; but we are bound at the same time to state our opinion that 
the practice has of late years been steadily decreasing both in severity and 
extent.
49
 
The Commission concludes: 
The police establishment has become the bane and pest of society, the terror of 
the community (…). Corruption and bribery reign paramount throughout the 
whole establishment; violence, torture and cruelty are their instruments for 
detecting crime, implicating innocence or extorting money.
50
 
The Report enumerates the different methods of torture applied by the Police to the 
suspects to extract confession: 
Twisting rope round the arm to impede circulation; lifting up by moustache; 
suspending by the arms tied behind the back; searing with hot irons; placing 
scratching insects, such as the carpenter beetle, in the navel, scrotum and other 
sensitive parts; dipping in wells and rivers till the party is half suffocated; 
squeezing the testicles; beating with sticks; prevention of sleep; nipping the 
flesh with pincers; putting peppers and red chilies in the eyes, or introducing 
them into the private parts of men and women; these cruelties occasionally 
preserved in until death sooner or later ensues
51
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In the words of the colonialist historian who worked in Indian Police Service, Sir 
Percival Griffith, the report ‘galvanized the Madras Government into much needed 
action’.52 One of the major outcomes of the report was the recommendation by the 
Second Law Commission in 1855 that police should not have any authority to record 
the confession of an accused person. This recommendation culminated in the 
elaborate distrust of the police which was embodied in the Criminal Procedure Code 
and the Indian Evidence Act 1872.
53
  The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, ruled all 
confessions made to the police or by a person in police custody to be out of the stream 
of evidence.
54
 The Criminal Procedure Code 1898 excluded from evidence all 
statements recorded by the police including those of witnesses.
55
 
Ruthven observes ‘a model of its kind and a milestone in the law of evidence, the 
Evidence Act proved less than a complete remedy against torture’.56  He further 
reveals that ‘actual instance of torture remained at the same level or even declined, the 
act supplied defense lawyers with a very effective weapon, while in no way leading to 
an improvement in actual police practice’.57 
During the period between the suppression of Indian Rebellion of 1857
58
 and the rise 
of the nationalist movement at the turn of the century, relatively few accounts were 
printed in English. However, ‘the absence of documentary evidence does not 
necessarily mean that the practice itself had been abolished’.59 A pamphlet, in 1860, 
summarized the proceeding of two cases of murder and torture committed by police 
of Burdwan, Calcutta in the judgments of the Sessions Judge and Judge of Sudder.
60
 
The pamphlet reads as follows: ‘It warned that cases of torture are notoriously of 
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frequent occurrence in Bengal; but as no police objective can be served by taking 
notice of them they are looked upon with perfect placidity by the government’.61 
The report of the Police Commission in 1905, appointed by Lord Curzon
62
, reveals 
the same sorry state of affairs: ‘There is no point at which (according to the evidence 
before the Commission violence is not done to the spirit or letter of the law; and these 
abuses are practically universal’.63 The commission further identifies: ‘Suspects and 
innocent persons are bullied and threatened into giving information they are supposed 
to possess. The police officer, owing to want of detective ability or to indolence, 
directs his efforts to procure confessions by improper inducement’.64 
The language of the Curzon Commission Report was a good deal more restrained than 
that of the Madras report, but it would be simplistic to infer that the practice of torture 
had diminished proportionately. It condemned the unnecessary severity and 
unnecessary annoyance with which the police discharged their duties, but exonerated 
them of ‘actual physical torture’ which it stated to ‘now rarely happen’.65 In the words 
of Ruthvan: ‘Its aura, if not exactly white wash, has the flavor of bureaucratic 
obfuscation. The reality was that little could be done to improve things’.66  
Despite the Curzon Commission’s professed belief in their comparative rarity, the 
disturbing allegations of actual physical torture continued to appear in the nationalist 
and in some cases the English press.  In 1909 F.C. Mackarness published various 
cases of police torture in different states of India.
67
 One reported notorious case that 
occurred in the Punjab in 1908 where Mr . Kennedy, a Session Judge, with the 
concurrence of three Indian assessors, had sentenced a woman, Gulab Bano, to death 
after she had confessed to having poisoned her husband. The Lahore High Court 
upheld her appeal, after a civil surgeon supplied medical evidence confirming her 
charges of police torture. She had been hung upside down ‘from the roof of the 
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village police station and a baton smeared with green chilies had been thrust up her 
anus’.68 The alarming feature of the incidence is inquiry commission, despite the 
woman’s acquittal, completely exonerated the police and attempted to discredit the 
opinions of the two British high court judges and the civil surgeon.
69
 
There are some other evidences that endorse that torture was a common practice 
during the British rule in India. For instance Principal Phillaur Police Training 
School, in India writes that ‘it is common for a complaint to be made that Thanidar( 
incharge of Police Station) is not severe enough with the suspects in his cases’.70 M 
Joseph Chailley, a French Scholar, visited India twice between1900-1 and again in 
1904 to study the British administrative system in India.
71
 The French scholar writes 
in detail in his book L’ Inde Britannique on the working of the police in British India: 
‘they torture the accused and put pressure on the witnesses’.72 Despite the limited 
evidentiary value of confession under police custody, ‘the misdeeds of the police are 
frequent’.73 He further writes: ‘I have myself seen, on more than one occasion, 
constables who have been imprisoned for attempts to extort confessions’.74 
The answer to the question what changed the practice of police torture to extract 
confession during British colonial rules in India lies in: Torture unofficially yet tacitly 
incorporated into judicial system. Peer argues that ‘as long as torture did not directly 
undermine their position, the British could afford to overlook it’.75 He further 
elaborates that the police were crucial to the British Raj, and to some observers, at 
least, helped establish the foundations of a police state. 
 (B) Police Torture During the Post-Colonial Period  
This study reveals that there is an important element of continuity in torture employed 
by investigating agencies to extract confession. Upendra Baxi notes that the 
Commission’s findings in 1855 regarding the plight of the victims are still valid 
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today.
76
 Police torture is as much a reality now as it was then.
77
 In the Indian 
subcontinent, the use of force to obtain confession from suspects is known 
colloquially as ‘third degree’.78 The work of different scholars and police officers 
reveals the practice of torture. Nitya Ramakrishnan writes that ‘we may condemn 
torture publically, yet deep within, we hold it indispensable to law enforcement’.79 
Upendra Baxi reveals that ‘custodial violence or torture is an integral part of police 
operation in India’.80 He argues that ‘judicious use of custodial torture is seen both as 
necessary and justified for the performance of role obligations’.81An Inspector 
General Police writes: ‘Torture is accepted as standard practice and not always 
discouraged by department superiors’.82  
Both international
83
 and national
84
  human rights NGOs unfold the practice of police 
torture prevalent in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. The police of post-independence 
India has been charged by Amnesty International with practicing torture to extract 
confession.
85
 Human Rights Watch also endorses the fact: ‘Soliciting a confession as 
one of the first step of crime investigation with information gleaned from the 
interrogation becoming the basis for gathering supporting evidence’.86 Asian Human 
Rights Commission reports that ‘most officers honestly believe that they have a right 
to punish the suspect and justify torture as the only means to investigate crime’.87  A 
joint Report of International Federation for Human Rights(FIDH) and Odhikar says: 
‘Ill treatment, torture and extra-judicial killings in custody are common place in 
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Bangladesh’.88 A report of the United Nations Development Programme identifies 
that crime investigation in Bangladesh highly relies on confession.
89
 The Human 
Rights Commission in Pakistan also unfurls the practice of police torture in these 
words: ‘torture in order to obtain confession, to intimidate and terrorize is widespread, 
common and systematic’.90 
In 2013, a report of the United States Institute of Peace reflected that police in 
Pakistan employ ‘illegal detention and extract confessions through third degree-
methods’.91 An empirical study of  a total of 1820 victims of alleged police torture 
examined at the office of Surgeon Medico Legal Punjab Lahore during a period of 
five years (1998-2002) reveals: ‘Most of the victims at the time of examination were 
showing visible evidence of physical trauma’.92  It is noteworthy that ‘most of these 
victims had been detained by the police in illegal custody, for a period ranging 
between 1 to 2 weeks, after which they were recovered by the bailiff presented before 
and ordered by the court for medico-legal examination’.93 The study further reveals 
that the victims of police torture are from the lower strata of the society. ‘The 
residents of rural were subjected to more violence, showing a pattern of high 
handedness of the poorer class by police, with no say in the society’.94 
The UN Human Rights Treaty bodies have shown concerned in their periodic reports 
on the use of torture by law enforcement agencies. The UN Human Rights Committee 
as early as 1997 has expressed its concern about the widespread use of torture by the 
law enforcement agencies in India: ‘It certainly appears that there is a tradition of 
police brutality and arbitrariness in much of the country, the degree of brutality is 
frequently being sufficiently unrestrained to amount to torture, often with fatal 
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consequences’.95 The Human Rights Council in its concluding observations on India 
after the first cycle of India’s Universal Periodic Review once again expressed the 
same concern.
96
 Submissions to the Human Rights Council also indicate that torture is 
a serious problem and may undermine the legitimacy of convictions in Pakistan.
97
  It 
further reveals the horrible fact: ‘Detainees also die in custody due to torture and 
general abuse’.98 In its Universal Periodic Review, the Human Rights Council 
recommended that Bangladesh address the issue of torture by law enforcement 
agencies.
99
 
The reports of Police Commissions, Law Commissions and observations made by the 
High Courts and the Supreme Courts in these countries identify the torture inflicted 
by investigating agencies. One State Police Commission in India had candor to 
acknowledge it. The Uttar Pradesh Police Commission observed: 
We regret to note that old and crude methods of investigation still continue to 
persist. Complaints of beating, physical torture, maltreatment and harassment 
by Police Officials are not wanting. Most of these complaints are concerned 
with the investigation of cases.
100
 
Indian Law Commission Report says: ‘Even so, a large number of complaints persist, 
complaining of unlawful deprivation of liberty of the citizens at the hands of police 
and other enforcement authorities, of their resort to unlawful methods of investigation 
and of cruel and unusual treatment of the accused while in their custody’.101 
In Parmananda Pegu v State of Assam, the Supreme Court of India noted that the 
confessions were involuntary, and the medical evidence and cause of death did not 
match the confessions made.
102
 The Court acquitted the accused, who was sentenced 
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to death by the trial court, on the basis of the fact discovered that the police had 
extracted an involuntary confession.
103
 In Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors, the 
Supreme Court of India condemned: ‘Dehumanizing torture, assault and death in 
custody are so widespread as to raise serious questions about credibility of rule of law 
and administration of criminal justice’.104 The three member bench of the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan ordered disciplinary action against police officers and officials who 
were found guilty of committing torture on accused and registering seven false cases 
against the parents of the accused.
105
 In Saifuzzaman v. State the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh expressed concern about indiscriminate arrests of innocent persons who 
are then subject to third-degree methods with a view to extracting confessions.
106
  
This study identifies two major causes for use of torture by the investigating agencies 
in the Indian Subcontinent. 
 4.1.2. Causes of the Use of Torture 
4.1.3. Lack of Training and Modern Equipment 
In the absence of sophisticated modern techniques of investigations, the law 
enforcement agencies adopt third degree methods to force a confession of guilt.
107
 In 
the perspective of India, Police officers complain that ‘they are professionally ill 
equipped to meet the requirements of a force serving a modern democratic state and 
its people’.108  In 1998, the Ribeiro Committee on Police Reforms recommended that 
the investigating police officers be trained in the scientific method of police 
investigation and not be utilized for law and order duties.
109
 In 2009, Human Rights 
Watch interviewed many police officers in India that ‘admitted that use of force is 
their primary investigation tactic’.110 In 2012, the Indian Law Commission Report 
identifies the weakness of police’s investigation in these words:‘Police are quite often 
handicapped in undertaking effective investigation for want of modern gadgets such 
as cameras, video equipment etc. Forensic Science laboratories are scarce and even at 
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the district level, there is no lab which can render timely assistance to the 
investigating police’.111 The report of Indian Law Commission in 2015 also 
underlines the need for reforms for ‘better and more effective investigation’.112 
Since 1961 the reports of Police Commissions of Pakistan highlight the need for 
training and skill to enhance the capacity of police for the investigation.
113
 Among 
these, Mitha Police Commission report made comprehensive recommendations to 
address the problems of investigation.
114
 In 2014, the National Judicial Policy Making 
Committee expressed its concern over the defective investigation in the criminal cases 
and made recommendation to the all provincial governments in Pakistan for the 
training and capacity building of investigating officers.
115
 
The police officers equal to the rank of Inspector General in Police Service of 
Pakistan have highlighted the deficiency of police investigation in their books and 
publications. In this series, M.A.K Chaudhry writes in his memoir: ‘The police 
regularly use torture to elicit confessions because they lack other, more sophisticated 
means of investigation’.116 Brigadier Yasin has similar opinion: ‘The investigating 
agencies including police employ torture as a major tool for investigation because 
these are poorly equipped’.117 Another veteran police officer writes: ‘The police use 
torture because they lack professional competence to elicit confession through 
intelligent interrogation’.118 Further he reveals: ‘In the areas with higher crime rates, 
this trend has been somewhat ignored and thus tacitly tolerated by the police 
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administrators and the governments’.119 The Report of Asia Society edited by leading 
police experts in Pakistan and the United States reflect: ‘Professional skill of Police in 
investigating crime must be sharpened’.120  
A report compiled by United Nations Development Programme on police reform in 
Bangladesh reveals that ‘forensic evidence such as fingerprints and detailed crime 
scene sketching or photography is rarely used to support investigation’.121 The report 
furthers depicts, much of equipment of the Chief Chemical Examiner’s Office is 
‘significantly outdated’ the laboratory has ‘no serology or DNA capacity’.122 
 
4.1.3. Abuse of Power to Arrest and Investigate  
  
Ironically, the Police Act of 1861 (along with the Police Rules of 1934), a colonial 
legacy that was meant to control people rather than serve them,
123
 remained 
applicable in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as a central law (with very minor 
modifications).
124
 The British, instead of following the model of the London 
Metropolitan Police set up in 1829, a centralized, paramilitary police system designed 
for colonial Ireland was introduced in Colonial India.
125
 This model was obviously 
suitable for India as the colonial state needed a colonial police, answerable only to 
itself not to the people.
126
 David Arnold argues that the colonial police structure was 
meant to be an institutional realization of the Benthamite ideal of the Panopticon.
127
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Indian Penal Code1860 and Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empower police to 
arrest
128
, arrest without warrant
129
, detain
130
, to arrest on suspicion
131
 and to conduct 
investigation.
132
  Section 54 of Code of Criminal Procedure empowers police to arrest 
without a warrant from magistrate when there is ‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘credible 
information’ of the commission of a cognizable offence133in nine situations. If the 
police are unable to complete the investigation within 24 hours from such an arrest, 
section 167 provides for further detention by the police up to a maximum of 15 days, 
subject to the orders of a magistrate.
134
 Even a magistrate is powerless to authorize 
further police custody beyond 15 days on the whole.
135
  
The practice is different from the theory, the investigation starts with the arrest of 
suspect instead of collecting all possible evidence before the arrest.
136
 S. K. Ghosh 
summarizes the working of police: ‘the average Indian method was and to a certain 
extent even today is that the investigating officer finds rightly or wrongly his suspect, 
extort a confession from him and thus proceeds to search for facts to fit him’.137 Thus 
police makes a clever blend of the two detestable methods, namely ‘third degree’ and 
‘padding’.138 The police officers consider 24 hours are not enough ‘to interrogate a 
suspect thoroughly and courts do not give police remand easily’.139 That is why 
police, in majority of cases, makes the formal entry of the arrest of the suspects after 
completion of the process of investigation. First Information Report (FIR),
140
  as the 
name reflects, is only a first step before the actual investigation. However, there is a 
definite tendency by police officers to file FIRs only after the investigation, once the 
suspect culprit has been identified. It is condemnable to take people in police vehicles 
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and to subject them to interrogation in police stations without sufficient evidence 
collected against them.
141
  
This unfettered power to arrest is not only exploited by the police but also the 
complainant especially in the charges of offence of murder. Whenever an offence of 
murder is committed, the immediate or extended family of the victim has some 
suspicion regarding the murderer; it is customary for the police to urge them to add as 
many names as they want to the list of potential suspects. Ultimately, ‘those people 
who claim to be innocent are dropped from the list after they pay off the police’.142 
The implied objective of throwing out a wide net is to arrest ten people in order to 
have a chance to catch the actual culprit.
143
  
The reports of the Law Commission of these countries also identify the abuse of 
power by police under section 54 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Indian Law 
Commission Report reveals the fact: ‘Complaints of abuse of power and torture of 
suspects in custody by the Police and other law enforcing agencies having power to 
detain a person for interrogation in connection with investigation of an offence are, on 
rise’.144 As a matter of fact members of the weaker or poor sections of society are 
arrested informally and kept in police custody for days together without any entry of 
such arrests in police record. The Indian Law Commission Report 177 noted that the 
Code confers ‘a vast sometime absolute and on some other occasion, an unguided and 
arbitrary power of arrest upon police’.145 The same report shows its concern that 
arrest of a person ‘without warrant and without an order from magistrate seriously 
invades the liberty of a citizen’.146 Pakistan Law Commission, in its Report No.49 
also observes that in most of cases, ‘police officer arrested the person without 
collecting any material connecting with commission of the offences’.147  
The Supreme Court and the High Court of these countries had made important court 
directives on custodial accountability. The Lahore High Court in Khizer Hayat v. the 
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State observed: ‘Merely because there is power to arrest, it is by no means necessary 
that the police should in all cases take the suspect into custody’.148  The Lahore High 
Court forwarded its judgment in the case of Allah Rakhi v. the State to the Secretary 
of the Law Commission of Pakistan to consider the incorporation of a new section in 
the Criminal Procedure Code to minimize the probability of misuse of power by 
Police.
149
 The Supreme Court of Bangladesh, in Saifuzzaman v. State, expressed 
concern about indiscriminate arrest of innocent persons who were then subjected to 
third-degree methods with a view to extracting confession.
150
 The High Court 
Division of the Bangladesh also explained that before the arrest the police officer 
must have had ‘actual knowledge of underlying facts that lead to the suspicion’.151The 
Indian Supreme Court in D.K. Basu v.West Bengal issued a list of eleven guidelines 
for police to follow when arresting someone.
152
 These guidelines were never followed 
as Indian Law Commission Report 180
th
 noted: ‘Can anybody assure that in India, the 
Police invariably would inform a person in detention that he has a right to call a 
lawyer at the time of his interrogation’.153  
 
4.1.4. Insufficient Legal Protections against Torture during Police Investigation 
 
Firstly a statement made by an accused person to the police in the course of 
investigation is wholly inadmissible.
154
 The Indian Evidence Act 1872 reinforces the 
bar against admissibility of confessional statement by the accused to the police.
155
 No 
statement made to the police by anyone, whether witness or suspect, is admissible as 
evidence
156
 and offer of any threat or inducement to elicit a statement or information 
is barred.
157
 However a suspect’s statement to police is admissible as evidence if it 
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leads to ‘discovery of fact’.158 It is indirect route that leads to police reliance on 
confession. The Indian Law Commission report refers it as ‘fruits here posed no 
problem’.159 
Another remedy to police torture is the detained person has the right to ‘request the 
magistrate for a medical examination by a medical officer’.160 The Magistrate before 
whom an arrested person is produced shall enquire whether he has any complaint of 
torture or maltreatment in police custody and inform him that he has right to be 
medically examined.
161
The medical legal report is only a yard stick to prove or refute 
the allegation of torture and inhuman and degrading punishment during the custody. 
 It is evident that these two statutory protections could not restrain police to use force 
to extract confessions since British rule in India. The Indian Law Commission 
recognizes the fact: ‘The existing law is inadequate and ineffective in dealing with the 
custodial crimes and in many cases the erring officers go scot free on account of the 
complainants inability to prove the case against them’.162 The report further reveals: 
‘torture under police custody is extremely difficult to prove due to two reasons the 
victim is afraid to speak out; and secondly, no third party may ordinarily be present 
who can give oral testimony’.163 To address the issue of paucity of evidence and 
probable escape of culprit, the Law Commission of Bangladesh has recommended 
‘raising a presumption against the custodial official if injury or death in custody is 
established’.164 
Despite their treaty obligations, the Governments in the Indian Subcontinent are 
reluctant to criminalize torture in custody which provides impunity to law 
enforcement agencies. Torture is not defined in domestic legislation even the 
Constitution. Domestic legislation in accordance with international convention on 
torture is overdue in these countries. 
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In short use of third degree method (torture) by police to extract confession has been a 
long history in the Indian Subcontinent.  The judicious use of custodial torture is seen 
both as a necessity and justification for police operation. Owing to a lack of forensic 
support and the proper training of staff, torture is considered as a cheap and effective 
means to secure a confession. Evidence obtained as a result of torture, whether the 
torture generates the ‘lead’ fatally taints the death penalty trial. This defacto practice 
of police torture multiplies the risk of prosecuting the innocent and the weak of the 
society. 
4.2 The Right to Access to Legal Council 
The right to defend one-self is an essential part of the right to a fair trial in criminal 
and civil proceedings and serves, among other purposes, to ensure that the principle of 
equality of arms is upheld. In the international legal framework, Article 14 (3) (d) of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires:  
to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal 
assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any 
case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in 
any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it.  
According to Professor Manfred Nowak, the right can be further divided into an 
individual’s rights to defend oneself in person; to choose one’s own council; to be 
informed of the right to counsel and to receive free legal assistance.
165
 In capital 
cases, the right to counsel applies to all stages of criminal proceedings including the 
preliminary investigation and pretrial detention.
166
 The Human Rights Committee has 
observed in its various decisions that cases involving a death sentence clearly require 
counsel in the interests of justice. In Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, it stressed that 
‘legal assistance to the accused in a capital case must be provided in ways that 
adequately and effectively ensure justice’.167 In Kelly v. Jamaica, it expressed the 
opinion that ‘while Article 14(3)(d) does not entitle the accused to choose counsel 
provided to him free of charge, measures must be taken to ensure that counsel, once 
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assigned, provides effective representation in the interests of justice’.168 In Reid v. 
Jamaica, the Committee held that ‘the State party should have appointed another 
lawyer for his defense or allowed him to represent himself at the appeal 
proceedings’.169 In Robinson Lavende v Trinidad and Tobago, the Committee 
reiterated its standpoint that ‘it is imperative for legal aid to be available to a 
convicted prisoner under sentence of death, and this principle applies to all stages of 
the legal proceedings’.170 
The Human Rights Committee has recognized that the right to counsel means the 
right to effective counsel and must be qualified to represent and defend the 
accused.
171
 The Committee expressed concern at the inadequate system of legal aid 
representation in Jamaica, finding that such inadequacy in capital cases ‘amounts to a 
violation of article 6 and 14 of the Covenant’.172 In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Extra Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution stated ‘all dependents facing the 
imposition of capital punishment must benefit from the service of a competent 
defense counsel at every stage of the proceedings’.173 Interpreting the right to counsel 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human 
Rights held that the State must also provide effective counsel and has an obligation to 
see that the appointed counsel is carrying out his or her duties adequately.
174
  
In addition to international guidelines, the constitutions of India
175
 and Pakistan
176
 
provide for a right to defend through legal counsel of his or her choice. The Criminal 
Procedure Code 1898 empowers the trial court to provide legal aid to the person 
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charged with an offence punishable by death.
177
 Despite constitutional and statutory 
provisions the legal aid system remained underdeveloped in the judicial system of 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
India violates an individual’s right to legal representation at all stages for those facing 
capital punishment.
178
  The judiciary has played an active role in interpreting the 
meaning and scope of legal aid in India.
179
 By the late 1970s, the Supreme Court in 
Sunail Batra v. Dehli Administration
180
 recognized the right to legal representation as 
a fundamental right by a liberal interpretation of Article 21 of the constitution which 
relates to protection of life and liberty. The higher judiciary in India has not only 
realized the magnitude of this issue but in many cases namely Khatri and Others v. 
State
 
of Behar
181
 and Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh
182
 has issued 
directions to the states to ensure the provision of legal aid. In Hussainara Khatoon v. 
Home Secretary,
183
 the State of Bihar Justice Bhagwati explained that denial of the 
right to legal aid amounts to denial of equal justice and equal access to justice. In 
Sukh Dass v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh the Supreme Court of India 
observed that conviction  of an accused in a trial in which the accused was not 
provided legal aid would be set aside as being in violation of Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India.
184
 In Babubhai Udesinh Parmar v. State of Gujrat
185
  the 
Supreme Court commuted the sentence of death finding the confession untrue and 
noted ‘he had no opportunity to have an independent advice’. As in  Bachan Singh 
Case Justice Bhagwati  held that ‘there can be no doubt that the death penalty in its 
actual operation is discriminatory for its strikes mostly against the poor and deprived 
sections of the community and the rich and the affluent usually escape from its 
clutches’.186 
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In India, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was amended in 1973
187
 and  a 
provision under Section 304 provided to an unrepresented accused at State 
expenses.
188
 In the  light of recommendations of the 14
th
 Report of the Law 
Commission
189
, India accorded constitutional sanctity to free legal aid in 1976 by 
incorporating Article 39-A that obligates the state to provide free legal aid by a 
suitable legislation.
190
 To materialize the objective, the Expert Committee for Legal 
Aid made its recommendation for the establishment of a legal aid system for the 
weaker sections of the society.
191
 Moreover, in 1977 the Committee on Judicature, 
chaired by Mr. Justice P.N. Bhagwati proposed organizational set up for free legal 
aid.
192
Against this backdrop, the Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 was passed that 
envisaged the establishment of Legal Service Authorities at the National, State and 
District levels along with Legal Services Committees at the Supreme Court, High 
Court and the Taluka levels.
193
 This Act was not enforced by the Government until 
November1995.Amnesty International conducted a study of Supreme Court 
judgments in death penalty cases from 1950 to 2006 which   revealed that 
effectiveness of legal aid was limited.
194
 To ensure free and competent legal services, 
in 2010, the Indian Government promulgated the regulations that are applicable to the 
Legal Service Committees of the Supreme Court, High Courts, the Districts and 
Talukas.
195
 The Regulations empower legal services authorities to specially engage 
experienced and competent lawyers for the indigent accused in the matters where life 
and liberty are at risk.
196
 
The Regulations are a good indicator of measures adopted to strengthen the system of 
legal aid in India. But the two major challenges hamper to trickle down the fruit of the 
legal aid system to the poor facing the charges of capital offences. Firstly the fee for 
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the state’s appointed lawyer is not enough to attract the services of competent and 
experienced lawyers as this has been endorsed by the report based upon the study of 
Legal Services Authorities of eight states.
197
 Under Regulation 8 of NALSA(Free and 
Competent Legal Aid the amount stipulated payable per month to lawyers who are 
called Retainer Lawyers or solely committed to the cause of fighting legal aid cases is 
a mere sum Rs.5000 (52 pound sterling) per month for district legal service; 
Rs.7500(78 pound sterling) per month for High Court Legal services; Rs 10000(104 
pound sterling) per month for Supreme Court Services.
198
 Without taking into account 
the element of corruption, the fees allocated for the legal aid programme are not 
attractive enough to hire the services of a competent lawyers.
199
 
Another challenge to free legal aid in India is the mounting arrears of cases and lesser 
number of lawyers appointed by the state for legal assistance. According to a recent 
report, ‘the Indian criminal justice system is plagued with the ever increasing number 
of 31.3 million pending cases in different courts of country at all levels’.200 Despite 
the efforts of the Indian Government ‘backlog of cases is mounting every year’.201 
The question is how many cases a trial judge can handle properly before his fatigue 
reaches the level which may affect the fairness of the trial.
202
  It means those who 
cannot engage lawyers cannot get due attention of judge and the lawyer. According to 
the Regulations, the strength of Retainer lawyers shall not exceed: (a) 20 in the 
Supreme Court Legal Services Committee; (b) 15 in the High Court Legal Services 
Committee; (c) 10 in the District Legal Authority;(d) 5 in the Taluk Legal Services 
Committee.
203
 Obviously the number of lawyers is not in proportion to the number of 
indigent accused facing various charges. The onus is on the Government of India to 
respect the right of the accused to be defended by a competent and qualified legal 
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practitioner of his or her choice especially when many people in the country cannot 
afford a lawyer.
204
 
In Pakistan, the free legal aid for the weaker segment of society is an even more 
neglected area. The Constitution of Pakistan requires the State to provide 
‘inexpensive and expeditious justice’.205 ‘Equity before law’ and ‘equal protection of 
law’ is another fundamental right guaranteed by Article 25 of the Constitution of 
Pakistan.
206
 The Code of Criminal Procedure under Section 340 also gives a right to 
the accused ‘to be defended by a pleader’.207 The High Court Rules also provide for 
legal assistance at the State’s expense for an accused person charged with a capital 
offence.
208
 
Despite the constitutional bindings and provisions under the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of the country, there is no comprehensive system for legal aid to be 
provided to the indigent persons facing criminal and civil proceedings. The laws and 
rules governing the legal aid system are scattered and not administered by a single 
body. For instance, each High Court extends free legal aid to needy persons under the 
Destitute Litigant Fund Rules 1974 in constitutional matters to destitute litigants. The 
Deputy Registrar High Court is empowered to decide the eligibility of the recipient of 
free legal aid under this scheme.
209
 The High Court Rules authorize the court to 
engage the legal counsel at the state’s expense for unrepresented accused facing the 
death penalty or life imprisonment.
210
 Under the rules, the government appointed 
legal counsel (pauper council) is entitled to get meager amount Rs. 200. per hearing 
211
(approx. 3 pounds) 
The Pakistan Bar Council provides legal aid through its committees working at the 
Central, Provincial and District levels.
212
 In 1999, the Pakistan Bar Council notified 
the Free Legal Aid Committee Rules, 99 by exercising the provision under the Legal 
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Practitioner and Bar Council Act, 1973.
213
 Each legal aid Committee maintains two 
lists of lawyers’ panels: Lawyers who offer services on pro bono basis214 and those 
who offer services on low bono basis.
215
 The Free Legal Aid Committee Rules1999, 
require each member of   the Pakistan Bar Council and the Provincial Bar Council to 
conduct at least one case each year assigned to the member by the legal aid 
committee.
216
 
Another system of free legal aid is that of District Legal Empowerment Committees 
that are established and administered by the Law and Justice Commission of 
Pakistan.
217
 These committees are chaired by District and Sessions Judges of the 
respective district in the country.
 218
 The committee determines the fees of the legal 
counsel in accordance with the nature of  the  case and ‘it shall not be more than 
Rs.20000 in any circumstances for a case’.219 
 In 2009, the Government of Pakistan promulgated the Public Defender and Legal Aid 
Office Ordinance, 2009, which aims to ‘promote justice throughout Pakistan by 
providing quality and free legal services, protecting individual rights, and advocating 
for effective defender services and a fair justice system’.220  Under the ordinance ‘any 
court may direct the Chief Public Defender, an Additional Chief Public Defender, a 
District Public Defender, or a Public Defender to represent any person including the 
indigent person in court for whom the court considers, on any ground that such person 
should be represented by such officer.
221
 It was a serious effort to streamline the issue 
of legal aid in Pakistan. At the time of writing the chapter, the Ordinance has yet to be 
implemented, and no appointments have been made to any of the newly created 
positions. Similarly, the Punjab Public Defender Service Act, 2007, a provincial 
equivalent to the PDLAOA, has yet to be implemented. 
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One of the reasons of inadequate legal aid in Pakistan is that the state appointed 
counsel are poorly paid. In 2007, the International Federation for Human Rights and 
the Human Rights Commission conducted the interviews of various attorneys 
estimated that ‘as an average fee for an appeal to High Court in a murder case is 
approximately Rs 60000 (about £400) and appeal in Supreme Court Rs.300000 ( 
about1980 pound sterling)a strict minimum.
222
 
Secondly, after analyzing the laws and rules dealing with legal aid in Pakistan it may 
be discerned that the rules lack sufficient details and guidance on the criteria and 
methods for the selection of cases and screening of deserving litigants the criterion to 
assess the eligibility based upon discretion. Further, the sources of funding are not 
determined which is of paramount importance for a sustainable legal aid system. The 
National Judicial Policy 2012 underlines the problem and suggests that ‘the Federal 
and Provincial Government may allocate sufficient fund for the Pakistan Bar Council 
for activation of the legal Aid Committee’.223 
Thirdly, there is a lack of clear operating procedures, proper monitoring, reporting 
and evaluation mechanism, which make it impossible to assess the scale and quality 
of the legal aid services provided to people. On the basis of the Lahore District Courts 
Survey (2010-11), Osama Siddique derives the conclusion: ‘Almost no one has ever 
heard of a free legal aid scheme for vulnerable or disadvantaged litigants, let alone 
accessed it’.224 Further, he describes the miserable and pathetic condition of legal aid 
in these words: ‘more limited choices and contacts for selecting legal counsel 
Pakistan’.225  
The Constitution of Bangladesh ensures equal protection of the law
226
 and guarantees 
speedy and fair trial
227
 but contains no explicit provision that directly binds the 
Government to provide free legal aid. In recognition of the legal aid as a right, the 
Government enacted the Legal Service Act 2000. The Act was an initial step to 
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empower disadvantaged and vulnerable people but it is full of weaknesses, loopholes 
and procedural complexities.
228
 The Act does not spell out the procedure for the 
selection of the needy applicant and financial resources of the District Legal Aid 
Committee solely responsible to provide legal aids at grass roots level.
229
 Justice 
Mahmudur Rahman writes: ‘In Bangladesh many cases remain midway because the 
applicant is unable to afford the legal counsel’.230 A report of the United Nations 
Development Programme reveals the fact that the lack of legal representation renders 
the judicial system ‘virtually inaccessible to the vast majority of the poor and the 
disadvantaged’.231 Bangladesh expressed its position on public defender in its 
reservations to the ICCPR that they aspired to fully implement the statutory right to a 
public defender but currently they lack the financial wherewithal to ensure that right 
is guaranteed
232
 The provision of legal aid to the needy at the state expense in 
consonance with international guideline remains a distant goal in Bangladesh.
233
  
4.3 Issues Related to Witnesses 
Article 14(3) (e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires: 
‘To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him’.234 The right of the accused to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his or her behalf is subject to the restriction that this be 
‘under the same conditions as witnesses against him (dans les memes conditions que 
les temoins a charge’.235 In its General Comment the Committee explained that this 
provision was ‘designed to guarantee to the accused the same legal powers of 
compelling the attendance of witnesses and of examining or cross-examining any 
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witnesses as are available to the prosecution’.236 The Committee observed in Grant v. 
Jamaica case where the failure of a witness to appear in court is attributed to the 
State’s authorities, the proceeding will be in violation of Article 14, paragraph 1 and 
3(e) of the Covenant.
237
 
In the trial system in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the burden of proof lies on the 
prosecution
238
 to prove the guilt of the accused. The prosecution and defense prepare 
their respective cases and the prosecution has to first lead evidence.
239
 The defense 
cross-examines
240
 the prosecution witness to test the veracity of the prosecution case. 
The entire merit of the case is based upon witnesses. Jeremy Bentham highlighted the 
importance of witnesses in these words: ‘witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice’.241  
In Zahira Habibulla. Sheikh and Anr. v. State of Gujara, the Indian Supreme Court 
observed ‘If the witness himself is incapacitated from acting as eyes and ears of 
justice, the trial gets putrefied and paralyzed, and it no longer can constitute a fair 
trial’.242 In criminal proceeding there may be persons involved who do not hesitate to 
commit or contract others to commit violent crimes to stop or influence witness. It is 
therefore necessary to ensure that witnesses appear in court and give correct and 
truthful statements. On the other hand, any measure undertaken to increase the 
security and comfort of witnesses has to be balanced against the rights of the defense 
and the obligation to respect the principles of due process. 
The main issues related to witnesses in the three countries include unreliable 
witnesses, refusing to appear due to fear of reprisal and witnesses turning hostile 
under threats, intimidation or any inducement. These issues not only cause undue 
delay in trial but enhance the probability of powerful escaping from prosecution. 
Firstly, the problem of unwilling witnesses may be traced back during the period of 
colonial India. Joseph Chailley depicted the untrustworthy character of witnesses in 
                                                 
236
 UNCHR ‘General Comment No.13’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments 
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (1994) UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 14 (1994), para 12. 
237
 Lloyd Grant (represented by counsel) v. Jamaica (Communication No. 353/1988) (4 April 1994) 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/353/1988, para.8.4. 
238
 Indian Evidence Act 1872, Article 101. 
239
 Code of Criminal Procedure1898, sec. 
240
 Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Article137, Article138, The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the Code of 
Criminal Procedure,1973 lay down a comprehensive legal frame work for recoding the 
241
 Jeremy Bentham, A Treatise on Judicial Evidence from the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham, Esq 
(1
st
 edn,Baldwin,1825), p.226. 
242
 Zahira Habibulla Sheikh and Anr. v. State of Gujarat, (2006) Criminal Appeal No-446-449 of 2004, 
p. 14. 
 122 
these words: ‘Witnesses, again are less accurate observers, less truthful, and more  
timid than in Europe. It would be no exaggeration to say that a judge, and especially a 
criminal judge, rarely finds, in the course of a case, a man whose testimony he can 
rely and of whom he can say, here is the person who is telling truth’.243 To illustrate 
the credibility of dispositions Chailley quoted some examples which he picked up 
during his visits to Indian Courts ranging from high court to magisterial courts. In 
1914, an English judge gave the following remarks regarding witnesses in India: 
…. in England it had been reasonable to assume that the individual citizen was 
willing to help the state, willing to give information of crime brought to his 
knowledge, willing to give evidence in court against the accused. This 
assumption was grotesquely untrue in India, where the only willing witness was 
the false witness or the personally interested one.
244
 
After a century, in March 2003, the findings of the committee on the Reforms of 
Criminal Justice System, chaired by Dr. Justice V.S. Malimath are not different from 
the observation of Mr. Chailley. The report says: ‘Witnesses come to the court, take 
oath and quite often give false evidence with impunity. The procedure for taking 
action for perjury is not simple and the judges seldom make use of them’.245  
Secondly, witnesses are unwilling to appear in court. This problem involves the 
physical and moral vulnerability of the witness which calls for physical protection of 
the witness at all stages of the criminal justice process till the conclusiveness of the 
case. The Indian Law Commission in its 154
th
 Report captured the precarious plight 
of witness in the criminal justice system in these words: ‘A poor witness is caught 
between the devil and deep sea. If it fails to attend the court he shall be penally liable 
and if he attends, he undergoes an agonizing experience resulting in great 
inconvenience and loss’.246 The witnesses not only get threats but in many cases they 
have been killed. The Indian Law Commission reveals the horrible fact in these 
words: ‘The impunity with which persons facing charges of mass murders, rape and 
gruesome killing are able to frustrate the justice process through the tactics of 
intimidation, threats and even elimination of witness has given cause for grave 
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concern’.247 Justice Wadhwa in Swaran Singh vs. State of Punjab observed: ‘Here the 
witnesses who are harassed a lot (….) not only that witness is threatened; he is 
abducted; he is maimed; he is done away with or even bribed. There is no protection 
for him’.248 The Bangladesh Law Commission Report No. 74 states: ‘The witnesses 
are reluctant to come before a court or tribunal to give their evidence in the case for 
fear of their own life and property or those of families’.249 The Pakistan Law 
Commission commented that ‘they may not be unnecessary called and be ensured 
protection of their lives’.250 
In Pakistan, no one is willing to testify against powerful criminals and militants in 
courts because killing witnesses has become an easy and effective method of 
stymieing justice in many cases. A notorious example is that of terrorist Malik 
Ishaq
251
 who was charged with at least seventy murders but was never convicted 
because no one wanted to put his or her life in danger by being a witness against 
him.
252
 There are numerous reported cases where witnesses have been killed by the 
family or friends of powerful accused and accomplices of terrorists. The five 
witnesses of Wali Khan Babar’s murder case including Rajab Bangali, Asif Rafiq, 
Naveed Tanoli brother of Inspector Shafiq Tanoli who arrested the accused and 
Haider Ali who identified the accused and one prosecutor Naimat Randhawa were all 
killed despite the direction of the Sindh High Court under the Anti-Terrorist Act of 
1997.
253
 The key witness of Sabeen Mahmood’s Murder254 case namely Ghulam 
Abass was killed on September 7, 2015.
255
 
The third problem is that of the witness turning hostile under intimidation or 
allurement. In the best interest of justice, it is vital to preserve the evidence  that  has 
already been collected at the stage of investigation by not allowing witnesses 
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retracting from their statements.
256
 The Bangladesh Law Commission reports that ‘in 
most of the cases involving rich and influential persons, witnesses turn hostile making 
the whole process of justice infructuous’.257 In India, there are numerous examples 
when the prosecution case has fallen apart due to witnesses turning hostile. Some 
highly publicized examples of witnesses turning hostile include  the murder case of 
model Jessica Lal, in which eyewitness Shyan Munshi back tracked from his police 
statement because  Siddharth Vashisht, also known as Manu Sharma, the son of 
Venod Sharma, a wealthy and influential Congress-nominated Member of Parliament 
from Haryana, as the murderer
258
. In BMW case, Sanjeev, son of an Indian 
Industrialist ran over six people including three police officers. Prosecution witness 
Manoj Malik retracted his statement and described the vehicle involved in the 
accident as a truck instead of a car.
259
 Subsequently, the Delhi High Court, the 
appellate court, made the observation:‘ The power of money had adopted dubious 
methods to win over witnesses, police and prosecutors’.260 In the trial of the Best 
Bakery case ( burning 14 persons alive in 2002), Zaheera Sheikh, whose family 
members were burnt to death, and other witnesses retracted their statements under 
intimidation.
261
 As a result all accused were acquitted by Vadodara fast track trial 
court due to lack of evidence.
262
 Gujarat High Court in its judgment State Of Gujarat 
vs Rajubhai Dhamirbhai Bariya, on 26 December, 2003, refused to review the trial 
court order but the Supreme Court ordered for retrial.
263
 The Supreme Court 
observed: ‘If the witnesses get threatened or are forced to give false evidence that also 
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would not result in a fair trial. The failure to hear material witnesses is certainly 
denial of fair trial’.264  
In Pakistan, on October 30, 2015 the Chief Justice of Pakistan took suo moto notice 
on the acquittal of five accused persons including the son of a former Federal Minister 
charged with the murder of a 16 years old orphan by the trial court. The Anti-
Terrorism Court (ATC) in Lahore exonerated the accused on the ground that there 
was no possibility of conviction due to lack of evidence 
265
 because the prosecution 
witnesses turned hostile. The mother of the deceased, Mst. Ghazala  recorded the 
statement in the Supreme Court that  ‘she  is  too  weak  to  fight against  the  killers  
of  her deceased  son,  as  the  accused  party  is  very  powerful’.266  The three 
member bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan commented in their order: ‘We in 
the given circumstances are shocked to see the state of affairs where a mother of a 
young boy because of her weaknesses and other shortcomings is being compelled to 
give up her right to seek justice. The procedure provided under our present criminal 
justice system is very cumbersome”.267  
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh has no comprehensive legislation to guarantee the 
protection of witnesses.
268
 Only a limited protection  exist in the form of sections 151 
and 152 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which safeguard witnesses against 
harassment during examination or cross examination in court.
269
 In the perspective of 
India, both Law Commissions and the Supreme Court of India have underlined the 
need for law on various aspects of witness protection. The 154th Report of the Indian 
Law Commission 1996 contains a chapter on ‘Protection and Facilities to 
Witnesses’.270 One of the recommendations of the Commission was: ‘witnesses 
should be provided sufficient protection’271 but the Commission does not suggest any 
measures for the physical protection of witnesses. The urgent need to introduce 
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protection measures is evident from the observation made by the Supreme Court in 
National Human Rights Commission v. State of Gujrat. 
272
 The Supreme Court of 
India placed emphasis on the need to secure the safety of witnesses as it is a means to 
ensure a successful prosecution.
273
 In Neelam Katara v. Union of India
274
 the Delhi 
High Court laid down the guidelines with respect to witness protection. In Zahaira 
Habibullah. Sheikh & Others v. State of Gujrat and others, the Supreme Court 
legislative measures to emphasize prohibition against tampering with witness, victim 
or informant have become the imminent and inevitable need of the day.
275
 The 
Malmaith Committee identifies this big flaw that ‘there is no law to protect the 
witnesses’.276 The 178th Report of the Law Commission referred to the fact of 
witness turning hostile, and the recommendations were only to prevent witnesses 
from turning hostile. The Report suggested an amendment to insert Section.164 A to 
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
277
 The Criminal Law Amendment Act 2005, has 
inserted section 195A into the Indian Penal Code, which criminalizes the act of 
‘threatening or inducing any person to give false evidence’ with imprisonment up to 
seven years or fine or both. 
To address the issue of the protection of witnesses in Pakistan the Federal 
Government included a provision in ‘the Protection of Pakistan Act 2014’  reiterating 
that ‘the Government shall take appropriate measures to provide adequate security to 
the prosecution witness’.278 The Sindh Witness Protection Act, 2013, envisaged to 
‘encourage the witnesses to give evidence by providing protection to them and their 
families’.279 The programme spells out relocation, false identity and other necessary 
security measures.
280
 But the law could not be materialized because of a ‘lack of 
adequate resources’.281  
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It is pertinent to mention that anti-terrorism legislation in these countries  have had 
provisions for the protection of witnesses. In India, the draconian laws like the 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, and the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, 2002, provided for protection of witnesses. In Pakistan, the Anti- 
Terrorism Act, 1997 provides protection for witnesses, prosecutors and judges.
282
 The 
recently promulgated Protection of Pakistan Act also only mentions the responsibility 
of the Government to protect witnesses.
283
  Witness protection will have to be ensured 
in all criminal cases involving grave crimes not limited to terrorist crimes. The 
protection clause for witnesses under special anti-terror legislation
284
 only applies to 
prosecution witnesses and not to a defense witness, who also faces the threat of 
intimidation and harassment from the police and may be afraid to depose before the 
court.
285
 This is a glaring omission in witness protection that severely prejudices the 
ability to mount a credible defense. 
Conclusion 
A life taken under state apparatus/judiciary is an arbitrary deprivation of life if the 
standards of collection of evidence against the accused and fair trial as enunciated 
under Articles 9, 14, 15 and 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) are not met. In this context, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee has consistently held that if Article 14 of ICCPR is violated during the 
trial then Article 6 of the ICCPR is also breached. The reports of different UN Special 
Rapporteurs also reiterate the interpretation of the Human Rights Committee. In this 
series, the first report of UN Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions 
says: ‘where a government has imposed a death penalty but failed to comply with the 
procedural safeguards presented in international law, it has violated international law 
and has arbitrarily deprived a person of his life’.286 In fact, the potential for wrongful 
conviction and possibility for the execution of the innocent or those who have not had 
a fair trial is the raison d’etre for exacting standards and a heightened level of due 
process in capital cases. 
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To evaluate the fairness of criminal proceedings in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
this study has referred to the human rights treaties which have been ratified by these 
countries, norms of customary international law, the guarantees and protections 
provided in the domestic constitution and the penal laws of these countries. Judged by 
the said standards, the criminal proceedings do not conform to protections provided 
by international and the national laws to suspects and defendants in capital cases in 
the following areas: The collection of clear and convincing evidence, legal aid at 
state’s expense and protection of witnesses. 
At the pre-trial stage, the first gross violation to the safe guards for those facing 
capital punishment is that the investigating agencies employ torture to extract 
confession. The torture by police inflicted on the suspect has been a reality in all 
major phases of history from the Vedic Age to British Rule in the Indian 
subcontinent. This past refuses to go away and torture still prevails as a public secret. 
The indiscriminate use of torture based on the wrong assessment of suspects, behavior 
by investigating officers have been condemned by the judiciary, law commissions and 
police commissions hitherto appointed by different governments in different periods 
of time. The High Courts and the Supreme Courts of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
in variety of judgments have made the observations that police may not physically or 
psychologically intimidate suspects during custody and interrogation. Simultaneously, 
both international and national human rights organizations, and the UN Human Rights 
Council in its universal periodic reviews of these countries criticize the torture 
employed by the investigating agencies during the course of investigation. 
The investigating agencies including police employ torture as a major tool for 
investigation because they are poorly equipped,
287
 poorly trained to preserve crime 
scene and collection of evidence.
288
 Owing to a lack of forensic support and the 
proper training of staff, torture is considered as a cheap and effective means to secure 
a confession. At the same time, judicious use of custodial torture is seen both as a 
necessity and justification for police operation. It is not only glaring violation of 
safeguard ‘to impose death penalty only when the guilt of the person charged is based 
upon clear and convincing evidence’ but also multiplies the risk of prosecuting the 
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288
 J. C. Chaturvedi, Police Administration and Investigation of Crime (Delhi: Isha Books,2006), p.85. 
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innocent.  It is pertinent to mention that despite these south Asian countries being 
States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) none of them have defined and criminalized torture in their 
domestic law.  
Despite international, domestic constitutional and statutory obligations on the 
provision of effective legal aid in capital cases during all stages of a capital trial, the 
three states have failed to establish a mechanism to provide effective legal aid. It is 
imperative to respect the right of the accused to be defended by a competent and 
qualified legal practitioner of his or her choice especially when many people in these 
countries cannot afford to engage legal counsel for their defense. To fulfill the 
constitutional obligations under article 39-A, the Indian Government introduced the 
Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 that was not enforced by the Government until 
November1995. To ensure free and competent legal services, in 2010, the Indian 
Government promulgated the regulations. But two major challenges hamper to trickle 
down the fruit of legal aid system to the poor facing the charges of capital offences. 
Firstly, the fee for the state’s appointed lawyer is not enough to attract the services of 
competent and experienced lawyer. Secondly mounting arrears of cases at all levels of 
courts frustrate government effort- less number of lawyers appointed by the 
government for the legal assistance in proportion to the number of cases cannot make 
any difference. 
There is no comprehensive and uniform legal framework for legal aid in Pakistan. 
The laws and rules governing legal aid are scattered and not administered by a single 
body. The three different systems of free legal aid work namely under the command 
of three different entities: the High Court Legal aid system works under High Court 
Rules (Pauper Council) and Destitute Litigant Fund Rules; the Pakistan Bar Council 
provides legal aid through its legal aids committees; the Pakistan Law and Justice 
Commission provides legal aid through its District Legal Empowerment Committees.  
The three different systems of legal aid are without any other constant and sufficient 
source of funding except the meager amount allocated by the Government under 
Article 37(d) of the Constitution. To streamline quality and free legal services, the 
Government of Pakistan promulgated the Public Defender and Legal Aid Office 
Ordinance, 2009, which has yet to be implemented. 
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The Constitution of Bangladesh ensures equal protection of law and guarantees 
speedy and fair trials but contains no explicit provision that directly binds the 
Government to provide free legal aid to the indigent. In recognition of the legal aid as 
a right, the Government enacted the Legal Service Act 2000. The Act was an initial 
step to empower disadvantaged and vulnerable people but it is full of weaknesses, 
loopholes and procedural complexities. Consequently, the provision of legal aid to the 
needy at the state expense in consonance with international guideline remains a 
distant goal in Bangladesh. 
Thirdly, the criminal justice system in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh is unable to 
facilitate both defense and prosecution witnesses to testify in an atmosphere free of 
intimidation. The issues related to witnesses namely unreliable witnesses, refusing to 
appear due to fear of reprisal and witnesses turning hostile under threats, intimidation 
or any inducement get incapacitate the interest of justice by causing inordinate delay 
and providing immunity to the powerful from prosecution. One of the major causes of 
the problem is that no comprehensive legislation on the protection of witness as 
against threats, intimidation or any inducement whereby they are prevented from 
telling the truth or turning hostile. Limited protections exist in the form of Sections 
151 and 152 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which safeguard witnesses against 
harassment during examination or cross examination in court. 
It is pertinent to mention that special laws enforced to combat terrorism in these 
countries
289
 provide protection for witnesses, prosecutors and judges. The protection 
clause for witness under special anti-terror legislation only applies to prosecution 
witnesses and not to defense witnesses, who also faces the threat of intimidation and 
harassment from the police and may be afraid to depose before the court. This is a 
glaring omission in witness protection that severely prejudices the ability to mount a 
credible defense. 
To conclude, the criminal justice systems in the three South Asian countries focused 
upon in this study are plagued by an ineffective system of legal aid at the state’s 
expense, investigation based upon torture and confession and no effective law to 
protect both prosecution and defense witnesses. The presence of the three major flaws 
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 India Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987; India Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
2002; Pakistan Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 provided for protection of witnesses.  Pakistan Anti- 
Terrorism Act, 1997 and   Protection of Pakistan Act 2014. 
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questions the legitimacy of criminal proceedings in general and, that of fair trial in 
capital cases, in particular. 
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Chapter 5 
Application of Capital Punishment under Special Laws and 
Courts to Counter Terrorism in Pakistan, India and 
Bangladesh 
 
Introduction: 
Pakistan
1
, India
2
 and Bangladesh
3
 have constituted special courts under special laws 
to counter different types of terrorism including religious militancy and separation 
movements. Without declaring emergency by invoking respective emergency clauses 
enshrined in domestic constitutions and treaty laws, the governments in these 
countries claim that they are in situation of war. Both the judiciary and governments 
in these countries justify the establishment of anti-terrorism courts under special laws 
on the ground that the war on terrorism requires special laws and procedures to 
prosecute the terrorists who get easily exonerated under regular criminal justice 
systems. The special laws empower courts to prosecute individuals for vaguely 
defined offences related to terrorism and to award sentences of death as a maximum 
punishment. This chapter explores how special legislation in these three countries 
have broadened the scope of capital punishment. Moreover, the special courts have 
heightened the risk of arbitrary and subjective application of capital punishment by 
adopting special procedures and lowering the fair trial standards. 
 5.1 International Legal Framework on Counter Terrorism and Special 
Courts 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
Anti-terrorism Courts under Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, since its enactment the law has been amended 
seventeen times; The investigation for the Fair Trial Act 2013; Protection of Pakistan Act 2014; In 
2015, Twenty-first Constitutional Amendment to establish Military Courts for the period of two years.  
2
 The legislative response of India to deal with terrorism include Terrorist Affected Areas (Special 
Courts) Act 1984, the Terrorism and Disruptive Activities(prevention)Act,1987 (allowed to lapse in 
1995, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002(repealed in 2004), and Unlawful Activities Prevention  
Act,2002, the Unlawful Activities( prevention) Act 1967(as amended in 2004 and 2008) and National 
Investigation Agency Act,2008. 
3
 Bangladesh also introduced special laws namely Anti-Terrorism Act 2009 and Special Power Act 
1974 to combat various heinous offences including terrorism. 
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 5.1.1. Global Counter Terrorism Strategy 
 
The international legal framework has been developed, under which states may take 
special measures to deal with terrorism or any state emergency. Following 9/11, the 
Security Council, under its power provided by Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter, passed a resolution that obliged the Member States to criminalize terrorists’ 
acts as serious offences.
4
 The Security Council Resolution 1566 called on states to 
criminalize terrorist acts and punishing terrorists.
5
  Security Council Resolution 1373 
required appropriate measures to combat terrorism in conformity with international 
standards of human rights.
6
  Security Council Resolution 1456(2003) calls on 
Member States to take measures to combat terrorism that must be consistent with 
international law on human rights, international law on refugee and humanitarian 
law.
7
 
A series of resolutions on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism has been adopted by the General Assembly, the first dating 
from December 2002
8
. These resolutions also oblige states to ensure the compatibility 
of counter terrorism measures with their obligation for human rights. The United 
Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2006,
9
 based upon a report by the UN 
Secretary General, highlights  priority areas namely ‘promoting the rule of law, 
respect for human rights and effective criminal justice systems’.10 The report 
condemns terrorists’ acts as ‘violations of the right to life, liberty, security, well-being 
and freedom from fear’11 but at the same time it insists that ‘we must never sacrifice 
our values and lower our standards to those of the terrorists’.12 The report warns that 
                                                 
4
 UNSC Res S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001), para.2. 
5
 UNSC Res1566(8 October 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1566(2004), para.3. 
6
 UNSC Res1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373, para.3(f). 
7
 UNSC Res 1456 (20 January 2003), UN Doc S/RES/ 1456, para.6; Reports of the Counter-terrorism 
Committee referred to the same requirement UN Doc S/2005/800, para.13; Conclusions for Policy 
Guidance Regarding human rights and the CTC,UN Doc S/AC.40/2006/PG.2, (25 May 2006). 
8
 UNGA Res 57/219(18 December 2002) UN Doc A/RES/57/219, p,1; the same provision has been 
incorporated in subsequent resolutions: 58/187, 22 December 2003; 59/191,20 December 2004; 
60/158,16 December 2005 and 63/185 18 December 2008; 64/168, 18 December 2009; 
9
 UNGA Res 60/228 and Annex, 8 September 2006. 
10
 Report of the UN Secretary General, ‘Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global 
Counter-terrorism Strategy’ (2006) UN Doc A/60/825, paras.77-78. 
11
 Ibid, para.111. 
12
 Report of the UN Secretary General, ‘Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global 
Counter-terrorism Strategy’ (2006) UN Doc A/60/825, para.112. 
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the consequence of reducing the conditions ‘may generate cycles of terrorist 
violence’.13   
Counter Terrorism/Emergencies and Right to Fair Trial 
International human rights instruments ‘do try to envision and legally encompass this 
state of emergency and confine unlimited use or abuse of governmental power’.14 In 
this regard, Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
allows the states parties to derogate some rights ‘in time of public emergency which 
threatens a life of nation’.15 Manfred Nowak comments: ‘Similar to an individual’s 
right to self-defense under criminal law, a government’s emergency power allows it to 
take exceptional measures including suspension of basic rights’.16 In fact, the 
principle of legality and the rule of law have to govern such public emergency so 
government to comply with two basic conditions before invoking Article 4(1) of the 
Covenant. First, the situation must amount to a public emergency which threatens the 
life of a nation and second the state party must have officially proclaimed a state of 
emergency.
17
 The ICJ confirmed in the Nuclear Weapons Opinions
18
 as well as in the 
Wall Opinion
19
 that as long as a State has not validly derogated from a provision, the 
norms apply irrespective of the existence of an emergency. Moreover, this power of 
the state is governed by the proportionality principle. A Government may derogate 
from its legal obligations ‘to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation’.20 Ramraj explains the requirement of strict necessity: ‘States may use such 
measures as are strictly necessary to deal with the emergency’.21 
                                                 
13
 Report of the UN Secretary General, ‘Uniting against Terrorism: recommendations for a global 
counter-terrorism strategy’(2006) UN Doc A/60/825,para.113. 
14
 Roza Pati, Due Process and International Terrorism: A International Legal Analysis (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), p.19. 
15
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1976, entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171(ICCPR), art.4(1). 
16
 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary 73(1993) 
17
 UNCHR ‘General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations During a State of Emergency’ (31 
August 2001) Un Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1, para.2. 
18
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, 
paras.226-267,240  
19
 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004,134-203, 178 (para.106). 
20
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1976, entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171(ICCPR), art.4(1)  
21
 Victor V. Ramraj, ‘The Emergency Powers Paradox’ In Victor V. Ramraj & Arun K. 
Thiruvengadam (eds) Emergency Powers in Asia: Exploring the Limits of Legality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp-21-55, p. 51. 
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Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does 
not enlist the right of fair trial under Article 14 among the category of non-derogable 
rights.
22
 It does not imply that States facing an emergency can depart from the right to 
a fair trial as they see fit.
23
 The required minimum level of due process is identified 
with the help of the principle of consistency.
24
The principle requires derogation 
measures to be consistent with the State’s other obligations under international law 
such as the norms of international humanitarian law, applicable during armed 
conflict.
25
 The Human Rights Committee, in its General comments spells out: 
Furthermore, the category of peremptory norms extends beyond the list of non-
derogable provisions as given in Article 4, paragraph 2. States parties may in no 
circumstances invoke Article 4 of the Covenant as justification for acting in 
violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law, for 
instance by taking hostages, by imposing collective punishments, through 
arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviating from fundamental principles of 
fair trial, including the presumption of innocence.
26
 
In its General Comment 32, on the right to a fair trial the Human Rights Committee 
affirmed, ‘the guarantees of fair trial may never be made subject to measures of 
derogation that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights. Thus, for 
example, as Article 6 of the Covenant is non-derogable in its entirety, any trial 
leading to the imposition of the death penalty during a state of emergency must 
conform to the provisions of the Covenant, including all the requirements of Article 
14.
27
 
Guarantees of Fair Trial under International Humanitarian Law 
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 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1976, entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171(ICCPR), art.4(2). 
23
 Evelyne Schmid, ‘The Right to Fair Trial in times of Terrorism: A Method to Identify the Non-
Derogatable Aspects of Article 14 of the International Covenant and Political Rights’ (2009) Gottingen 
Journal of International Law 29, p.31. 
24
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party’s] other obligations under international law. 
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 Martin Scheinin and Mathias Vermeulen, ‘Unilateral Exceptions to International Law’ in Martin 
Scheinin(eds.), Terrorism and Human Rights (Cheltenham: An Elgar Research Collection, 2013), pp.3-
39, p.29. 
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 UNCHR ‘General Comment 29’, in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2001) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para.11. 
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 UNCHR ‘General Comment No. 32’, in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments 
and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2007) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/32, para.59, para.6. 
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Every human being is entitled to a fair and regular trial whatever the circumstances 
including in the context of the war on terrorism, an international armed conflict and a 
non-international armed conflict. States are obliged to observe the minimum standards 
of due process in international armed conflicts as well as non- international armed 
conflict under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols 
of 1977. The convergence of the fair trial Articles in the two 1977 Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions provide a sound basis for an assessment of the 
customary minimum standards of a fair trial.
28
 Article 75 paragraph 4, Protocol I 
provides the fundamental guarantees in judicial matters that must be respected even 
during international conflicts, referring to an ‘impartial and regularly constituted 
court’.29 Broadly speaking, ‘those judicial standards which are common to both 
Protocols are applicable in both types of armed conflict’.30 
The majority of guarantees are included in Article 6 Protocol II Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions which protects persons prosecuted for offences related to a non-
inter-national armed conflict.
31
 Article 6, Protocol II, envisages certain due process 
protections and a prohibition on juvenile executions, and the execution of pregnant 
women and mothers of young children.
32
 The International Committee of the Red 
Cross commentary on this article says: ‘Article 6 lays down some principles of 
universal application which every responsibly organized body must, and can, 
respect’.33 Article 6 supplements and develops Common Article 3, paragraph 1, sub-
paragraph (1)(d) of the four Geneva Conventions which prohibits ‘the passing of 
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced 
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’.34 
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 Stephanos Stavros, The Right to a Fair Trial in Emergency Situations’ (1992) 4(2) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 343, p 
29
 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 
1125 UNTS 3, Article 75(4). 
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 Evelyne Schmid, The Right to Fair Trial in times of Terrorism: A Method to identify the Non-
Derogatable Aspects of Article 14 of the International Covenant and Political Rights, (2009) Gottingen 
Journal of International Law 29, pp.29-44, p.39. 
31
 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, (1977)1125 UNTS 609, art.6. 
32
Ibid, art.6. 
33
 ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols,1987, para. 4597. 
34
 Additional Protocol I (AP I) regulates international armed conflicts and Additional Protocol II (AP 
II) extends protection to victims of internal conflicts. 
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The International Court of Justice confirmed in Nicaragua versus the United State 
that Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, constitutes a ‘minimum yard 
stick’ applicable to all armed conflicts.35 Pro. Schabas explains that Common Article 
3, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty 
and Article 75(4) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provide an 
indication of what is ‘recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’.36 He further 
argues: ‘Humanitarian law provisions define the lowest common denominator of 
human behavior, a minimum standard below which no civilized society can descend 
either in wartime or in peace time’.37 
 5.1.2. Legitimacy of Special Courts/Tribunal 
The establishment of a special court must remain an exceptional decision. The 
independence and impartiality of the special court must be ensured, they must observe 
minimum fair trial guarantees. The right to a fair trial is set out in Article 10 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 14 of ICCPR. Article 14(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights says: ‘Every one shall be entitled 
to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law’.38 The Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 32 
noted: ‘The requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of a tribunal 
in the sense of Article 14, paragraph 1, is an absolute right that is not subject to any 
exception’.39 The Human Rights Committee explains: ‘A situation where the 
functions and competencies of the judiciary and the executive are not clearly 
distinguishable or where the latter is able to control or direct the former is 
incompatible with the notion of an independent tribunal’.40 The Basic Principles on 
the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1985, 
stipulated: ‘The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and 
enshrined in the constitution or the law of the country’. 
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 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
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Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.213. 
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 Ibid, p.213. 
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 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1976, entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171(ICCPR), Art.14(1). 
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 UNCHR ‘General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunales and 
to a Fair Trial’ (2007) UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 , para.19; see Communication No. 263/1987, 
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 138 
The trial of civilians by military courts is not strictly prohibited by the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, the Human Rights Committee 
underlines that ‘the trials of civilians in military or special courts may raise serious 
problems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice is 
concerned’.41 That is why the Human Rights Committee has particularly in its views 
concerning individual communications or its concluding observations on national 
reports repeatedly called on States Parties to prohibit trials of civilians before military 
courts.
42
 In 2006, the Economic and Social Council approved the Draft Principles 
Governing the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals that affirm the 
jurisdiction of military courts should be restricted to military personnel in relation to 
military offences.
43
 Similarly, Principle 29 of the Updated Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity states 
that: ‘The jurisdiction of military tribunals must be restricted solely to specifically 
military offences committed by military personnel’.44 
Regarding procedure, the special or military tribunals must in all circumstances adopt 
standards and procedures internationally recognized as guarantees of a fair trial, 
including rules of international humanitarian law. The Human Rights Committee in 
its General  Comment 32 notes: ‘While the Covenant does not prohibit the trial of 
civilian in military or special courts ,it requires that such trials are in full conformity 
with the requirements of Article 14 and that its guarantees cannot be limited or 
modified because of the military or special character of the court concerned’.45 But in 
practice, states use special powers of arrest, detention and lower standard of proof to 
prosecute suspects and political opponents. Roza Pati points out that ‘it was often 
hard to reconcile such measures with time honored guarantees of due processes’.46 
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 Roza Pati, Due Process and International Terrorism: A International Legal Analysis (Leiden: 
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Experience of special courts in different parts of  the world whether they be in Kenya 
or the Republic of Ireland have meant a diminution in legal standards, a denial of 
basic human rights and their main function has been to put a legal veneer on killings 
by the state.
47
 This has lead, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Palamara-
Iribarne v. Chile to clarify that under no circumstances should civilians be tried 
before a military court.
48
 The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in 
Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v. Sudan declared: ‘Civilian appearing before and 
being tried by a military court presided over by active military officers who are still 
under military regulations violates the fundamental principles of fair trial’.49 
Nepal and Sri Lanka faced far more protracted and deadly insurgencies and acts of 
terrorism but they did not use the death penalty to ensure the national security.
50
 
Since1976, Sri Lanka did not carried out any execution though capital punishment 
remains in the statute book. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) perfected 
the use of suicide bombers, invented the suicide belt and pioneered the use of women 
in suicide attacks. The (LTTE) assassinated former Prime Minister of India, Rajiv 
Gandhi on May 21 May 1991, President of Sri Lanka Ranasinghe Premadasa on 1 
May 1993,
51
 Lakshman Kadirgamar, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister on 12 August 
2005. There were attempts of suicidal attack on then Minister and current President of 
Sri Lanka Maithripala Sirisena on 9 October 2008.
52
 
Nepal is another South Asian Country that did not use capital punishment to deal with 
the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists and the last execution was conducted in 1979. 
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist(CPN-M) in the armed struggle that claimed 
over 13,000 lives from 1996 to 2006.
53
 
To conclude the international legal frame work allows establishment of special or 
military courts to prosecute terrorists but the courts are the exception but not a rule. 
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UN Security Council resolutions allow members states to take special measures to 
counter terrorism but these steps must be in conformity with international human 
rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights permits states to take special 
measures to derogate from some rights ‘in time of public emergency which threatens 
a life of nation’. Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) does not enlist the right to fair trial under Article 14 among the 
category of non-derogable rights. But it does not imply that States facing an 
emergency can depart from the right to a fair trial as they see fit. Derogation measures 
must be consistent with the State’s other obligations under international law such as 
the norms of international humanitarian law, applicable during armed conflict. Those 
countries who are not party to the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty,
54
 
may they resort to capital punishment for the most serious crimes as per Article 6 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 6 of the Covenant is 
non-derogable in its entirety, which means that any trial leading to the imposition of 
the death penalty during a state of emergency or armed conflict must conform to the 
provisions of the Covenant, including all the requirements of Article 14. 
 
 5.2. Working of Special Courts to Counter Terrorism in Pakistan, India 
and Pakistan and Violations of Due Process  
 5.2.1. The Special Courts in Pakistan and Right to Fair Trial  
Overview 
The main anti-terror framework in Pakistan includes Anti-terrorism courts working 
under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 and Military Courts established under Pakistan 
military Act 1952 amended in 2015. The Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 provides the basic 
legal framework for Pakistan’s national counter terrorism efforts. According to an 
Amnesty International Report more than 326 persons were executed during the year 
2015, ‘the third highest number recorded globally’.55 Many of those executed had in 
fact been convicted by Anti-Terrorism Courts, special courts established under the 
                                                 
54
 Article 1 outlaws  capital punishment in all cases but article 2 permits reservation of the application 
of the death penalty in time of war, pursuant to a conviction for ‘a most serious crime of a military 
nature committed during war time’ 
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 Amnesty International, Death Sentences and Executions (London: Amnesty International, 2016), 
p.26. 
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Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997, which the authorities have used to try defendants 
charged with offences under the Penal Code.
56
 
 In 2015, under 21 Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan, 11 military courts 
conducted the trials of the suspects in cases related to terrorism.  According to the 
report of an NGO, 11 Military courts concluded the trial of 64 people, out of which 36 
were sentenced to death and four were given life imprisonment
57
. 8 out of the 36 
people sentenced to death have been executed.
58
 
Rationale and Constitutionality of Anti-Terrorism and Military Courts in Pakistan  
In 1998, the Supreme Court in Mehram Ali and others versus Federation of Pakistan 
validated the constitutionality of anti-terrorism courts subject to three amendments. 
First, the appointment of judges to the Anti-Terrorism Court must be for fixed 
tenures. Second, the working of the special courts should be subject to the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. Finally, appeals against the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism 
Courts must be heard by the regular High Courts and the Supreme Court.
59
 The 
Supreme Court declared: ‘No objection can be taken to the establishment of special 
courts for speedy trials and prevention of terrorist acts/heinous offences under the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 because Article 37(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 
enjoins upon the state to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice’.60 A recent study 
published by the United States Institute of Peace reveals: ‘After nearly two decades of 
functioning many of anti-terrorist courts now have trials running for several years’.61  
In January 2015, Parliament passed the 21
st
 constitutional amendment that amended 
Article 175 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to provide jurisdiction to military 
courts for a period of two years to try civilians for terrorism-related offences.
62
 The 
constitutionality of the courts was challenged by the different Law Bar Associations 
of the country and the petitioners contended that the amendment is contradictory to 
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principles of separation of powers recognized by Pakistan’s Constitution and it would 
lead to violations of the rights to a fair trial and the independence of the judiciary.
63
 In 
District Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan,
64
 the full bench of the Supreme 
Court held that the trial by military courts of individuals accused of terrorism offences 
who are known to or claim to be, members of terrorist groups was compatible with 
the Constitution particularly fundamental rights and the independence of judiciary.
65
 
The Court further maintained: ‘Trials of civilians by Court Martial/Military Courts 
was an exception and could never be the rule, however the gravity of the current 
situation faced by the state of Pakistan and the intensity of the armed conflict 
warranted its description as threat of war’.66 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
enumerated the reasons for the failure of the regular criminal justice system to 
prosecute the terrorists: ‘Logistical shortcomings and legal lacunae exposed 
witnesses, police investigators, prosecutions and judges to violence that impaired the 
working of the present criminal justice system’.67 Instead of strengthening the 
criminal justice system it is a ‘renewed reliance on the failed and blunt instruments of 
coercion and military force’.68 In the Supreme Court judgment, Justice Ejaz Afzal in 
its dissenting opinion termed military courts as ‘short cut’ and ‘palliative’ to the 
problem’.69  
 5.2.2. Incompatibility of Military Court’s Proceedings with the Right to a Fair Trial 
At least 27 convicts by the military courts filed appeals with civilian courts, alleging 
coercion of confessions and denial of access to lawyers and to evidence used against 
them according to Reuter’s research and local media reports.70 In the 16 cases that 
came before the Supreme Court, the full bench (five judges) dismissed the convicts’ 
appeals and upheld the decisions of the military courts of awarding capital 
punishment and declared: ‘It does not appear to be a case of no evidence or 
insufficient evidence nor the conclusions drawn appear to be blatantly unreasonable 
or wholly improbable. No illegality in the conduct of the trial exists. The Law and the 
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Rules, more particularly, those protecting the right of the accused were adhered to. No 
case of malice in law or Coram Non Judice was made out’.71 
The following areas of the military courts are not in conformity with the national and 
international standards on fair trial: 
Impartiality and Competence 
Impartiality and competence of the Military Courts in Pakistan are seriously 
questioned as the judges of the military courts are serving army officers.
72
 As a part of 
military hierarchy one cannot risk career progression in the zeal to do complete 
justice.  It was argued in District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of 
Pakistan against the military courts as the Armed Forces were directly engaged in a 
fight with the terrorists, the investigator into the crime and the judge presiding the 
military court would certainly belong to the Armed Forces and therefore being party 
to the conflict, they may be held to be judges in their own cause.
73
 The competency of 
Military Courts is not in conformity with national and internationally recognized 
standards regarding the qualification of a judge. To serve as a judge of the military 
court does not require any qualification in law or training for judicial work.
74
  
Public Hearing 
The Pakistan Army Act 1952 does not guarantee public trials in Court Martial or 
public hearings in Court Martial appeals. The Amended Army Act allows judges of 
military courts to hold in camera trials and made a provision for proceedings through 
video link and the law allows judges of military courts to hold in camera trials, and 
keep the identities of individuals associated with the cases secret.
75
 No one including 
human rights organizations and relatives are allowed to attend the proceedings of the 
courts.
76
 Trials are held behind closed doors ‘in itself is problematic in terms of access 
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to fair trial’.77 In District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan, the 
minority view identified that trials of the accused held by military courts behind 
closed doors as a violation of Article 10(A) 10(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan.
78
 
Recently Reuters examined 10 cases of capital sentences by the military court and 
interviewed the lawyers representing the accused who alleged that they were denied 
access to court records and were not allowed to meet their clients for the duration of 
the military trial.
79
 
The provision of secret trial is in violation of Article 14(1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
80
 Article 10 and 11 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights require that except in narrowly defined circumstances 
all court hearings and judgments including criminal proceedings must be public.  
Confession under Custody 
The Code of Criminal Procedure does not admit confession under custody as 
evidence.
81
 In Mehram Ali and others versus Federation of Pakistan, the Supreme 
Court invalidated Section 26 under Ant-Terrorism Act,1997 that allowed to treat 
confession in police custody recorded by not below the rank of Deputy 
Superintendent as evidence.
82
 The Court observed that the role of a police officer and 
a magistrate cannot be equated.
83
 Consequently the section was not incorporated in 
the Anti-Terrorism Law 1997. 
Reports of international non-governmental organizations, namely the International 
Commission of Jurists, Human Rights Watch and International Crisis group have 
shown concerns over death sentences awarded by courts which do not observe 
internationally recognized standards of fair trial.  In a 2016 report,  the International 
Commission of Jurists says: ‘A clear violation of its legal obligations and political 
commitments to respect the right to life, the right to fair trial, and independence of 
judiciary’.84 The report of International Crisis Group  underlines: ‘As the courts fall 
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far short of national or international fair trial standards, the risk of miscarriage of 
justice is unacceptably high’.85 Human Rights Watch highlighted: ‘Military courts are 
going to operate in secret and prohibit any meaningful public scrutiny and verification 
of their observance of fair trial’.86 
To conclude establishment of military courts to address the failures of the civilian 
justice system have not only made application of the death penalty arbitrary but it 
would frustrate Pakistan’s struggle to create a professional and independent criminal 
justice system. 
 
 5.3 Anti-Terrorism Legislation in India and Due Process of Law 
 
Overview: 
The Government of India promulgated three different laws in different time periods 
mainly to stem separatists’ movements in the states of Kashmir and Punjab. The 
legislative response of India to counter terrorism include the Terrorist Affected Areas 
(Special Courts) Act 1984, the Terrorism and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 
1987-allowed to lapse in 1995, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 (repealed in 
2004), and Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 2002, the Unlawful 
Activities(prevention) Act 1967(as amended in 2004 and 2008) and national 
Investigation Agency Act,2008. All of these special acts envisage the punishment of 
death for those charged with terrorist acts resulting in death.
87
 The death row 
prisoners executed in India during the past couple of years were tried under the 
special courts constituted under anti-terrorist legislation. 
Rationale and Constitutionality of Special Law 
On many occasions the Supreme Court of India has upheld the constitutional validity 
of these laws by recognizing the gravity of the terrorist acts and the necessity of 
counter terrorism legislation. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,
88
 the Supreme Court 
discussed the need and purpose for the enactment of the anti-terror laws at length. The 
Supreme Court observed that terrorism is not an ordinary problem which can be 
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tackled under the ordinary criminal laws of the land and that the enactment of special 
laws is imperative for dealing with a scourge of terrorism.
89
 The Supreme Court 
further observed that ‘conceptually public order and terrorism are different not only in 
ideology and philosophy but also in cause or the mens rea’.90 In the eyes of the Court: 
‘Terrorism is a new crime far serious in nature, graver in impact, and highly 
dangerous in consequence’.91 The SC maintained in Dilawar Hussain v. State of 
Gujrat that TADA was adopted to deal with secessionist and terrorist activities 
against the State and not to cover ordinary crimes for which provisions exist in the 
Indian Penal Code.
92
 It was felt that ordinary criminal courts were not only 
overburdened but they also lacked facilities for the trial of terrorist-related offences. 
In People’s Union for Civil liberties v. Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutional validity of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) by arguing: ‘Fight 
against the overt and covert acts of terrorism is not a regular criminal justice 
endeavor. Rather it is defense of our nation and its citizens’.93  
5.3.1. Violations of Fair Trial Standards under TADA and POTA 
Independence of the Court: The Terrorism and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 
1987 (TADA) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 (POTA) empowered the 
Central Government to constitute Designated Courts
94
 for the trial of the accused 
charged with terrorism related offences.
95
Under these laws, the special court was 
presided over by the sitting Sessions Judges appointed by the Central Government or, 
if applicable, the State Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of that 
State’s High Court.96 Permitting the executive to constitute and appoint judges to the 
Special Courts creates the risk of political influence and violates the cardinal principle 
of judicial Independence. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence 
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of the Judiciary guarantee: ‘Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary 
courts or tribunals using established legal procedures’.97 
Remand Period or Police Custody 
Unlike the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the TADA had increased the period of 
police remand up to sixty days and judicial remand up to 180 days.
98
 But the 
Designated Court extended this period to one year on the report of the public 
prosecutor indicating reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period 
of 180 days.
99
 The POTA Act under Section 49(2) allowed the detention of a suspect 
for up to 180 days without filing of charges in the Court.
100
 It was argued that such a 
lengthy period of detention violated India’s constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial 
and also lead to custodial abuse and torture. This provision also violated Article 9(2) 
and 9(3) of the ICCPR which requires that all arrested persons be promptly informed 
of the charges against them and they be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or 
release.
101
 
Confession under TADA and POTA 
Both the TADA and POTA made confessions before the police officers  admissible as 
evidence.
102
 It was a departure from the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1973 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
103
 that do not accept 
confessions made under police custody as evidence. The Law Commission of India in 
its 185
th
 Report, on the review of the Indian Evidence Act, disapproves the 
admissibility of confessions made to police officers. The Commission commented 
that the basis for introducing sections 25 and 26 in the Indian Evidence Act 1872 
holds good even today.
104
  
The Supreme Court of India in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab upheld the legality of 
this anomaly in the criminal procedure and declared that Section 15 of TADA does 
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not offend either Article 14 or Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
105
 At the same 
time, the court issued guideline to adopt the procedure to make it ‘in conformity with 
the well-recognized and accepted principles and fundamental fairness’.106 The 
Supreme Court left the task on the discretion of the judge of the Designated Court to 
decide the ‘question of admissibility or reliability of a confession in its judicial 
wisdom’.107 In another case State of Gujrat v. Mohammad Atik and others, the 
Supreme Court accepted the petition of the public prosecutor. The Supreme Court 
validated a confessional statement recorded in accordance with the requirements 
contained in the section and set aside the decision of the trial court (Designated Court 
that had not accepted the confession under police custody as an evidence .
108
 
In judgment People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India the Supreme Court 
of India reiterated that a confession under police custody is admissible as evidence 
under POTA.
109
 The Court maintained: ‘Parliament has taken into account all relevant 
factors in its totality and same is not unjust or unreasonable’.110 The Court reinforced 
the version of its previous judgment: ‘Non-inclusion of obvious and settled principle 
does not make the section invalid’.111  
It is common practice in the regular Indian Criminal Justice System that the 
investigating agencies and prosecutors extract evidence and use it as evidence to 
convict the accused or suspect. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court had 
confirmed the death penalty for the accused who had been convicted solely based on 
their confessional statements under the TADA and the POTA.
112
  In this context, 
ample examples include Devender Pal Singh Bhullar,
113
 Afzal Guru,
114
 Yakub Abdul 
Razak Memon
115
 and Ajmal Qasab wherein the court upheld the death penalty based 
on confessional statements and circumstantial evidence. Davender Pal Singh was 
sentenced to death solely based on his confessional statements recorded by the 
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Deputy Commissioner of Police under Section 15 of the TADA. The bench of three 
judges confirmed the death sentence on 22 March 2002, Justice M.B. Shah delivered 
a dissenting opinion on the ground that ‘there was nothing to corroborate the 
confessional statement’ and it was not ‘voluntary and truthful’.116  
In the case of Afzal Guru, the Supreme Court in its judgment held: ‘All these lapses 
and violations of procedural safeguards guaranteed in the stature itself implies us to 
hold that it is not safe to act on the alleged confessional statement of Afzal and place 
reliance on this item of evidence on which the prosecution places heavy reliance’.117 
In another case Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab alias Abu Mujahid, the 
accused of the Mumbai Carnage popularly known as 26/11, was convicted on the 
basis of his confession.
118
 In the Case of Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. The State of 
Maharashtra the Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence awarded by the 
designated court established under TADA on the basis of a confession by the co-
accused: ‘The confessional statements of various co-accused mention that Tiger 
Memon has instructed them to stay in touch with A-1 for further instruction. Meaning 
thereby, A-1 assumed the role of Tiger Memon in India during his absence’.119 
 
Presumption of Innocence  
Both anti-terror legislation TADA and POTA made a marked departure from very 
crucial safeguard of the presumption of innocence. Under the TADA the burden of 
proof was shifted on the accused to prove his innocence.
120
 It was also provided under 
POTA if the accused had rendered any financial assistance to any accused or suspect 
the Designated Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that such person 
has committed any offence.
121
 
 5.3.2. Application of the Death Penalty under the Repealed/ Lapsed Anti-Terror Laws 
In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab the Supreme Court introduced the doctrine of 
‘rarest of rare’ to retain capital punishment.122 Subsequently, the Supreme Court in 
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Machi Singh v. State of Punjab illustrated how to identify the rarest of rare cases: 
‘When the murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, 
revolting dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the 
community’.123 The Supreme Court further elaborated: ‘When collective conscience 
of the community is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the judicial power 
center to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards 
desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty’.124 In light of the above cited 
judgments of the Supreme Court the courts in India justify the death penalty under the 
notion of ‘collective conscience’ especially in terror cases. In fact Judges in India 
‘take upon themselves the responsibility of becoming oracles or spokesmen of public 
opinion’.125 
The notion of ‘collective conscience’ proved to be a fluid idea to implement capital 
punishment. Amnesty International’s study of Indian Supreme Court judgments in 
death penalty cases  from1950 to 2006 shows: ‘The determination of a crime as 
shocking the collective conscience’ has many nuances and differences and is 
influenced in ultimate analysis by the social and other perspectives of judges’.126 
Recently Surya Deva reviewed 86 cases decided by the Indian Supreme Court 
between January 2000 and October 2011 and concluded that ‘the Court’s application 
of the ‘rarest of rare’ guidelines of Bachan Singh is quite inconsistent and 
arbitrary’.127  On November 20, 2012, the Supreme Court in Sangeet and Anr vs State 
of Haryana admitted: ‘Even though Bachan Singh intended a principled sentencing 
but sentencing has now really become judge centric’.128 
In two well reported cases of capital punishment the Supreme Court applied the 
notion of collective conscience subjectively: Firstly, Muhammad Afzal Guru was 
charged with complicity and conspiracy in committing an attack on the Indian 
Parliament in December 2001 under POTA and was sentenced to death by the 
Designated Court. Arundhati Roy, winner of Booker Prize for her novel in 1997, also 
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endorsed the fact: ‘No direct evidence of Afzal Guru’s involvement was available’.129 
It is clear that even the prosecution did not accuse that Afzal was at the site of the 
attack or that he was responsible for killing any of the security forces.
130
 The Supreme 
Court set aside the conviction under Section 3(2) of POTA. The Court also set aside 
the conviction under Section 3(5) of POTA because ‘there is no evidence that he is a 
member of a terrorist gang or a terrorist organization, once the confessional statement 
is excluded’.131 The Supreme Court upheld the sentence of death awarded by the 
special court on the following ground: ‘The incident which has resulted in heavy 
casualties has shaken the entire nation the collective conscience of the society will 
only be satisfied if capital punishment is awarded to the offender’.132 This judgment 
shocked many people across the India. Nandita Haksar wrote: ‘My sense of justice 
has been outraged by the judgment given by the courts’.133  
Secondly, Yaqub Mamon, executed in July 2015, was tried under TADA, charged 
with providing a logistic and financial support to those behind Bombay bloody 
bombing in March 1993. The Supreme Court  commuted the death sentences of other 
10 convicts to life imprisonment except Tiger Mamon.
134
 
Indian Law Commission Report on the Death Penalty shows concerns: 
For one thing, these death sentences are implemented even when the underlying 
law in some of these cases has either been relapse (TADA) or has repealed 
(POTA). TADA in particular was repealed in the face of criticism for not 
respecting fair trial guarantees and amidst widespread allegations of abuse.
135
  
 5.3.3. Incompatibility of Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 1967 (Amended in 2004 and 2008) 
with Fair Trial Standards 
In 2004, with the repeal of POTA, the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 was 
enacted with certain amendments. The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act as 
amended in 2004 had eliminated the TADA and POTA’s provisions concerning the 
admissibility of confessions before the police officers and the provisions of the Indian 
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Evidence Act 1872 and the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 were made applicable 
in the matter of recording of the confessions. Similarly, in the 2008 Amendments of 
UAPA, confessions to the police were rendered inadmissible as evidence. The 
independence of the judiciary has also been restored with the disposal of POTA’s 
Special Courts. At the same time many provisions of the repealed POTA were 
incorporated in the UAPA.   
 
Presumption of Innocence  
The UAPA as amended in 2004 restored the burden of proof on the prosecution.  
However in 2008, Section 43E was inserted which empowered the court to presume 
the accused guilty of terrorism if arms or explosives were recovered from his or her 
possession .
136
 Moreover under this law the accused has to prove his/her innocence in 
case of ‘the evidence of the expert including the finger prints of the accused or any 
other definitive evidence suggesting the involvement of the accused’ found at the 
crime scene.
137
 It means this provision allows the court presume the accused to be 
guilty merely on the basis of material evidence, without any need to establish any 
kind of mental element for the alleged offence. 
Period of Remand 
The UAPA as amended in 2008 made a departure from the Code of Criminal 
Procedure in respect of remanding the accused in a terrorism offence. The UAPA 
permitted the period of remand between 30 to 90 days to  conduct investigation.
138
 
Moreover a proviso was inserted which provides that if it is not possible to complete 
the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the court may if it is satisfied 
with the report of the public prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation 
and the specific reason for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of 
ninety days, extend the said period to one hundred and eighty days.
139
 While the 
courts were obliged to grant extension of police custody beyond 90 days under 
POTA, the new provision under the UAPA leaves this at the discretion of the court.
140
 
The word ‘shall’ in POTA has been replaced by ‘may’ and this is a significant 
difference. This period of police remand multiplies the risk of torture to extract a 
confession. 
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In 2015, the Indian Law Commission report on the death penalty made a 
comprehensive analysis of anti-terrorism legislation including the Terrorism and 
Disruptive Activities Act 1987(TADA), the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 
(POTA) and now the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 1967 (UAPA) in these 
words: 
 
Did not provide for the full range of fair trial guarantees: they defined offences 
vaguely, thus compromising the principal of legality, reversed the presumption 
of innocence in certain instances; allowed for a long period of pre-charge 
detention, made certain confession to specific police officials admissible as 
evidence and limited the right to appeal by allowing appeals to the Supreme 
Court. 
141
  
These special laws contain special provisions at the cost of deviating from some of 
the established basic principles of the Indian criminal justice system. Jayakumar 
summarized the anti-terror legislation in India in these words: ‘The way  in which 
such a harsh law had found its entry into the statute book is itself a negation of 
constitutional and democratic values’.142 
 
 5.4 The Anti-Terrorism Laws in Bangladesh and its Incompatibility 
with International Standards on Fair Trial 
 
Overview 
Bangladesh anti-terrorism legislation includes the Special Powers Act, 1974 and Anti-
Terrorism Act, 2009. In this context, some special laws have also been promulgated: 
The Women and Children Repression Prevention Act of 1995. The law was repealed 
and replaced with Prevention of Oppression against Women and Children Act 2002 
and The Acid Offences Prevention Act, 2002. Both the Special Powers Act of 1974 
and the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009 govern the prosecution of terrorist activities. 
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Independence of Tribunals 
The Anti- Terrorism Act of 2009 empowers the Government to constitute special 
courts for effective and speedy trials of offences related to  terrorism.
143
 Section 28(2) 
of ATA States: ‘A Special Tribunal constituted under sub-section (1) shall consist of a 
Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge appointed by the Government in 
consultation with the Supreme Court’.144The wording of the provisions do not clearly 
spell out whether the Supreme Court disapproval of nominating a judge is binding on 
the government. With such lack of precision the independence of the Special Tribunal 
is not guaranteed.
145
 The provision does not meet the condition of the independence 
of the Tribunal provided for by Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil 
Political Rights.  
Anti-Terrorism Surveillance legislation violates to right of Privacy and Fair Trial 
Section 97-A of the Telecommunication (Amendment) Act of 2006 authorizes the 
investigating and intelligence agencies to engage in telecommunication surveillance 
and intelligence gathering such as tapping mobile or land phone lines, without a valid 
warrant.
146
 Moreover, Section 97-B allows information recorded under section 97-A 
to be admissible evidence at trial under the Evidence Act of 1872.
147
 It is an 
established principle that ‘a valuable role to be performed by the intelligence agencies 
in gathering information of relevance to subsequent criminal investigations but the 
function of intelligence for investigatory purposes and law enforcement are two 
functions that need to be kept distinct’.148This is clearly an arbitrary interference with 
the privacy provision of Article 17 of the ICCPR which states: ‘No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy’.149 Moreover the 
admission of such evidence during a trial undermines respect for the right to fair trial 
guaranteed by Article 14 of the ICCPR. 
Conclusion 
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Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights categorically 
says: ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’.150 Article 6(2) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) says: ‘Those countries 
who have not abolished the death penalty must apply in ‘most serious crimes’ The 
United Nations Human Rights Committee has consistently held that if article 14 of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is violated during the 
criminal proceeding then Article 6 of the Covenant is also breached.  In addition, the 
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) passed three resolutions
151
 prescribing 
safeguards regarding application of death penalty for those countries which have not 
abolished it yet. Safeguard 5 clearly expresses that capital punishment may only be 
carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court after legal 
process which gives all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial. The application of 
the death penalty for offences not resulting in loss of life and its trial without 
guarantee of fair trial is tantamount to an arbitrary deprivation of life. 
The United Nations legal framework on counterterrorism including its protocols, 
conventions and resolutions of the Security Council, General Assembly and 
Commission on Human Rights, allows the members countries to make special 
legislation to criminalize acts of terrorism but it must be in consonance with all of its 
obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, 
refugee law, and humanitarian law. In other words, international legal framework 
discourages to implicate the innocents in fight against terrorism. The international 
legal frame work allows the establishment of special or military courts to prosecute 
terrorists but such courts must remain the exception. It is mandatory that the 
independence and impartiality of special courts or tribunals must be ensured and they 
must observe the minimum guarantees of fair trial as enshrined in international human 
rights and humanitarian law. 
In the name of security and the war on terrorism, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have 
been applying capital punishment under the special courts constituted under special 
laws bypassing the under resourced and inefficient criminal justice systems to combat 
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terrorism and other heinous offences. These extraordinary measures to counter 
terrorism have multiplied the risk of arbitrary application of the death penalty on the 
following grounds: 
Firstly, the vaguely defined acts of terrorism under anti-terrorism legislations in the 
jurisdiction of three countries violate the principle of legality that requires that 
criminal liability and punishment be limited to clear and precise provisions. In the 
absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism under international law, it 
provides a space to many states to prosecute acts of terrorism as capital offences 
which do not meet the threshold of ‘most serious crimes’ in light of Article 6(2) of the 
ICCPR. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee suggests that the offences 
related to a broad definition of terrorism
152
 and attacks against the internal security of 
the state
153
 do not fall under the definition of the ‘most serious crimes’. 
The special laws in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh have enhanced the scope of 
capital punishment by enlisting the terrorism related offences that do not meet the 
threshold of ‘most serious crimes’. In Pakistan, terrorism related offences that do not 
result in death include hijacking or assisting a hijacking,
154
 kidnapping for ransom or 
hostage taking,
155
 and attempt to harm railway passengers such as by explosion or 
derailment.
156
 In India using any special category of explosives to cause an explosion 
likely to endanger life or cause serious damage to property is punishable by death.
157
 
The special laws of Bangladesh include the following as capital offences: 
‘intentionally destroy or damage any property, whether movable or immovable, 
belonging to the Government
158
, privation of eyesight, damage to the ear, 
disfiguration of the face or breast or sexual organ
159
 and trafficking of woman for 
prostitution or to engage a woman in an illicit immoral Act’.160  
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Secondly, these special laws lower the general standards of due process and provides 
special powers of arrest and detention, validity to confession under police custody and 
reversing the presumption of innocence- the accused is guilty until his/her innocence 
is proven. The diminution in legal standards means a denial of basic human rights and 
their main function has been to put a legal veneer on state killings. In the name of 
speedy justice, these laws have been encouraging a culture of custodial torture and 
providing legitimacy to confessions as major evidence. In this context, during the 
previous years, India executed Ajmal Kasab, Afzal Gru and Yaqub Mamon who were 
charged with terrorism and sentenced to death under special laws to counter terrorism. 
All of them were convicted on the basis of confessions. Military courts in Pakistan 
during their working in the year 2015 convicted 40 persons, out of which 36 were 
sentenced to death on the basis of confessions. Though the right to legal defense 
exists in Pakistan Army Act, 1952, practically the accused were not provided legal 
assistance at the state’s expense. The secret trials and the absence of public or media 
oversight, information about charges and available written judgment may make 
convictions easier but it enhances the probability of implicating the innocent. 
Execution of an innocent acts as a catalyst and not only churns out new terrorists but 
also weakens the rule of law in general and the criminal justice system in particular. 
It is recommended that the governments of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh adopt an 
integrated approach by addressing the other factors contributing to flourish terrorism 
and must learn from the experience of other countries of the world, especially of two 
other South Asian countries, Sri Lanka and Nepal, which faced far more protracted 
and deadly insurgencies and act of terrorism but they never invoked capital 
punishment to protect national security. 
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Chapter 6 
Capital Punishment under Sharia and its Application in 
Pakistan 
Introduction 
Under Article 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan, the state cannot enact the law that 
is repugnant to the Quran and the Sunnah.
1
 This chapter aims at exploring the scope 
and application of capital punishment under the Quran and Sunnah and its application 
in Pakistan. In this regard, research relies on the basic sources of Islamic 
Jurisprudence (the Quran and Sunnah). In order to examine the effects of grafting the 
Qisas and Diyat Law 1997 into secular penal laws of the country on the prosecution 
of the offence of murder, the research analyzed reported cases of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Courts. 
 6.1 Sources of Islamic Law(Shari’ah) 
The Shari’ah, Islamic Law, is mainly based upon two primary sources, the Qu’ran and 
the Sunna (sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad).
2
 The Quran and Sunnah 
legislate both man’s duty to God, i.e, religious observances(ibadat) and his duties to 
his fellow man(mu ‘amalat).3 
 6.1.2. The Qu’ran  
All schools of thought of Islamic Jurisprudence have a firm belief that ‘the Quran as a 
chief source is the root of all the other sources of Islamic legislation’.4 Several verses 
in the Quran expressly indicate that it is the basic and main source of law in Islam.
5
 
Ahmad Hassan argues that the position of the Quran as the first and foremost basis for 
legal theory does not mean that ‘it treats of every problem meticulously’.6 
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The presentation of the details of legal rules does not fall under the basic objective of 
the divine book.
7
 The legislative part of the Quran is the model illustration for future 
legislation and does not constitute a legal code by itself. 
Coulson evaluates the legal aspect of the Quran in these words: ‘A collection of 
piecemeal rulings on particular issues scattered over a wide variety of different 
topics’.8 Out of over 6200 verses (ayat), less than one-tenth relate to law and 
jurisprudence.
9
 There are close to 350 legal Ayat in the Quran most of which were 
revealed in response to problems that were actually encountered.
10
 There are about 
thirty ayat on crimes and penalties such as murder, highway robbery, adultery and 
false accusations.
11
 Another thirty ayat speak of justice, equality, evidence, 
consultation, and rights and obligations of citizens.
12
 In this regard, Bassiouni says: 
‘The Quran does not set forth a complete system of criminal justice but it does contain 
the elements necessary for the construction by believers of a system of justice capable 
of being responsive to the needs of the society of a given place and time’.13 
 6.1.3. Sunna or Hadith 
The Sunnah (literally meaning ‘beaten path’ or custom) is regarded as the second 
main source of Islamic Law. In the context of Islamic Jurisprudence, it refers to the 
model behavior of the prophet. Since the Holy Quran enjoins upon the Muslims to 
follow the conduct of the Prophet which is distinguished as ‘exemplary and great’.14 
The Holy Quran has used the word uswah hasana for the exemplary conduct of the 
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prophet.
15
 The Quran makes obligatory to obey the Prophet.
16
 The Quran declared the 
prophet to be the interpreter of the Qur’anic text.17 Perhaps this is the reason why the 
sunnah is considered complementary to the Quran and supplementary to Quranic 
injunctions.
18
 It is the Sunnah of the Prophet that gives the concrete shape to the 
Quranic teachings.
19
 The Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said before his 
death, ‘I leave two things among you. You shall no go astray so long as you hold on 
to them: the book of God and my sunnah’.20 
It is pertinent to mention that the Muslims do not take it as an institution prevalent 
among the Arabs tribes in the pre-Islamic days. The word sunnah up to the time of 
The Prophet meant the practice of antiquity.
21
 Alfred claimed that ‘it means act and 
saying of the Prophet it has no relation to the Sunnah of the Arab tribes’.22 Khadduri 
claims that so far as Muslim jurists are concerned, Islamic law is unrelated to pre-
Islamic law ‘they scarcely had anything to do with pre-Islamic law’.23  
Hadith  
The term hadith in Arabic literally means ‘speech’ or oral tradition. Loosely speaking, 
the terms Sunnah and Hadith convey the same meaning namely, the traditions of the 
Prophet.
24
 Since the dominant method of transmitting reports containing the Sunnah 
of the prophet was oral, the term hadith was used to refer to that process of 
transmission. Eventually the two terms Sunnah and hadith were used interchangeably.  
On the contrary to the undisputed status of the Quran, the authenticity and history of 
the writing down and compilation of hadiths have been areas of fierce debate among 
Muslims as well as among western scholars of hadith. The hadith is at once the 
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strength and the weakness of Islam.
25
 Sir William Muir writes: ‘About a hundred 
years after Muhammad, the caliph Umar II issued circular orders for the formal 
collection of all extant traditions’.26 The complete record of the sunnah was compiled 
by Ishaq ibn Yassar 136 years after the death of the Prophet, in 11 AH.
27
 As the 
traditions were not collected immediately after the death of the Prophet, any tradition 
or percept thereof has to pass the test of its being genuine’.28 The debate over the 
authentic (sahih) is as extensive as the one over the interpretation of each hadith. 
Attempts by certain Muslim groups about the time of Imam Shafi to impose a clear 
formal distinction between the Quran and the extra Quranic component of the Islamic 
traditions are discernable
29
 and it was chiefly to refute these efforts that Imam Shaafi 
composed his Risala.
30As a father of Muslim jurisprudence, on the one hand ‘Imam 
Shafi maintains that Sunnah is a binding source of law and that there is no 
contradiction between  the Quran and  the Sunnah’.31 On the other hand, he 
acknowledged the necessity for human reason to provide legal rules for situations not 
expressly or specifically regulated by divine revelation. Reason could not operate as a 
source of law independent of the divine will’.32 All Muslim schools of thought 
consider authentic Sunnah (Sahih Sunnah) as a second major source of Sharia and 
‘anti sunnah position failed completely’.33 The Constitution of Pakistan recognizes the 
Quran and Sunnah as sources of Islamic law.
34
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 6.1.4 Legislative Techniques-cum-sources of law 
To address the issues which are not mentioned in the Quran or the Sunnah, Muslim 
jurists resort to legislative techniques –cum-sources of law.  In Islamic Jurisprudence, 
Ijtihad encompassed issues not judged by the Quran or Sunna.
35
 Ijtihad refers to the 
‘jurists’ maximum effort to infer a legal judgment’.36 Ijma: consensus of Jurists is the 
unanimous agreement reached by Muslim scholars during any period after the 
prophet’s death on any legal judgment bearing upon a particular situation or 
incident.
37
 Qiyas: analogical deduction- Ismah: verdicts of in fallible Imams in the Shi 
ah law; Istihsan: juristic equity and al- Masalih al Mursalah( public interest).
38
  
In short, the basic material sources of Islamic Law are the Qur’an and the Sunnah. 
Qiyas and Ijma are, in fact, instruments or agencies for legislation on new problems 
for whose solution a direct guidance from the Quran and the Sunnah is not available. 
It is therefore, obvious that Qiyas and Ijma are considered to be an authoritative 
source of law being subservient to the Quran and the Sunnah.  Ahmad Hassan 
emphasises that ‘the authenticity of these auxiliary sources shall be determined only 
by the degree of their consonance with the other two original and unchanged sources 
of law’.39 
 6.2 Sanctity of Life and Prohibition of killing of the innocent in Sharia 
According to the Quran man is the central creature and ultimate purpose of creation. 
In this regard, the Quran says that man is God’s vicegerent on earth ‘Your Lord said 
to the Angels: I am appointing a vicegerent on earth’.40 Although the Quran accords 
human beings with the title of God’s Vicegerents’ on earth, but the act of giving life 
(I’jad) and taking it away (I’dam) as exclusively God’s prerogative. Thus, the terms 
i,jad and i’dam denote actions by God that human beings are not allowed to emulate. 
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The Prophet Muhammad has declared homicide as the greatest sin only next to 
polytheism.
41
 
The Quran categorically denounces the killing of an innocent person: ‘On that 
account: We ordained for the Children of Israel that if any one slew a person - unless 
it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land - it would be as if he slew the 
whole people: and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the 
whole people’.42  
In this verse of the Qur’an the word ‘soul’ (nafs) has been used in general terms 
without any distinction or particularization of race, religion and gender. In this regard, 
Abul  A‘la Mawdudi elucidates that ‘the injunction applies to all human beings and 
the destruction of human life in itself has been prohibited’.43 Mahgoub El-Tigani 
Mahmoud says that ‘the act of murder was considered a crime against the whole 
society for whoever attacked a human body was guilty of attacking the universal 
human right to life’.44  The state has no license to kill its citizens. Nor can the crimes 
of the State be justified on the authority of the Holy Qura’n or Traditions  (Hadith) 
when the ‘state murders its citizens openly and secretly without any hesitation or on 
the slightest pretext, because they are opposed to its unjust policies and actions or 
criticize it for its misdeed’.45  
Allah ordains in the Holy Quran: ‘Take not life, which has made sacred, except by 
way of justice and law. Thus does He command you, so that you may learn 
wisdom’.46 The Quran permitted the taking of a life only ‘by way of justice and law’ 
as a measure for preventing cycles of violence. Therefore, a man can be killed only 
when the law demands it. “Islam prohibits homicide but allows only one exception, 
that the killing is done through a due process of law which the Qur’an refers to as bi’l-
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haqq (with the truth). The death penalty must not be invoked in an ‘arbitrary and 
capricious manner in violation to the principle of equality and due process’.47 
 6.3. Concept of Justice, Crime and Punishment under Shariah 
The Holy Quran does not give a dictionary definition of justice but it links the concept 
to the notions of equity
48
, righteousness
49
 and truth
50
. The Holy Quran contrasts 
justice with transgression, falsehood
51
 and the disturbance in the natural order 
(fitnah). The concept of justice is usually related to, and connected with the concept 
of equality. In the eyes of law, it means that the law should treat those people equally 
who adhere to its rules and norms, regardless of their social, political or economic 
status.  O ‘ye who believe! stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing, and 
let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. 
Be just: that is next to piety’.52 ‘O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as 
witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and 
whether it be (against) rich or poor: for Allah can best protect both. Follow not the 
lusts (of your hearts), lest ye swerve, and if ye distort (justice) or decline to do justice, 
verily Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do’.53 Allah ordains in the Quran: 
‘Allah doth command you to render back your trusts to those whom they are due and 
when ye judge between man and man, that ye judge with justice’.54 The Quran 
attributes paramount importance to justice and equity and God ‘loves those who are 
fair and just’.55 Having a close look at the above injunctions or all the injunctions of 
Shariat as a whole, we find them universal in nature and everlasting and useful in 
character.
56
 It paved the way for establishment of complete equality and justice.
57
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The word crime( juram) has been used in many verses 
58
 but the Quran does not, 
however, provide the definition of crime or the procedure to be adopted to prove an 
offence except in the case of zina and qazaf.
59
 The literary period of Islamic law 
begins about the year 150 of the hijra (A.D. 767) and from then onwards the 
development of technical legal thought can be followed step by step from scholar to 
scholar.
60
 The various schools of Islamic jurisprudence differed from one another 
according to their interpretation and knowledge of text, their customs, social 
environments, and their political allegiance.
61
 The second century of Islam saw 
tremendous and rapid development of technical legal thought.
62
 The Muslim Fuqha 
(jurists) defined crime ‘in terms of punishments.63 The jurists defined a criminal 
offense by ‘an action of killing, beating, wounding or assaulting a human self or body 
parts’.64 The Islamic Jurisprudence categorized Islamic Criminal Law under three 
separate crimes (a) Hudood
65
, (b) Qisas
66
 (c) Tazir.
67
  The punishment for the offence 
is called hadd because it prevents him to repeat the offence. The hudud penalties are 
also classified as right of God. For al-Mawardi and other jurists all of the hudood 
penalties were specially defined punishments.
68
 Hence qisas was not part of the 
hudood because it referred mostly for the right of humans. The Shafities also 
acknowledge qisas as a hadd, which they saw as encompassing both homicide (qatl) 
and bodily harm( Jinyat).
69
The third category of crimes- the t’azeir discretionary 
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punishments that may Muslims rulers exercised ‘due to the absence of a Sharia’s text 
to determine the deserved penalty’.70 
The penalties of Islam were not readily legislated for random, arbitrary or 
spontaneous implementation. Muslim jurists exhibited concrete concerns over the 
authenticity of evidence, the legality of pre-trial investigation, and provision of 
sufficient space for post-trial revisions and corrections’.71 One of the distinctions of 
the application of criminal law under sharia is that it is applied on all humans, 
regardless of their status or role, whether they were members of the ruling elite or part 
of the ruled class.
72
 The laws of the Muslims were based upon equitable principles 
‘ensuring to individuals perfect equality of rights’.73 The sharia did not have a king 
with immunity from wrongdoing. Punishment in Islam, in general, advocated a 
principle of equality between the criminal act and its penalty, thus it was called 
qisas.
74
 Punishment is justified in Islamic Law by deterrence, retribution, 
rehabilitation and the idea of protecting society by incapacitating the offender.
75
 
6.4 Capital offences under Hudood and Qisas Crimes 
It is commonly understood that hudood laws prescribe fixed punishments for between 
five and seven types of crimes, depending upon the particular school of thought. 
According to the Hanafite and Shiite classification, the crimes under the category of 
hudood punishment are: Zina (adultery/ unlawful sexual intercourse), false allegation 
of adultery (qadhf),the drinking of alcohol(shrub khamr), theft (sariqa), apostasy and  
banditry(qat ‘al-tariq, hiraba).76 The punishments under the hadd may be enumerated 
as: death by stoning, amputation of a limb or limbs, flogging by hundred or eighty 
strikes.
77
 The Pakistan Huddood Ordinance 1979, following the majority view, 
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recognizes five crimes as hudood offences: Zina
78
, Qadhf
79
, Sariqa
80
, and Khamer.
81
 
Keeping in view the scope of the research, only capital offences would be discussed 
in detail: Zina,(adultery) and Apostasy. 
 6.4.1 Zina (Adultery) 
 Muslim jurists treat it as both a sin and crime. The criminalization of adultery 
predates Islam and can be traced to a period as early as the Hebrew Bible.
82
 The 
penalty of stoning to death (rajam) most commonly associated with zina is not 
specifically mentioned in the Quran. The Quran prescribes the punishment of the 
offence of Zina: ‘The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication,- flog each 
of them with a hundred stripes.’83 The Quranic verse is clear in stating that the 
punishment of flogging is for  the adulterer, without any distinction between married 
or unmarried people or virgin.
84
 Imam Razi records: ‘All are agreed that the 
punishment of one hundred strips is applicable to all types of delinquents’.85 The 
punishment of flogging may be supported by two arguments: 
The first argument is based upon the evidence from the other verse of the Quran that 
states: ‘And when they are honorably married, they commit lewdness, they shall incur 
half of the punishment (prescribed) for a free woman in that case’.86 Now ‘half of the 
punishment for a free women’ can be one half of one hundreds strips, that is fifty, but 
the use of stoning as punishment cannot be halved. Hence, the penalty referred to 
must be flogging mentioned in the relevant verse.
87
 
The second argument: It is perfectly possible that the death penalty by stoning for the 
offence of zina was practiced before the Quranic verse in surah 24 which abrogated it 
Muhammad Sharif says that Surah al-Nur (Chapter xxiv) which prescribes the 
punishment for zina was revealed between the 5
th
 and the 6
th
 Hijra and before that no 
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specific punishment for Zina was provided in the Quran.
88
 The punishment of Rajam 
(stoned to death) was only enforced in Abrahamic traditions(Judaism and 
Christianity) which predated Islam, but was then abrogated by the relevant Quranic 
verse defining the punishment as flogging. The reference to this aspect of Jewish law 
may be found in the New Testament.
89
 In this connection, a Tradition recorded in 
Bukhari Sharif also corroborates the stance. Shaibani inquired from ‘Abdullah son of 
Abi Aufa whether the Prophet had anyone stoned to death. He said, ‘Yes’. Was it 
before Surah al Nur or after? The reply was that he did not know.
90
 
Despite this fact, it is widely held view among traditionalist commentators of the 
Quran that this verse applies only to unmarried men and women, including Hanfi,
91
 
Shafi
92
, Hanbli
93
 and Shia school of sharia law
94
  support the punishment of stoning 
(rajam) for a married adulterer. The Muslim Jurists understood the hadith corpus to 
authorize stoning for adultery, a norm that the second caliph of Islam, Umar 
reportedly affirmed emphatically: ‘That those who committed adultery were to 
receive a penalty of death by stoning’.95 In one of these cases, a woman came to the 
Prophet to confess her adultery. The Prophet asked if there were witnesses, but there 
were none. She insisted that her confession be received, but the prophet insisted that 
she return four times in order for her reiterated confession to be deemed equivalent to 
four eyewitnesses. When she did that, he still insisted that she corroborates her 
confession with external evidence. She then confessed to being pregnant. The 
Prophet, clearly wanting to avoid applying the penalty, deferred it until she gave birth, 
because otherwise the penalty would affect her unborn child. Eight months later, she 
returned, but the prophet again refused to apply the penalty because she had to 
breastfeed the child, and he asked her to return nine months later. When she returned 
he asked her if she wanted to recant her confession, but she confirmed it. He then felt 
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that he had no choice but to order the penalty carried out. When his companions 
returned from the stoning, he asked them if they had heard her recant. They asked 
why and he said that, if she had, they should have stopped the stoning. 
A man by the name of Maiz, came to the Prophet and begged the prophet to punish 
him. The Prophet initially sent Maiz away, declining to hear the case. Maiz came back 
a second time renewing his confession and requesting punishment. On the fourth time 
the prophet finally spoke and confirmed his neighbor whether the defendant was of 
sound mind. Maiz insisted that he was of sound mind and had committed adultery 
within the full meaning of the term. Eventually, the Prophet found Maiz guilty but did 
not punish him. Not waiting for specific instructions from the Prophet, the people of 
the town themselves decided to enforce the harsher of the punishments: death by 
stoning. When they informed the prophet of what they have done, he exclaimed in 
dismay that they “should have let Maiz go. He further remarked that if Maiz had 
repented, God surely would have accepted his repentance.
96
 
The application of the punishment is ‘only in rare cases’ due to stringent evidentiary 
requirements.
97
  The Quran says: ‘ if any of your women are guilty of lewdness take 
evidence of four, witnesses from amongst you, against them’.98 It is essential that the 
four witnesses must have witnessed actual discourse and full penetration. Aly 
Mansour writes, ‘It is nearly impossible to satisfy the pre-requisite for an eyewitness, 
unless the act is performed openly and publically’.99 The only mode of proof thus left 
is confession.
100
 The offender has to swear four times that he has actually committed 
adultery and in his confession he should give sufficient details to dispel any doubts.
101
 
A jurist argues that only the deterrent effect of punishment in Islamic law is meant by 
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the Law of adultery.
102
 Rahim argues that the punishment is only for ‘those offenders 
who defy public decency and openly flaunt their vices’.103 
In addition to the requirement of four eye witnesses, the possibility of being punished 
for qadhf (false accusation of un-chastity) deter the witness to give false evidence. 
The Quran further says: ‘And those who launch a charge against chaste women, and 
produce not four witnesses, flog them with eighty stripes’ and reject their evidence 
ever after: for such men are wicked and transgressors’.104  Coulson remarks that the 
strict burden of proof imposed upon prosecutor requires to a high degree of certainty 
that reaches its zenith: ‘It is better for several actual offenders to escape liability than 
for one innocent person to suffer liability’.105 
The above two quoted hadith determine the essential parameters of the Islamic 
criminal justice system. It means that ‘Islam urged the rehabilitation of offenders and 
diversified the paths of repentance for them to maximize the private prevention of 
crime’.106 The Hudood penalties were indeed harsh to terrorize criminals- that is why 
the hudud application should be narrowed to the maximum degree possible to allow 
the intrinsic legitimacy of the application to deter criminals’.107 
Punishment of Zina(adultery) under the Pakistan Hudood Ordinance 
Under the Offence of Zina(Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance,1979, the act of 
adultery by a married person if witnessed by four male Muslims of good character, 
could be punished by stoning to death.
108
 Section 17 of the ordinance prescribes the 
mode of punishment of stoning to death.
109
 Since the promulgation of the law, stoning 
has never been officially implemented in any case but the law furnished an 
opportunity to the players in the criminal justice system to vent their gender and 
                                                 
102
 Sheikh Muhammad Mustafa Shalabi, Al-Fiqh al-Islami Bayn al Mithlly ‘ah wal-waq’iyah, 
(Alexandria:1960), p.207. 
103
 Abdur Rahim, The Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence: According to the Hanafi, Maliki, 
Shafi’i and Hanbali Schools (London: Luzac & Co, 1911), p. 362. 
104
 Al-Quran, Surah Al-Nur, 24:5. 
105
 Noel J. Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press,1969), pp.64-65. 
106
 Mahgoub El-Tigani Mahmoud, Criminology and Penology in Islamic Jurisprudence (Lewiston: The 
Edwin Mellen Press, 2015), p.165. 
107
 Mohamed Abu-Zahra,al-Jarima wal-Uqoba Fil Fiqh al-Islami (Cairo:Dar al-Fikr al –Arabi,1988), 
p.178. 
108
 Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, section 4, 5(1), 5(2)(a), 8(b)  
109
 Ibid, section.17. 
 171 
patriarchal biases while processing cases under them.
110
 Against this backdrop, many 
government-appointed commissions also found the violations of fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan and recommended its repeal.
111
 
After 26 years, the Government of Pakistan amended the Ordinance and the amended 
law itself explains its objective to ‘provide relief and protection to women against 
misuse and abuse of law’.112 The Protection of Women ACT 2006 also provides for 
stoning in the case of rape or adultery (as Hadd offenses) but are legislatively 
demoted from overriding status.
113
 The Protection of Women Act inserted the 
offences of unnatural lust, rape,
114
 and gang rape
115
 into the Pakistan Penal Code as a 
Tazir offence punishable by death. Martin Lau argues that complete repeal of the Zina 
Ordinance would be difficult without new Constitution of Pakistan.
116
 
In line with the international guidelines to abolish the penalty of death for crimes 
related to sex and religion, the Government of Pakistan requires a paradigm shift in its 
approach of interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah rather than reliance on the 
classical Islamic Jurisprudence. In 1981, the Federal Shariat Court in Hazoor Bakhsh 
v. Federation of Pakistan declared that the punishment of stoning to death was 
unislamic.
117
 The judgment provoked the wrath of the President of Pakistan and 
religious parties and the President promulgated an ordinance to empower the Federal 
Shariat Court to review its own judgment.
118
 Subsequently the judgment was reversed 
in a review filed by the Federal Government under the pressure from religious 
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factions.
119
 It is rightly observed: ‘The judges were immediately replaced but the 
court’s role in acquitting people accused of hadd offenses has remained intact’.120 In 
this context, in 2007, the Legal Committee of the Council of Islamic Ideology 
recommended that the punishment for the offence of zina (adultery) be 100 hundred 
lashes not stoned to death.
121
 
 6.4.2. Apostasy (Ridda, irtidad) 
The Arabic equivalent for apostasy is riddah or irtid from the root radd which among 
other connotations has the meaning to retreat, to retire, to withdraw from or fall back 
from. Apostate is known as Murtad.
122
 In the context of Sharia it is equated with 
renunciation or abandonment of Islam by one who professes the Islamic faith.
123
 In 
fact, apostasy is not mentioned as a capital offence in the Quran. The Quranic verses 
condemn apostasy but its punishment is restricted for divine justice in the hereafter.
124
  
Some Muslim Scholars inferred the punishment of apostasy as death from the 
interpretation of the following two verses: 
In Surah Al-Baqra, The Quran ordains: ‘And whoever of you reverts from his religion 
[to disbelief] and dies while he is a disbeliever - for those, their deeds have become 
worthless in this world and the Hereafter, and those are the companions of the Fire, 
they will abide therein eternally’.125  
The word used in the Arabic text fa-yamut is significant. Some scholars made the 
interpretation that the verse clearly envisages the natural death of the renegade after 
apostasy. Sheikh Ismail Haqqi, in his commentary Ruh al-Bayan says in respect of 
this verse: This contains a warning against apostasy and in it is inducement to revert 
to Islam, after apostasy, till the time of death’.126 Fakhr –ud-Din –ar-Razi also 
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endorsed the same translation.
127
 The consequences of such apostasy are declared in 
the verse to be‘ his deprivation of  fruits of Islam enjoyed by Muslims in this world 
and life after the death’.128 
In the sub-continent Muhammad Abu’l A-la Maududi has relied on Quranic verses 
11-12 from Surah Taubah.
129
 ‘If they break their oaths after their covenant, and revile 
your religion, then fight these leaders of disbelief surely, they have no regard for their 
oaths- that they may desist’.130 He construes the word ahd ‘as meaning a covenant to 
accept Islam’. This construction, generally speaking, is not endorsed by any of the 
well-known commentaries, published in the Indo-Pak subcontinent or abroad 
131
  take 
the term ‘ahd’ as equivalent to a political pact and in their comments on these verses, 
given the history of  the agreements between the Muslims and the disbelieving 
Qurash. The standard exegetical works of Baidawi
132
, Fakhr-ud-Din al-Razi
133
 and 
Rashid Rida
134
 also interpret the word ahad as: These verses clearly relate to the 
mushrikin(polytheists) of Arabia and not to apostates. The object of the fighting 
against infidels specified at the end of the verse is to make them desist (from their 
actions). If the persons concerned were to be killed for apostasy, there should have 
been no question of an attempt to making them desist from their course. The fight 
with the leaders of disbelief can be none other than fighting with the leaders of a 
movement of apostasy.
135
 
Majority of Muslim jurists have classified apostasy as a hadd punishable by death as 
mainly relying upon traditions of companions of the Prophet.
136
 The primary 
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justification for the execution of the apostate is that in the early days of Islam 
apostasy was ‘tantamount to the renunciation of allegiance to the Islamic 
Commonwealth’.137 Capital punishment for the offence of apostasy developed during 
the early Islamic empire.
138
 The reports pertaining to the Khilafat –i-Rashidah reveals 
some incidents which included an element of active hostility to Muslims. It is 
reported that the first Caliph of Islam, Abu Baker, ordered an apostate to be killed.
139
 
Majid Khadduri argues that the tradition that all apostates be killed had its origin 
during these wars of rebellion and not during the Prophet Muhammad‘s time.140 The 
decision and practice of Abubakar, consensus of the opinion of other Companions of 
the Prophet, and later Muslim jurists, all prescribe capital punishment for the 
apostate.
141
 S.A Rehman argues that the occurrences during the regimes of the four 
rightly guided caliphs were illustrations of requital for active hostility or social 
disruption and not merely for peaceful dissent from the truth, after its initial 
acceptance.
142
 Zwemer also reinforces that laws and practices in regard to the apostate 
from Islam became more rigid ‘after the Muslim state extended its domain and 
authority beyond Arabia’.143 
Most of the Muslims scholars
144
 accept and agree that the laws relating to riddah 
(apostasy) and blasphemy in jurisprudence do not only violate the right to freedom of 
religion but also the fundamental principle of freedom of belief in religion, as 
enshrined in the Quran.
145
 This punishment is contradictory to the Quran that 
categorically asserts: ‘There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the 
religion’.146 The Tafsir al-Manar describes the commandment contained in this verse 
as one of the greatest principles of the Islamic faith and one of the majestic pillars of 
                                                 
137
 Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp.169-
70. 
138
 W. Heffening, ‘Murtad in Islam’ in Clifford Edmund Bosworth et al.  (eds.), The Encyclopedia of 
Islam (Leiden: Brill,1992), p.635. 
139
 Samuel Marinus Zwemer, The Law of Apostasy in Islam (London: Marshal Bros.1924).p.35. 
140
 Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Concept of Justice (1978), p.238. 
141
 N. Hanif, Islamic Concept of Crime and Justice, volume 2 (New Delhi: Sarup & Sons 1999), p.180. 
142
 S. A. Rehman, Punishment of Apostasy in Islam (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture,1972), p.132. 
143
 Samuel Marinus Zwemer, The Law of Apostasy in Islam (London: Marshal Bros.1924). p.9. 
144
 Muhammad Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tafsir al-Quran al-Hakim-Tafsir al-Manar, 
vol.5(Cairo: Matba’at al-Manar,1931):327; S.A Rahman, Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, ch.2 and 
El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law, ch.2. 
145
 Abdullahi Ahmad An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and 
International Law (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p.184. 
146
 al-Quran, Surah Al-Baqarah,2:256. 
 175 
Islamic polity (Siyasah).
147It further elaborates that ‘it is not permissible to subject 
anyone to coercion to make him accept Islam, nor will anyone be heard to say that a 
member of his household was compelled to go out from it’ and cites the verse: ‘And if 
thy Lord had willed, all who are in the earth would have believed together’ in 
corroboration of this position. Some of the exegetists of the Quran cite the opinion 
that this verse has been abrogated by other verses.
148
 S A Rehman regrets that 
‘attempts made by Muslims scholars themselves to whittle down its broad humanistic 
meaning by imposing limitations on its scope, dictated by exigencies of theological 
controversies that arose in the course of our history’.149 
Another verse of the Quran explains: ‘And say, the truth is from your Lord, so 
whoever wills let him believe; and whoever wills - let him disbelieve’.150 The Prophet 
is enjoined not to worry his soul out in grief, for those who turn away. He is forbidden 
to force them to the straight path, for this would interfere with the Divine Scheme of 
life here being a trial for the human soul. It is repeatedly emphasized that the duty of 
the Prophet is to convey the message fully and leave the rest to God. The Din is to be 
established by goodly exhortation and not by threat of force. 
In the Indian subcontinent, the Muslims scholars Allama Iqbal and Syed Amir Ali 
highlighted the status of rationalism and intellectual liberty in Islam. Syed Amir Ali 
says that the vicegerent of Mohammad assisted in the growth of free thought and free 
inquiry originated and consecrated by the Prophet himself and persecution for the 
sake of faith was unknown’.151 During the Muslims Rule in India , the Hedaya was 
the chief source of guidance for working of the Court. According to the Hedaya, ‘any 
person killing an apostate is himself immune to prosecution or retaliation. In addition, 
the apostate loses all civil entitlements. His marriage becomes a nullity and no right to 
inherit’.152 Muhammad Iqbal, one of the greatest poets of the sub-continent, spiritual 
father of Pakistan, criticized the standard working of the Indian Judges relating to 
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apostasy in light of Hedaya and he questioned that this rule ‘tended to protect the 
interest of the Faith in this country’.153 
Apostasy is not a Hudood crime nor a capital offence in Pakistan. Pakistan still has no 
formal law prohibiting apostasy but blasphemy serves as a surrogate in suppressing 
those who dissent from Islam by word or deed.
154
 Section 295C relates to derogatory 
remarks in respect of the Prophet Muhammad. (The blasphemy has been discussed in 
another part of the dissertation). 
 6.5 Capital offences under Qisas Crimes 
The second category of crimes under the sharia deals with homicide and bodily hurt. 
In Islamic Criminal Law, qisas and diyat are also known as al-jinayat (literal meaning 
offences) and refer to homicide, bodily harm and damage to property.
155
 The Quran 
enumerates two kinds of homicides and differentiates them on the basis of 
perpetrator’s intent: deliberate or willful (amad) and accidental (khata).156 The Quran 
prescribes capital punishment for the offence of pre-meditated murder but it does 
elucidate the procedure how to determine the intent of the murderer. The Islamic 
Jurists has defined both mental and physical element of willful murder.
157
 The 
question how to establish the element of mens rea(intention) is a matter of debate 
between different Muslims jurists and school of thoughts.
158
  
In relation to the question of the juridical nature of these offences, we need to only 
quote verses 2:178-179 of the Quran:  
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O ye who believe! The law of equality is prescribed to you in cases of murder: the 
free for the free, the slave for the slave, the woman for the woman. But if any 
remission is made by the brother of the slain, then grant any reasonable demand, and 
compensate him with handsome gratitude, this is a concession and a Mercy from your 
Lord. After this whoever exceeds the limits shall be in grave penalty. 
159
 
This verse prescribes the punishment of Qisas for the offence of homicide. The 
Arabic word qisas denotes equality, analogy, and equity.
160
 It is translated as 
retaliation
161
 or equality.
162
 Asad translates it as ‘synonymous with musawah, i.e., 
making a thing equal, making the punishment equal to the crime- ‘just retribution’.163 
In the opinion of Hallaq, Qisas is not exclusively an act of revenge but ‘the 
considered and measured equalization (supervised, in all cases, by the Qadi) of loss of 
either limb or life’.164 
Another important constituent of the verse: ‘The free for the free, the slave for the 
slave, the woman for the woman’. It means ‘whatever the status of the guilty person, 
he or she is to be punished in a manner appropriate to the crime’.165 The punishment 
is without gender and social status-‘no matter whether he was high born or low born, 
man or woman, free man or slave, Muslim or non-Muslim(dhimmi)
166
. Dr Mahmood 
Ghazi elucidates that Islam advocates equality in punishment without discriminating 
between gender and social status- even the ruler is not exempted from the qisas.
167
 
The application of Islamic criminal law embraced all humans, regardless of their 
status or role, whether they were members of the ruling elite or part of the ruled 
class.
168
 Ghulam Ahmad Prevaiz says that this verse maintains the basic principles of 
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justice and equity ‘no distinction should be made between the great and the humble, 
what is to be considered is not the status of the person murdered or the murderer, but 
the principle of justice according to which life is equally valuable’.169 
The verse does not explicitly explain what would happen when a free man murders a 
slave or vice versa, or what course should be adopted if a man slays a women or vice 
versa. Anderson states that some of the early jurists of Islam were of the opinion that 
a man could not be killed in qisas for killing a woman.
170
 The verse also does not 
clarify if a free man can be murdered for  killing a slave and different jurists made 
their different opinion.
171
 Hadi Hussain explains that ‘the Quranic text provides no 
justification for this kind of inhuman discrimination’.172 Such kind of interpretation is 
not acceptable to  the followers of Islam because they are inconsistent with the widely 
recognized commands of the Quran and the Sunnah.
173
 Cherif  Bassiouni asserts that  
the ‘principle of every individual’ equal before the law is an extension of the general 
proposition in Islam that all are equal’.174 
 Moreover the verse 179 states: ‘The law of equality there is (saving of) life to you, o 
ye men of understanding; that ye may restrain yourselves’.175 Al-Tabari explained that 
qisas laws were revealed to reform the pre -Islamic culture of revenge. A famous 
commentary on the Quran explains: what this means is that there is preservation of 
life for others [i.e. innocent members of the family or tribe] in qisas since no one else 
other than the killer should be killed according to God’s decision.176 Al-Tabari goes 
on to explain that this verse was in response to pre-Islamic tribal laws where the 
innocent could be killed for crimes committed by members of their families or tribes. 
Anderson has said that the obligation of vengeance was inbred in the Arabs.
177
 Thus, 
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the qisas was intended to limit the vicious blood feuds that Arab tribes would pursue 
with great fervor, sometimes from generation to generation. Islam forbad the 
traditions of revenge and vendetta to be replaced by an equity qisas on all humans.
178
 
Peters reckons that ‘most important reforms were that revenge in kind could only be 
taken on the person of the offender and only after due trial’.179 Salim al-Awwa 
explained: Qisa (retribution) is permitted due legal process but not the victims to do it 
themselves.
180
 
Emphasis is on Forgiveness 
Although the Quran very clearly makes provisions for the death penalty a punishment 
for an offence of premeditated murder under the principle ‘an eye for an eye’ it also 
makes provision for an alternative course of action through victim forgiveness and 
restitution. The verse of the Quran that bears the command of qisas ends with stress 
being placed on forgiveness. The settlement should be made ‘in a goodly manner’ and 
compensation ‘handed over generously’, pointing out to the two parties and to the 
whole community that ‘this is an alleviation and mercy from your lord’.181 Haleem 
argues: ‘In this section the words ufiya(pardoned) and akhi(his brother), bi’l-ma‘ruf 
(in a fair way) and b-ihsan (in a good way) are calming words that call for 
magnanimity and generosity on all sides’.182 The heir or heirs of the victim in an 
intentional murder can pardon the punishment of qisas of the convict either against 
diyat or without accepting any compensation.
183
  
The majority of Muslims jurists argue that the Quran and Sunnah permit to forgo the 
qisas punishment and to adopt alternative forms of punishment. The victim (heirs in 
case of murder) have a ‘right to forfeit the claim to physical retaliation’ and resort to 
settlement.
184
 To derive the law of qisas and diyat in the case of intentional murder 
the Muslims jurist have corroborated their stance that the Quran always suggests 
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pardon and compensation with Qisas.‘And We ordained for them therein a life for a 
life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and for 
wounds is legal retribution. But whoever gives [up his right as] charity, it is an 
expiation for him. And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed – then it is 
those who are the wrongdoers’.185 The Quran encourages the victim’s family to 
pardon the offender. ‘And the retribution for an evil act is an evil one like it, but 
whoever pardons and makes reconciliation - his reward is [due] from Allah. Indeed, 
He does not like wrongdoers’.186 ‘And if you punish [an enemy, O believers], punish 
with an equivalent of that with which you were harmed. But if you are patient - it is 
better for those who are patient’.187 These verses conclude with the preferred option 
namely forgiveness by the victim, and of course the heirs of the victim.
188
  The Quran 
permits to take retaliation who are injured but it also reminds that ‘it is better to 
forgive and seek reconciliation’.189  
It is pertinent to mention here that ‘compensation is an option, and that both parties, 
heirs and murderer, must agree to it’.190 The compounding of the offence should be 
voluntary and without any element of coercion or pressure of any kind. To facilitate 
reconciliation, compensation is always accompanied by an admission of guilt or 
assumption of responsibility, apology, and request for forgiveness by the 
perpetrator’.191 
As a policy matter, compensation is encouraged over retaliation as a way of breaking 
the cycle of violence, and of bringing about reconciliation between the victim and the 
perpetrator.
192
 Vikor explains a civilizational intent behind this rule that ‘early 
legislators did not aim to abolish the idea of lex talions or blood revenge outright’.193 
He further elaborates that the ‘intention behind making the victims choose between 
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revenge and compensation was clearly to direct the victims towards the less severe 
punishment’.194 Dr Tahir ul Qadri says: ‘The punishment of blood money possesses 
the restituted character’.195 Abd Allah Yousuf Ali maintains: ‘If the aggrieved party 
consents forgiveness and brotherly love is better and the door of mercy is kept 
open’.196The significance of this option is that  ‘it saves life’.197 God wants to promote 
life as well as justice, which are promoted through qisas as well as forgiveness. The 
system of victim forgiveness and restitution means of achieving justice without losing 
another life. 
On top of it, the principle of mitigating the Sharia penalties works. Dr. Tahir ul-Qadri 
explains: ‘A system of preconditions and prerequisites for the imposition of Islamic 
punishments, relating to substantive as well as to procedural penal laws, has been 
formulated to check the frequent application of severe punishments’.198 In this regard, 
principles and techniques of avoidance of huddod and Qisas penalties are par 
excellence. The tradition of Prophet says: ‘Avoid budud[punishments] whenever you 
find an opportunity to do so’ ‘if there is an exculpating cause for then release him as it 
is better that the imam makes a mistake in pardoning than in punishing’. 199 From the 
earliest periods in Islamic history, the very real specter of unjustified and excessive 
punishment rankled Muslim jurists.
200
 The harshness and irrevocability of these 
punishments-especially in the capital context- prompted jurists to find means to avoid 
punishment, lest they be responsible for the consequences of getting it wrong.
201
 The 
raison d’etre is to reinforce principle that to pardon a criminal is better than to punish 
an innocent person. 
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Abdur Rahim underlines that ‘ any doubt would be sufficient to prevent the 
imposition of hadd’.202  In this context, Rahim reckons two aspects of doubt: First 
even if the accused himself did not entertain any doubt on the point this is called error 
or doubt with respect to subject of the application of law (shubhatul-mahal).
203
 
Secondly, the doubt and error with respect to the act( shubhat-ul- fa’il).204 It connotes 
that if the case is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the court should find in favor 
of the defendant. This equates to the established legal maxim ‘presumption of 
innocence’ which is a key element of the right to fair trial under article 14(2) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
205
 ‘It is a well-established 
principle in qisas crimes that circumstantial evidence favorable to the accused to be 
relied on, but unfavorable evidence is to be disregarded’.206 Moreover, the 
prerequisite of the high standard of proof (at least two witness) to prove the guilt 
under the Shariah equates to Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of 
those Facing the Death Penalty approved by Economic and Social Council in 1984.
207
 
 6.6 Analysis of Pakistani law of Qisas and Diyat in light of concept of 
Justice under Quran and Sunnah  
 
 6.6.1Emergence of Qisas and Diyat Law in Pakistan  
This law was promulgated to bring the existing penal laws of Pakistan dealing with 
homicide and body hurt in conformity with the Quran and the Sunnah in the light of 
three judgments
208
 of three Shariat courts namely the Shariat Bench of Peshawar High 
Court, Federal Shariat Court and finally  the Sharait Appellate Bench of the Supreme 
Court.
209
 As a part of the Islamization process (Nizam-e- Mustafa), the President of 
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Pakistan established the Federal Shariat Court to review laws of Pakistan for 
repugnancy to Islam.
210
 The Shariat Court hierarchy included local benches as well as 
a Federal Shariat Court (FSC) subject only to the review of the Supreme Court. In 
exercise of powers conferred by the constitution,
211
 these courts could, upon finding a 
law un-Islamic, require the government to amend the law. It is a judge-led process of 
Islamization executed by the Shariat court of the country.
212
  
This law was enacted without developing any consensus among the ‘executive, 
judiciary and members of the Parliament that ‘had different approaches to the 
application of Islamic criminal law’.213 The law relating to qisas and diyat was 
introduced first as an ordinance in 1990. It is pertinent to mention that two different 
Assemblies debated the draft law of homicide and body hurt on 23 July, 1984
214
 and 
1993
215
 respectively but the law could not become legislation. On April 7, 1997, the 
Bill was tabled in the National Assembly through a motion.
216
 The law was passed by 
the Parliament within 30 minutes in April 1997 by violating the rules of assembly 
including handing over a bill to a standing committee, select committee for discussion 
and debate, and the prior notice to members of parliament.
217
 Syed Naveed Qamar 
raised the objection regarding the abrupt introduction of the law: ‘36 page law and 
you (speaker) want to pass it in five minutes and you do not want to send it to 
Committee’.218 The opposition walked out.219 No discussion or debate took place 
whatsoever about a law which had been deliberated by at least ten committees and on 
which no consensus had emerged in three successive Assemblies.
220
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Tahir Wasti argues that the Qisas and Diyat Law in Pakistan was enforced on the 
basis of ‘political expediencies without deep study, an analytical approach, organized 
research, and contemporary thinking’.221  The law was passed in perfunctory manner 
that shows the primary motive was to pay lip service to Islam by simply adopting a 
law that was issued in its name. As the Lahore High Court observed in Abid Hussain 
v.The State that law ‘injected into our pre-existing criminal law and legal system 
without any serious debate or deliberations’.222 
 6.6.2. Power of Legal Heir to Pardon off Promotes Unequal Justice 
This law brought drastic changes in Chapter 16 of the British-era Pakistan Penal Code 
1860 from sections 229 to 338 related to bodily hurt and murder.
223
 Section 338-E 
under the Pakistan Penal Code(PPC) states that aIl offences under Chapter 16 of  the 
Pakistan Penal Code (i.e. offences affecting the human body) can be waived or 
compounded in the matter provided in sections 309
224
 (i.e. a sane adult legal heir can 
waive his right of Qisas in murder without compensation) and 310 which provide  
compounding of Qisas on accepting badl-i-sulh (i.e. compensation), subject to the 
provisions of Section 345 of the  Criminal Procedure Code. i.e. with the permission of 
the court and only by the persons mentioned in the schedule. Wali, an adult and sane 
legal heir, was allowed to compound his right of qisas at any time by accepting badl-
i-sulh(exchange of compromise).
225
 Badle-i-Sulh was explained as mutually agreed 
compensation according to Shariah to be paid or given by the offender to wali in cash 
or kind in the form of moveable, or immovable property.
226
 
Firstly the right of the wali to compound Qisas at any stage of the trial has not helped 
to promote unequal justice but has had an impact on the process of investigation and 
trial. In addition, Qisa and Diyat Law ‘does not provide any guidelines to courts about 
how to ensure that the compromise between the parties is genuine or false’.227   
Consequently, the process of compromise resulted in coercion and corruption. Both 
the Shariat Bench of Peshawar High Court
228
 and the Federal Shariat Court
229
 did not 
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rule out the possibility of frightening the heirs of the deceased person to accept 
compromise and the Federal Shariat Court suggested that the courts should monitor 
the settlement process in order to ensure ‘the question of deciding upon the 
genuineness of a compromise and permitting composition in a case of retaliation 
should be vested in the High Court’.230 The perusal of Assembly debate on the law 
reflects that many members of the Assembly had shown their concern regarding the 
viability of the law. In this regard, Syed Zafar Ali Shah a member of opposition 
depicted the sorry states of affairs during the debate of Parliament in 1993 in these 
words: ‘Now a days a man kills another and then threatens his heirs that if they did 
not pardon him then he would kill them too. Because of these threats, people were 
pardoning murderers’.231 The Lahore High Court in Ghulam Shabir v. Mst. Zanib 
Bibi
232
 the court acknowledged the tactics that those accused use to take advantage of 
the heirs of the deceased. It was observed: 
In many cases the poor and helpless heirs of a deceased [person] cannot 
withstand the pressure tactics of the influential accused persons and finally 
submit to their demands even after the accused have exhausted all the remedies 
under the law. This is mostly done out of the fear of the accused and not of their 
own free will to pardon them in the name of God. 
In the recent past, the two most widely reported cases have unfurled how the powerful 
and the rich exploit the law. The swift release of the American Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) contractor Raymond Davis left behind many doubts and questions 
regarding the settlement of the double-murder case. The victims’ families’ counsel 
Asad Manzoor Butt has alleged that the government forced the families to accept 
diyat.
233
Another case that gained lime light in the media that Anti-terrorism Court 
(ATC) had awarded death sentences to Shahrukh Jatoi and Siraj Talpur, the key 
suspects, in Shahzeb murder case in June 2013.The case become a test for the 
criminal justice system as the Jatoi, who is the son of a billionaire and a very 
influential man, got the legal heir of the slain Khan to forgive the murder under the 
Islamic provision of the criminal laws. The legal heirs of (murdered) Khan could not 
sustain the pressure and influence and eventually submitted an affidavit of forgiveness 
of their son’s murder. 
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The Supreme Court, executive of the country and reports of government commissions 
have underlined the need to reform the law. On October 03, 2013, the Supreme Court 
decided to constitute a five-judge bench to take up matters concerning the misuse of 
compromise laws and Islamic injunctions to get those convicted of heinous cases 
pardoned in the name of God. The Prime Minister’s special assistant on legal affairs 
said: ‘This abuse was to the degree that influential and rich people would get away 
with murder, literally’.234 The principles of justice require that  the wali / state be 
allowed to exercise its option or the legal heirs of victims be allowed to compound the 
offence after the completion of the trial. The report of the National Commission on 
the Status of Women reflect that qisas be compounded only subject to completion of 
the following procedure: ‘Firstly, the crime is proved either by confession or by 
evidence; secondly, the convict must submit his or her written apology to the legal 
heirs of the victims through the court’.235 
 6.6.3. Discrimination Against Women 
Most importantly, the Qisas and Diyat Law implicitly condones honor killing. Before 
the introduction of the Qisas and Diyat law the Indian Penal Code 1860 allowed 
‘grave and sudden provocation to serve as mitigating factors in the adjudications of 
these crimes. In the Gul Hassan Case v. Federation of Pakistan, the court stated: 
‘According to the injunctions of Islam, provocation, no matter how grave and sudden 
it is, does not lessen the intensity of crime of murder’.236 The plea of provocation was 
argued and accepted in the courts in mitigation even though the provision as such no 
longer exists in law.
237
 In this regard, the judges invoked section 338F that empowers 
a vast discretionary authority to the judiciary to interpret and apply the law in 
accordance with the injunctions of Islam.
238
 But unfortunately ‘neither the parameters 
for interpreting the Islamic injunctions had been laid down nor were the judiciary 
sensitized on human rights and trained in Shariah law’.239 
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Against this backdrop, the judiciary made its own interpretation of Sharia   to apply 
the law. In Ghulam Yasin and 2 Others Vs. the State, the court exercised the powers 
under article 338F and made distinction of murder committed with intention (Qatl-e-
Amd) from the murder committed on account of honor.
240
 The court noted that ‘the 
persons found guilty of  murder (Qatl) committed on account of honor do deserve 
concession which must be given to them.
241
 In Gulam Hussain alias Hussain 
Bakhsh’case the Supreme Court upheld the plea of grave and sudden provocation.242 
The Lahore High Court in Muhammad Rafique v. the State gave the benefit of sudden 
provocation the accused, who killed his wife, on the ground that he followed well 
established social norms.
243
 In State v. Abdul Waheed and another, the Supreme Court 
Appellate Bench examined section 302(a) and (c) PPC and held that a Qatl-e-Amd ( 
premeditated murder)by husband will attract a punishment lesser than Qisas.
244
  In the 
State v. Muhammad Hanif case , the Supreme Court held that the husband ‘as 
custodian of honor of his wife had the right to kill the deceased while he was engaged 
in sexual act with his wife and he had not earned liability of Qisas or Tazir or even 
Diyat’.245 In Sardar Muhammad v. The State246, the Lahore High Court declared such 
murders not to be an offence at all and acquitted an accused of murdering two persons 
his daughter and partner in the sugarcane field.  
Since 1999 the judiciary in Pakistan has adopted an opposing stance in a series of 
judgments.
247
 The Lahore High Court in Muhammad Siddique vs. The State
248
 
proactively used its discretionary powers under s.338-E PPC in the case, involving a 
man who had killed his daughter, the  husband  of the daughter and their child, to 
confirm the trial court’s death sentence despite the fact that compromise had been 
reached during the proceedings. In Muhammad Akram Khan v. The State in 2001, the 
Court held that honor killings are murders and violate ‘fundamental rights as 
enshrined in Article 9 of the constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which 
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provides that ‘no person would be deprived of life and liberty except in accordance 
with law and any custom or usage in that respect is void under Article 8(1) of the 
Constitution.
249
  In Ashiq Hussain v. Abdul Hameed,   the Court held ‘no court could 
and no civilized human being should sanctify murders in the name of tradition, family 
honor or religion’.250 Similarly in Muhammad Saleem case wherein the Supreme 
Court held that ‘nobody had the legal or moral right to take the life of a human being 
in the disguise of ‘Ghairat’ (honour). Conviction and sentence of death had been 
rightly and lawfully recorded against the accused by way of Tazir’.251 
The provision of exception from the punishment of Qisas under the Qisas and Diyat 
Law 1997 gives protection to the perpetrators of honor crimes: Qisas cannot be 
applicable where murder(qatl-i-amd) is committed by a minor or insane person or in 
cases where the victim is a child or grandchild of the offender.
252
This clause saves 
perpetrators of honour crime to get away with the punishment of Qisas (retribution) 
because the killers are mostly the parents, siblings and other close relatives of the 
victims.
253
 Dr.  Ghazi supports the exception (section 306) on the basis of fiqah( 
Juristic Interpretation): ‘Father being ‘asl’(original) can eliminate its 
extension(Tauseeh)i.e. child but vice versa is not possible’.254 According to some 
scholars, a father is a life giver hence the Qisas of his life cannot be taken upon 
killing his children. Dr. Tanzil ur- Rehman also supports the exception to the general 
rule of retaliation because ‘due to respect paid to a father in Islam’.255 There are 
judgments of courts that exempted the father for murder of their children. In Faqir 
Ullah v. Khalil-uz-Zaman
256
Khalil-uz-Zaman
257
 and Mohammad Rafique v. State
258
 in 
which a wife was killed by her husband, the trail court awarded death penalty under 
section 302, Qisas and Diyat Law. But neither Dr. Tanzil –ur-Rehman nor courts in 
judgments cited herein above, have quoted hadiths (Traditions of the Prophet) to 
fortify their standpoints. In fact this exemption is neither mentioned in the Quran nor 
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by the authentic hadiths. The exemptions under section 306 &307 PPC is tantamount 
to giving a license to the Wali to kill the family members which is one of the causes 
of increase in the cases of honor killings.
259
 
The Government of Pakistan has passed several amendments in efforts to end the 
discriminatory application of the Hudood Ordinance and resulting abuse of the Qisas 
and Diyat Law. In 2004, the amendment was introduced to counter honor crime in 
Pakistan. Critically, the Act does not address the crucial problem of statutory 
concession available to perpetrators through the Qisas and Diyat laws which posit 
forgiveness powers in the hands of victims and his or her legal heirs.
260
 When Qisas is 
inapplicable due to waiver, the court can invoke section311 of the Pakistan Penal 
Code under the principle of Fasad Fil- Ard (serious disruption in society). However it 
is general court practice in Pakistan that once the heirs of the victim have waived their 
right to qisas, the court are hesitant to impose the a fore mentioned and the offender 
goes unpunished.
261
  
The tension between the empowerment of the victims and needs of the State has 
always engaged Islamic scholars. It is argued that ‘the safety of the community may 
even require that the state retain the right to impose tazir in case of pardon or 
settlement’.262 Dr Ghazi argues that it is  the right of the  state to punish the murderer 
to control law and order and to protect the right of society.
263
 Under the provision of 
Fasad  fil ard the Law must distinguish those cases in which the state’s intervention is 
necessary and those in which intervention constitutes an unacceptable usurpation of 
victim’s rights. 
The Pakistani version of the Qisas and Diyat Law discriminates against women and 
encourages unequal justice. The application of the law in the last twenty-five years 
catalyzed discriminatory cultural practices by placing the value of woman’s life in the 
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hands of her family members. In this context, the application of the Qisas and Diyat 
Law violates Article5 (a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women(CEDAW) by reinforcing the discriminatory 
conception of women as disposable vessels of honour. The Law also violates article 
15 of CEDAW that advocates for women’s equal protection before the law. 
In fact the law was grafted into the penal system without taking into account the 
social matrix of the society. The Hudood and Qisas ideal penalties were considered 
only by an ideal authority in egalitarian Muslim society. Abul Ala Maududi(1903-79) 
has rightly observed that an isolated provision of Islamic law cannot do any miracles 
without addressing the economics, social and political ails of the society.
264
 Salim el-
Awa
265
 and Hashim Kamili also endorse Madudi’s standpoint that  the Islamic 
criminal Justice System in an alien environment is not only unrealistic but most likely 
to produce the opposite results- frustration with the Islamic vision of justice and fair 
play.
266
 Tariq Ramdan argues that ‘The legal texts must be read in light of the 
objectives (maqasid)that justify them, first and foremost the protection of the integrity 
of the  person(nafas) and the promotion of justice (adle). A literal and non-
contextualized application of hudud without regard for the strictly stipulated 
conditions is a betrayal of the teachings of Islam, because it produces injustice’267  
To sum up, the law has failed to promote equal justice without discrimination of 
gender and sex. It defeats the intent and purpose of justice as enunciated in the Quran. 
The application of the Qisas and Diyat Law in Pakistan is not only contrary to the 
domestic constitution but also the required ends of justice as enunciated in the Quran 
and the Sunnah. It has increased the arbitrariness of the application of capital 
punishment. 
Conclusion 
The principles and ideals of justice as enunciated by the Quran reflect the norms that 
have resonance in contemporary human rights standards. These ideals and principles 
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provide the basis for an ethical critique of penal laws practiced by the Muslims and 
their leaders. The Quran and the practice of the Prophet (P.B.U.H) attribute a 
paramount importance to right to life, presumption of innocence, repentance (tawbah) 
and reformation. The procedure adopted by the Prophet to implement punishments 
grants maximum benefit to the offender on the principle that to pardon a criminal is 
better than to punish an innocent person. The penalties prescribed in the Quran are not 
readily meant for random, arbitrary or spontaneous implementation. 
The Quran as a divine book does not set forth a complete system of criminal justice. 
The legislative part of the Quran is the model illustration for future legislation and 
does not constitute a legal code by itself. The Muslims jurists of the sixth and the 
seventh century
 
developed an Islamic criminal justice system and the classified 
punishments into Hudoods, Qisas and Tazir. Under the Hudood crimes, the early 
Muslim jurists categorized adultery and apostasy as capital offences. The legitimacy 
of capital punishment for these two offences may be seriously questioned because the 
punishment has not been prescribed by the Quran. In this context, the Quran 
prescribes punishment for adultery 100 lashes not stoned to death. The Quranic verses 
condemn apostasy but its punishment is restricted for divine justice in the hereafter. 
The Pakistan Hudood Ordinance prescribes the punishment of stone to death 
268
 but it 
has been never implemented due to the stringent evidentiary requirements. Pakistan 
still has no formal law prohibiting apostasy but section 295C relates to derogatory 
remarks in respect of the Prophet Muhammad serves as a surrogate in suppressing 
those who dissent from Islam by word or deed. The capital punishment for offences 
related to sex and religion can be reviewed in the penal laws of Pakistan in line with 
the dictates of international guideline without violating the constitutional obligation to 
legislate in consistent with the Quran and Sunnah. 
Under the Qisas crimes the offence of premeditated murder is liable to capital 
punishment. The Quran enumerates two kinds of murder and prescribes the 
punishment of death (qisas) for the offence of intentional murder. The Quran 
envisages the implementation of Qisas without any discrimination based on, gender 
and social position. The Quran categorically ordains that life cannot be taken under a 
system that does not fulfill all the required procedural guarantees including 
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authenticity of evidence, the legality of pre-trial investigation, and provision of 
sufficient space for post- trial revisions. 
The majority of Muslims jurists argue that the Quran and Sunnah permit to forgo the 
Qisas punishment and to adopt alternative forms of punishment, in this context, heirs 
of the victim in an intentional murder can pardon the punishment of Qisas of the 
convict either against diyat or without accepting any compensation. The Quranic 
verse that gives the command of Qisas concludes with the option of forgiveness and 
reconciliation. The underlying principle is to promote justice as well as life. 
In 1990, Pakistan incorporated the Islamic law of murder and bodily hurt to bring the 
penal laws of the country in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah under the 
direction of the Shariat courts. The Pakistani version of the Qisas and Diyat Law was 
enforced on the basis of political expediencies without deep study, an analytical 
approach, organized research, and contemporary thinking and taking into account the 
social matrix of the society. Consequently, the law discriminates against women and 
encourages unequal justice. The law implicitly condones honour killings that are 
contradictory to tenants of Islam and spirit of the Constitution of Pakistan. The power 
of legal heirs to enter into compromise at any stage from investigation to the time of 
executions has not only marred the process of investigation but also gives an ample 
opportunity to the powerful and wealthy to frighten the legal heirs to enter into 
compromise. 
In short, it is not against the tenants of the Quran and the Sunnah to restrict the scope 
of capital punishment in Pakistan in consonance with the most serious crimes under 
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Quran 
categorically prescribes capital punishment for the offence of premeditated murder 
but at the same time condemns the killing of an innocent person. In addition to 
stringent evidentiary and procedural guarantees, the hudood and the qisas penalties 
are for ideal Muslims society ruled by the just rulers. In this backdrop, the application 
of capital punishment for the offence of pre-meditated murder both as a hadd or Tazir 
should be avoided due to the persistent occurrences of injustices in the society as a 
whole and inherent flaws in the criminal justice system in particular. 
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Chapter 7 
The Death Row Phenomenon in India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh: A Legal Challenge 
 
Introduction 
Death row phenomenon has become a legal challenge in India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh due to the increase in death row prisoners each year, the pendency of 
cases in appellate courts and miserable living conditions in overcrowded prisons. 
According to Amnesty International Global Report, about 40 percent of the total death 
row population of the world is confined in overcrowded prisons of these three 
countries.
1
 Especially in Pakistan, 7000 prisoners under sentence of death are 
confined in various prisons of the country. Law Commission Reports and judgments 
of the supreme courts of these countries help to study the legal and physical problems 
of prisoners under sentence of death. In addition to the interviews of death row 
prisoners recorded by different researchers, national and international NGOs reveal 
that misereres and horrors of life of those who are confined at death row. This chapter 
attempts to explore how the death row phenomenon is inhumane and degrading and 
indirectly undermines the legitimacy of capital punishment. 
 7.1. Defining Death Row Phenomenon 
Hudson points out that there is no single definition of the death row phenomenon.
2
 
But it is generally known due to two main features: The long period spent in awaiting 
death; the second component involves harsh physical conditions. The third element is 
psychological. Some authors have used term ‘death row syndrome’ to describe the 
consequential psychological illness that can occur as a result of death row 
phenomenon. Smith identifies the cause of psychological harms due to ‘extended 
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periods of time spent on death row, in harsh conditions coupled with the unique stress 
of living under the sentence of death’.3 
 7.1.1. Death Row Phenomenon Portrayed by Different Authors in the World 
The classical writers namely Camus, Foucault and Jeremy Bentham demonstrate in 
their works the experience of being on death row.
4
 They documented the nature and 
problems of being on death row; each of these classical works offers a glimpse of the 
wider social structures within which death row prisoners were positioned. Apart from 
these classical studies, there are numerous scholars who have documented this severe 
mental trauma, a result of the severe stress associated with death sentences.
5
  All these 
works show that all condemned prisoners suffer from an overwhelming sense of fear 
and helplessness, mental incompetence, fluctuating moods, recurrent depression, 
mental slowness, confession, forgetfulness, lethargy, listlessness, drowsiness, 
symptom of senility, self-mutilation and insanity confined elsewhere in the prison.
6
 
Some condemned prisoners grow old prematurely and describe themselves as ‘the 
living dead’ an image that conveys the extremity of their confinement’.7 
 It is a fact that waiting for death is more horrible than the death itself. George Scott 
has rightly said that ‘the fear of death, during those tragic days, is productive of much 
greater suffering than the actual experience of death’.8  Albert Camus has portrayed 
the agony and suffering of death row prisoners in these words: ‘Man is undone by 
waiting for capital punishment well before he dies. Two deaths are inflicted on him, 
the first being worse than the second’. 9 Robert Jonson depicted: ‘Defeated by the 
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awesome prospect of death by execution. Worn down in small and almost 
imperceptible ways, the gradually but inexorably become less than fully human’.10 
It does not only involve the delay but also often appalling conditions of detention 
imposed upon the inmates.  William Schabas described harsh prison conditions: 
‘Cells without amenities, little or no time outdoors for recreation, and absence of 
activities related to work or education, contemptuous prison personnel, restricted 
opportunities for family visits’.11 His life is lived twenty-three out of twenty-four 
hours a day in a space six feet wide and eight feet long.
12
The conditions of 
confinement also appear to aggravate existing mental disorder.
13
 It is the place where 
humanity is constantly denied. ‘Here life and death are one. Both are ever present; 
while there are times when death seems distant, it is only an illusion’.14 
Another bleak aspect of death row is segregation of condemned prisoners from the 
general population that makes prisoners feel degraded. In this context ,  C. Michael 
Lambrix( death row prisoner) explains: ‘Part of this stems from physical constraints, 
while part  stems from symbolic isolation that comes from living with the fact that 12 
members of your community have determined that you are a worthless person who 
should no longer be permitted to exist’.15 ‘Life on death row is a blending of the real 
and the unreal; it is a clash of internal and external tension, the tension of everyday 
living magnified a hundred times’.16 Robert Johnson says: ‘the stress of life under 
sentence of death reaches its zenith during the deathwatch’.17 
The reality of this waiting place for death is difficult to grasp. ‘Death row is indeed, 
the stuff of poets, because so much of the suffering that is involved belongs to the 
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spirit rather than the body. This is not a kind of torture that can be easily proven with 
photographs, X-rays, and medical reports, although psychiatrists and psychologists 
have attempted to study the matter. While serving a term in an English jail, Oscar 
Wilde in his poem ‘The Balled of Reading Gaol’ attempts to convey the mental 
suffering of the condemned man, forced to brood upon ‘[his]is anguish night and 
day’.18 In 2010, the feelings of Texas death row prisoners expressed by paintings, 
cartoons, poetry and prose published into a book.
19
 The feeling of a death row 
prisoner has been portrayed in these lines: ‘I like a hungry tiger, focused and driven, I 
have no time to deviate from the path, cuz with each breath I take, it could be my 
last’.20  The soul of another death row prisoners has been dissected in these words: 
‘Being on death row means dealing with pain, hurt, madness, suffering, sadness, 
hopelessness and depression, and believe it or not, happiness’.21 
 7.2 International Legal Framework on the Death Row Phenomenon 
 
The death row phenomenon has been explicitly recognized as a violation of human 
rights by international and domestic tribunals ‘due to the element of delay, harsh 
conditions of death row or the cumulative effect of both the element delay and harsh 
physical conditions on the death row.
22
 Moreover ‘the exact nature of the doctrine 
varies among the courts but the underlying concept remains the same’.23 In this 
context, the UN Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, 
Privy Council and courts of various countries including India maintain that the death 
row phenomenon is a violation of human rights. 
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The Human Rights Committee 
The Human Rights Committee dealt with a large number of ‘capital punishment cases 
submitted by inmates detained on death row in state parties to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, mostly in the Caribbean region, who claimed 
that their rights under the Covenant had been violated’.24 The Committee has 
generated a considerable amount of jurisprudence on this issue.
25
 Many of them had 
complained that ‘the length of their detention on death row constituted inhumane, 
cruel and degrading treatment, contrary to Article 7 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights ’.26 
The Human Rights Committee takes an intermediate position on the death row 
phenomenon. The committee in Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica does not accept delay 
in judicial proceedings alone as a violation to Article 7 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights: ‘In principle prolonged judicial proceedings do not per 
se constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment even if they can be a source of 
mental strain for the convicted prisoners. However, the situation could be otherwise in 
cases involving capital punishment and an assessment of the circumstances of each 
case would be necessary’.27 In another case Kelly v. Jamaica 28, the Committee held 
that the harsh conditions experienced on death row in Jamaica, particularly those 
relating to medical care, did violate Article 10 (all persons deprived of their liberty 
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person). The Committee continued its traditional stance that the prolonged periods of 
detention on death row do not per se constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
in various cases including Barrett and Sutcliff v. Jamaica,
29
 Kindler v. Canada
30
. For 
the first time, in the case of Francis v. Jamaica, the Committee recognized the death 
row phenomenon a violation of Article 7 and 10 of ICCPR due to the delay with a 
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combination of other factors including the role of the state in the delay, the condition 
of imprisonment and the mental condition of the prisoner.
31
 
 Deterioration in the mental health of the prisoner has been considered a ‘further 
compelling circumstance’ by the Human Rights Committee in Eustace Henry and 
Everald Douglas v. Jamaica found the violation of Article 7 and 10 paragraph 1 was 
found because the prisoner on death row received ‘inadequate medical treatment for 
his mental conditions’.32 In Albert Wilson v. Philippines the Committee found  the 
violation of Article 7 and 10 on the ground that the mental health of the death row 
prisoner was exacerbated by his treatment in ,as well as the conditions of his 
detention.
33
 The Committee concluded: ‘Aggravating factors constituting further 
compelling circumstances beyond the mere length of time spent by the author in 
imprisonment under a sentence of death’.34 In Henry and Douglas, the prisoners had 
been on death row for 10 years and suffered severe mental distress the Committee 
observed: ‘conditions of incarceration under which Mr. Henry continued to be held 
until his death, even after the prison authorities were aware of his terminal illness, and 
the lack of medical attention, for the gunshot wounds, received by Mr. Douglas, 
reveal a violation of Articles 7, and 10 paragraph 1, of the Covenant’.35 
A puzzling area of the Human rights committee case-law with respect to death row is 
the issue of the conditions of detention on death row-an area where Article 7 and 
10(1) overlap neatly. The original principle has also been refined and developed in the 
jurisprudence.
36
 The complementary relationship of the two provisions of the ICCPR 
is well illustrated in Hervin Edwards v. Jamaica: ‘ The period of 10 years alone in a 
cell measuring 6 feet by 14 feet, let out only for three and half hours a day, was 
provided with no recreational facilities and received no books’.37 The keeping of a 
prisoner in such conditions of detention constituted ‘not only a violation Article 10, 
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paragraph 1, but, because of the length of time in which the author was kept in these 
conditions, a violation of Article 7 was also incurred’.38 The Committee in Lloyd 
Reece v Jamaica,
39
 Dennis Lobban v. Jamica
40
 and Sandy Sextus v. Trinidad and 
Tobago
41
 refused to examine a possible violation of Article 7 once a violation of 
Article 10(1) was found. 
In its decision in Raymond Persaud and Rampersaud v. Guyana where the prisoner 
had been on death row for 15 years, the Human Rights Committee indicated that it 
was reconsidering its views on the death row phenomenon, but it did not go as far as 
to take the plunge and change its position. The committee observed: 
As regards the issues raised under Article 7 of the Covenant, the Committee 
would be prepared to consider that the prolonged detention of the author on 
death row constitutes a violation of Article 7. However, having also found a 
violation of Article 6, paragraph 1, it does not consider it necessary in the 
present case to review and reconsider its jurisprudence that prolonged detention 
on death row, in itself and in the absence of other compelling circumstances, 
does not constitute a violation of Article 7.
42
 
In its recent decisions, Munguwambuto Kabwe Peter Mwamba v. Zambia, the 
Committee accepted the prisoner’s claim that his detention on death row for over 
eight years for the hearing of his appeal affected his physical and mental health. The 
Committee also accepted the prisoner’ s claim of stress and depression due to 
‘sleeping in a dirty public toilet: cells are 3 by 3 meters; they accommodate several 
prisoners and have no toilet facilities, so they must avail of small tins to relieve 
themselves; TB, malaria and HIV/AIDS, are all prevalent in the prison’.43 The 
author's conditions of detention, as described, violate his right to be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and are 
therefore contrary to Article 10, paragraph 1.
44
 The Committee provided relief mainly 
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relying on violation of the right of fair trial instead of delay and hard physical 
conditions. 
European Court of Human Rights 
On the other hand, the approach of the European Court of Human Rights is different 
from that of Human Rights Committee. The European Court of Human Rights takes a 
prolonged period of delay as cruel and inhumane.
45
 In the judgment of Soering v. 
United Kingdom,
46
 the court prohibited the extradition of Soering to the State of 
Virginia, where he had been charged with a capital offence, on the grounds of  the 
long delay in Virginia between the death sentence and execution and ‘the anguish and 
mounting tension of living in the ever-present shadow of death’. 47 It is noteworthy 
that ‘it was not the death penalty itself that the court found offensive to the 
Convention, but rather the death row phenomenon the years-long wait for the scaffold 
under gruesome conditions, both physical and psychological’.48The European Court 
of Human Rights in the judgment of Soering v. United Kingdom separated these 
circumstances into two further categories: The harsh, dehumanizing conditions of 
imprisonment itself; and the sheer length of time spent living under such conditions.
49
 
The psychological repercussions on the condemned prisoner due to hard physical 
conditions and long period of detention on death row aggregate to be called the ‘death 
row syndrome’.50  This gave, as Hudson explains, ‘a seed of legitimacy for the 
doctrine [of the death row phenomenon] in tribunals around the world’.51 
Simultaneously the judgment worked as a precedent and guideline for the court itself 
for its future decisions. 
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The Privy Council  
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney 
General  of Jamaica et al., passed  a ruling as  the highest appeal court of the 
Caribbean States that ‘we regard it as an inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony 
of execution over a long extended period of time’.52 In the same judgment, the Privy 
Council gave a threshold period of five years on the death row as a strong ground for 
a violation of the right against inhuman or degrading treatment.
53
 To avoid overhasty 
executions, the Privy Council subsequently clarified in Guerra v. Baptiste that the 
period of five years was a guide ‘not a limit or yard stick’.54 In Henfield v. Attorney 
General of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, the Privy Council observed that 
where international courts were not approached a period of three and half years was 
‘in all the circumstances be so prolonged a time as to render execution as a cruel or 
inhuman punishment’.55 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in its 1993 decision in Pratt et al. v 
Attorney General for Jamaica et al., referred to the repeated fixing of execution dates 
as an aggravating factor contributing to the inhuman and degrading treatment that the 
two petitioners suffered during their fourteen-year stay on Jamaica’s death row.56 
 7.3 Death Row Phenomenon in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh  
7.3.1. The Period of Detention at Death Row 
The progressive limitations on the death penalty under human rights law, right of 
inmates to explore every avenue of appeal before the execution and the growth of 
abolitionist sentiment resulted in an extended period on death row.
57
 It has become 
difficult to complete the full range of procedural guarantees that are prescribed by 
international and domestic law within a reasonable period of time. Because of lengthy 
delays in the dispensation of justice, condemned prisoners often remain in death row 
                                                 
52
 Pratt v Attorney General for Jamaica and others [1993] UKPC1, para.60. 
53
 Ibid, para.85  
54
 Lincoln Anthony Guerra v. Cipriani Baptiste and Others [1996] UKPC 3, para.29. 
55
 Dwight Lamott Henfield v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas [1996] UKPC 4, 
para.35. 
56
 Pratt v Attorney General for Jamaica and others [1993] UKPC1, para. 
57
 William A. Schabas, Death Penalty as Cruel Treatment and Torture: Capital Punishment 
Challenged in The World’s Courts (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1996), p.96; also see Robert 
Johnson, Death Work: A Study of the Modern Execution Process (Belmont CA: Wadsworth, 1998), 
p.43. 
 202 
cells for years, and some for over a decade as their appeals make their painstaking 
way through labyrinthine judicial systems in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.  
In Pakistan, according to a survey undertaken by AGHS
58
 in 2002 on condemned 
prisoners, out of a total of 1,500 death penalty appeals pending in High Courts, 28 had 
been pending for a period between 9 to 12 years, and 326 for the last 6 to 8 years. Of 
the 217 total cases pending before the Supreme Court, 28 had been pending for the 
last 9 to 12 years, and 87 for the last 6 to 8 years.
59
 
The study, conducted by the Death Penalty Research Project at the National Law 
University in Delhi, based on interviews with 373 of the 385 inmates confined on 
death row in various prisons in India, shows a minimum period on death row 6 years 
and a maximum of 25 years.
60
 According to the research conducted by Reena Mary 
George
61
 by conducting semi-structured interviews of 111 prisoners on death row 
from 16 prisons based in six different states in India, the period on death row was 5 
to17 years. However, they have been incarcerated for longer the longest for over 22 
years.
62
 One prisoner told the interviewer that ‘the waiting period was long and that 
one died a thousand times a year’.63 
The Indian Law Commission Report describes that ‘the death row phenomenon has 
become an unfortunate and distinctive feature of the death penalty apparatus in 
India’.64 Indian Law Commission Report on the death penalty acknowledges the fact:  
It is distressing to note that the death row prisoners are routinely subject to an 
extraordinary amalgam of excruciating psychological and physical suffering 
arising out of oppressive conditions of incarceration and long delays in trial, 
appeal and thereafter executive clemency.
65
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The Supreme Court of India has discussed the issue of death row ‘in many cases but 
with different results’.66 The Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh, Justice Iyer referred to the six-year period under the sentence of death 
virtually making the prisoner a vegetable and argued, ‘the excruciation of the long 
pendency of the death sentence with the prisoner languishing near –solitary suffering 
all the time, may make the death sentence unconstitutionally cruel and agonizing’.67 A 
judge noted that the person would be more of a vegetable than a person and hanging a 
vegetable is not the death penalty.
68
 The minority judgment by Justice Bhagwati in 
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab went much further in finding the death penalty 
‘barbaric and inhuman in its effect, mental and physical upon the condemned man and 
is positively cruel’.69  
In February 1983, in Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court 
observed that avoidable delay also makes the process of execution of the death 
sentence unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and thereby, violative of the 
procedural due process guarantees enshrined under Articles 21,14 and 19’.70 The 
Supreme Court held that ‘delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of 
death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under the sentence of death 
to invoke Article 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death’.71  
A three member bench of the Supreme Court in Sher Singh v. State of Punjab
72
 
observed that the appellate courts in normal course take up to four or five years to 
process appeals apart from the time spent by the constitutional authorities under 
Article 72 and 161 in considering the mercy petition. The Court in Sher Singh 
therefore, departed from the fixed period of two years as a rule of thumb propounded 
by the Vatheeswaram Court and held that no pre-determined period of delay can be 
held to guarantee frustration of the death sentence.
73
 The Court pointed out that to 
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impose a strict time limit of two years would enable a prisoner to defeat the ends of 
justice by pursuing a series of frivolous and untenable proceedings.
74
 The Supreme 
Court in Sher Singh also held that in such Article 32 petition a death row convict 
cannot be allowed to take advantage of delay which is caused on account of 
proceedings filed by him to delay the execution.
75
 
 Owing to the conflict in these two decisions, a five judge bench of the Supreme Court 
was constituted to clarify the legal question of whether the delay of two years in the 
execution itself be a ground to commute capital punishment to life imprisonment. The 
Supreme Court in Triveniben held that the delay for the purpose of an Article 21 
claim made by the convict could only be said to kick in once the judicial process has 
come to an end ‘the delays in disposal of the mercy petitions or delay occurring at the 
instance of the Executive’.76 It did not coincide with the approach of the Human 
Rights Committee and the Privy Council which counts the time spent on death row 
from the time the death sentence is awarded. Secondly the Supreme Court may 
consider the question of ‘inordinate delay’ in the light of all circumstances of the case 
to decide whether the execution of sentence should be carried out or should be altered 
into an imprisonment for life. 
The limited guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in Triveniben were followed with 
inconsistency. In 1999, the Supreme Court in Daya Singh held the delay in clemency 
was not the only factor to commute, so the bench directed commutation on 
‘cumulative grounds’ after taking into account the prisoner’s incarceration for nearly 
two decades of which he had been under the sentence of death for 13 years. 
77
 The 
Supreme Court considered the time on death row during judicial proceedings as a 
mitigating circumstance in determining whether to commute the death sentence. In 
February 2011, the Supreme Court in Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan
78
 commuted a 
death sentence on appeal with one mitigating circumstance being that the accused 
was‘ languishing in the death cell for more than six years’ since he had been 
sentenced by the trial court. 
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In Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State of N.C.T of Delhi, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the application for commutation into life imprisonment on the ground of 
unreasonable delay of 8 years in disposal of the mercy petition.
79
 In this case, the 
Supreme Court debated on terrorism as a heinous offence instead of focusing on 
cruelty and inhumanity of the death row phenomenon.  
After three years in the case of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, a three-judge 
bench of the Indian Supreme Court held an excessive delay in carrying out the death 
sentence was an essential mitigating factor in a plea for commutation: 
we are of the cogent view that undue, inordinate and unreasonable delay in 
execution of death sentence does certainly attribute to torture which indeed is in 
violation of Article 21 and thereby entails as the ground for commutation of 
sentence. However, the nature of delay i.e whether it is undue or unreasonable 
must be appreciated based on the facts of individual cases and no exhaustive 
guidelines can be framed in this regard.
80
  
In the Curative Petition submitted by the wife of Devender Pal Singh Bhular, the 
Supreme Court in Navneet Kaur v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr commuted the death 
penalty in life imprisonment on the ground of ‘unexpected/inordinate delay of 8 years 
in disposal of the mercy petition and on the ground of insanity’.81 
In short in the majority of cases, an inordinate delay requires additional compelling 
circumstances. In this regard, the Indian stance is closer to that of the Human Rights 
Committee. Unlike the Privy Council and the Human Rights Committee the Indian 
Supreme Court calculates delay on death row after the rejection of appeal in the 
Supreme Court. But there are instances wherein the Supreme Court did not rely on 
only clemency period to commute the sentence of death but also takes into account 
the total period spent on death row.  
 7.3.2. Solitary Conditions of Detention 
The Indian subcontinent inherited prisons system from British colonial rule in India. 
Thomas Babington Macaulay, the head of the Indian Law Commission, reinforced in 
his minutes recorded on December 14, 1834 that 'the best Criminal Code can be of 
very little use to the community unless there be a good machinery for the infliction of 
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punishment’.82 Thus, imprisonment, ‘the chief form of punishment’ had to be made a 
'terror to wrong-doers'.
83
 In this context, when George Campbell took over as the 
lieutenant-governor of Bengal in 1871 and he implemented the policy of ‘making the 
prisoner feel the pain and torment of incarceration’.84 
In light of the policy, within the macro-structural punitive institution of the jail ‘newer 
forms of micro-structural penalties were invented by the jail authorities to extend the 
pain of his/her original sentence’.85 The motif of disciplining the prisoners was based 
on adopting two kinds of methods- firstly the prohibitive measures including the 
denial of basic rights, and secondly corporal punishments including physical torture. 
Fetters, the system of chain gang, whipping, solitary confinement, and denial of food, 
were some of the forms of punishment that were to be followed in Alipore, 
Presidency and other jails of Calcutta all through the nineteenth century.
86
 
Solitary confinement in cellular prisons or within a prison was another technique to 
exacerbate the pain of prisoners. To punish the ‘guilty of breaches of jail discipline’ a 
range of solitary cells were in operation; in which offenders might be confined in 
darkness and silence.
87
 ‘Solitary confinement’ was the extreme form of such 
segregation.
88
 This was a penalty that was not invented for Indian prisoners alone but 
was being experimented with even in European Jails, where the cell system was 
introduced to move certain types of criminals to total isolation. The European prison 
with which comparisons arise most easily is London’s Pentonville. Ignatieff has 
stressed the dehumanizing nature of the Pentonville system by referring to the prison 
as ‘the new discipline of solitude and silence’ and its daily routine as a ‘machine’.89  
 On the Model of Pentonville, the cellular jail in Port Blair, the capital of the 
Andaman and Nicobar (known as Blackwater-Kala Pani) was designed to function as 
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a machine in the process of punishment and reform. To serve the purpose, huge 
buildings of prisons with cellular cells were built during the British regime across the 
Indian subcontinent. The new punishment and the new prison, whether it was 
Pentonville Port Blair or Indiaman, aimed to correct the criminal through 
combinations of segregation, surveillance, labor and medicine.
90
 The kind of 
treatment of offenders especially punishments were ‘cruel and incompatible with 
human dignity’.91 
The prisons rules in vogue in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are one of the legacies 
of British Colonial rule in India. Under Section 30 of the Prison Act 1894, the 
prisoners under the sentence of death are segregated from other prisoners: ‘Every 
such prisoner under sentence of death shall be confined in a cell apart from all other 
prisoners and shall be placed by day and night under the charge of a guard’.92 The 
first clause of Section 30 maintains : ‘ After such admission of the prisoner in the jail, 
the Deputy Superintendent  is required to examine the cell and has to satisfy 
her/himself that it is secure and has no article which can be used as a weapon or 
instrument with which the prisoner can commit suicide’.93 The provision of 
segregation of prisoners under the sentence of death is strictly adhered to and honored 
by the prisons administration in these countries. After the judgment of the trial court, 
the prisoner is immediately transferred to a high security yard if he or she was already 
in a central prison. If the person is confined in a District Prison or Sub-Jail, he/she is 
taken to the Central Prison the next day or sometimes even the same evening. 
The prisons administration in these countries may have many reasons to justify the 
segregation of death row prisoners. One of the frequently quoted reasons of the 
segregation is ‘the security of other prisoners and prison guards, for whom exposure 
to a desperate individual with literally nothing to lose may be dangerous’. William 
Schabas is not convinced with the stated reasons for segregation of prisoners under 
the sentence of death and he considers the rationale and justification for segregation 
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‘are somewhat obscure’.94 The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan E Mendez 
following his predecessor Manfred Nowak has condemned solitary confinement at 
death as ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’.95 The Istanbul Statement on the use 
and effects of solitary confinement absolutely prohibits the use of solitary 
confinement for death row prisoners by virtue of their sentence.
96
 However, the 
Istanbul Statement is not legally binding upon these countries. 
The prisons administrations in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh consider the prisoners 
under the sentence of death as the most dangerous of prisoners and rate them as ‘high 
escape risk’. The theme of custody permeates and circumscribes death row in these 
countries. Robert Johnson categorizes two kinds of death rows namely reformed and 
unreformed.
97
 Under this classification, death row in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
may be categorized as unreformed regimes that offer unadorned long term solitary or 
near solitary confinement. Block of cells and cells where the death row prisoners are 
confined are run by disciplinary precisions. Watched closely and frisked often. The 
condemned prisoner spends the bulk of each day alone in his cell. Unlike the convict 
prisoners, death row prisoners are not allowed to work inside the facility and they 
spend their time in their death cells. They were allowed an hour's walk in the 
morning, and another hour in the evening with handcuffs.
98
 Death cells operate on the 
“22+ 2” system: 22 hours locked in a cell, followed by 2 hours of recreation out of the 
cell. The outdoor recreation takes place in a cage. The Prisons Rules in vogue in these 
countries describe that a prisoner under the sentence of death prisoners cannot be 
taken out of its cell without hand cuffs.
99
 The Pakistan Law Commission 
recommended that ‘the rule pertaining to the use of hand cuffs during the walk may 
be applied only in respect of terrorists and dangerous criminals’.100 
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The question is whether the pervasive custodial measures including the physical 
setting as punitively austere, surveillance and restricted outdoor movements out of 
their cells tantamount to solitary confinement. The Supreme Court of India in Sunil 
Batra v. Delhi Administration deliberated the issue and discussed the death row at 
length. Firstly, the Court observed: ‘Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Penal Code 
leave no room for doubt that solitary confinement is by itself a substantive 
punishment which can be imposed by a court of law. It cannot be left to the whim and 
caprice of prison authorities’.101 Similar to the approach of European Commission on 
Human Rights,
102
 the Court did not void section 30 of the Prison Act 1894 itself but 
the Court issued directions to alleviate the additional hardships due to segregation of 
death row prisoners. The Court further explains the safe custody under the law: ‘To 
distort safe-keeping into a hidden opportunity to cage the ward and to traumatize him 
is to betray the custody of the law. Safekeeping means keep in his body and mind in 
fair condition. To torture his mind is unsafe keeping. Injury to his personality is not 
safe keeping. To preserve his flesh and crush his spirit is not safe keeping’.103 
Secondly, the Supreme Court explained the threshold of custodial segregation and 
defined a prisoner under the sentence of death: ‘A prisoner under sentence of death in 
the context of Section 30(2) of Prison Act 1894 can only mean a prisoner whose 
sentence of death has become final, conclusive and indefeasible which cannot be 
annulled or avoided by any judicial or constitutional procedure’.104 The Supreme 
Court categorically observed that separate confinement may only be imposed when a 
prisoner is under an executable sentence of death. ‘A prisoner becomes legally subject 
to self-working sentence old death only when the clemency application by the 
prisoner stands rejected’.105 In this regard, the Court argued: ‘Death trial does not end 
in the Sessions Court and confirmation proceedings in the High Court are a 
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continuation of the trial. In other words’ until the High Court confirms a sentence of 
death, there is no operative executable sentence of death’.106 
The petitions of different death row prisoners in different High Courts and the 
Supreme Court reflect that the direction of the Supreme Court remained a wish list 
and nothing changed on the ground. It is also evident from the writ petition of 
Mahendra Nath Das
107
 before the Gauhati High Court for commutation of his death 
sentence. The petitioner contended that for over 14 years since being sentenced to 
death: he ‘has been kept in solitary confinement, deprived of all human 
companionship, with the threat of imminent death hanging over his head’.  Another 
death row prisoner Bhullar approached the Indian  Supreme court in May 2011, in 
addition to raising similar concerns of ‘ extreme inhuman suffering and great mental 
torture’ caused due to spending 22 hours a day in a 7 by 9 feet cell for over 10 
years.
108
 
The Supreme Court lamented in Shatrughan Chauhan & Another vs. Union of India 
& Others about the existence of widespread use of solitary confinement for prisoners 
on death row and urged the prison authorities to implement the Sunil Batra decision in 
its letter and spirit: It is completely unfortunate that despite enduring pronouncement 
on the judicial side, the actual implementation of the provisions is far from reality’.109  
The Court reiterated its stance on death row: ‘Even in Triveniben V. State of 
Gujrat,
110
 this court observed that keeping a prisoner in solitary confinement is 
contrary to the ruling given  in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and would amount 
to inflicting ‘additional and separate punishment not authorized by law’.111 
Bikramjeet Batra, an expert on capital punishment in India explains  the reason that 
‘unfortunately the Indian Supreme Court limited its engagement with death row only 
to that of delay caused by non-disposal of the mercy petition, there has been little 
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monitoring by the Court of actual conditions of detention, including solitary 
confinements’.112  
Inordinate delay with solitary confinement is one of the mitigating factors to commute 
capital punishment. In a number of its own judgments including T.V Vatheeswaran V. 
State of Tamil Nadu, Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan
113
, Vinayak Shivajirao Pol v. State 
of Maharashtra,
114
 the Court refers to the prisoners being in ‘death cells’ or solitary 
confinement immediately after being sentenced to death, yet there has been no 
attempt to reiterate the law laid down in Sunil Batra, or hold the prisons authorities 
liable for its violation. 
In 2009, the Supreme Court in Jagdish v. State of Madhya Pradesh. ruled that delayed 
executions failed to serve both the retributive and deterrence rationales of the death 
penalty. The Court observed: ‘Penologists and medical experts agreed that the process 
of carrying out a verdict of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human 
spirit as to constitute psychological torture’.115 The Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Pal 
v. Union of India commuted the death sentence into life imprisonment on account of 
delay in disposal of mercy petition by executive authorities and imposition of solitary 
confinement.
116
 The judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in 
Peoples Union of Democratic Rights v. Union of India & Others considered solitary 
confinement as a relevant supervening circumstance to commute the death 
sentence.
117
 
In Pakistan, the Justice and Law Commission also noticed the inhume aspect of death 
row prisoners and in its report the commission recommended that jail administration 
must not keep prisoners under the sentence of death in death row cells until the 
confirmation of sentence of death by the respective High Court.
118
 In 2009, the 
Supreme Court’s National Judicial Policy Making Committee recommended that all 
prisoners whose appeals against the death penalty were pending before a high court 
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should be kept, with adequate security arrangements, in regular barracks instead of 
death row cells. 
119
 In this regard, the Punjab Government, for instance, amended Rule 
330 of Pakistan Prisons Rule 1978 that has made it mandatory for Prison 
Superintendent to ensure that a condemned prisoner is not kept in a death row cell 
until the sentence is upheld by the High Court concerned’.120 This amendment was 
not meant for those whose appeals were pending with the Supreme Court or the 
mercy petition with the President of Pakistan. 
But practically the amendment has not been implemented due to non-availability of 
space and security reasons. In 2011, the Crisis Group interviewed prisons authorities 
in Lahore, Quetta and Karachi who said: ‘ unless separate barracks are built, 
condemned prisoners cannot be shifted to regular barracks in already grossly 
overpopulated prisons’.121 The prisons administration in Pakistan defends the 
custodial measures for the confinement of prisoners under sentence of death. In 
overcrowded detention facilities, it is a great risk to incarcerate death row prisoners in 
general barracks.
122
 The appellate courts in Pakistan never provided relief on the basis 
of the death row phenomenon. 
 
7.3 Physical Conditions at Death Row Cells 
 
In addition to the segregation of condemned prisoners in the name of security and 
good control, the conditions under which they are imprisoned are even worse than 
other detainees and convicts in the prison.  
The physical settings of the death row are intimidating. The death row prisoners are 
confined in cells or block of cells which are separated by the general prisons 
population. This area of confinement is separated from general prisons population 
secured by many locked gates. It is not a ward in a hospital where sick people wait to 
die. People here wait to be taken out of their cells and killed’.123 With respect to 
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physical hardship, death row is a prison within prison-physically. One can hear empty 
sound of the changing of the steel doors, the rattle of chains. There is an extraordinary 
system of watch and vigilance, and body searches. The high security yard is very 
similar to super maximum custody; colloquially known as ‘supermaxi’ in the United 
States.
124
 Many prisons have in-house gallows – a remnant from colonial times – 
which are a constant reminder of looming execution. Owing to their horrible settings, 
the death row blocks in various prison are known among prisoners by different names 
like ‘Anda’(Egg Barrack), Andheri(darkness) yard and phasi pehra(hanging yard). 
In the majority of prisons in the Indian subcontinent, death row cells are grouped into  
five in a row, each group sharing a twenty foot-square caged concrete veranda where 
the condemned can walk for an hour a day. Cells are small, cramped, bare and 
uninviting. The Pakistan Law Commission report based on a survey of central prisons 
in all provinces of the country identified: ‘Normally these are very small rooms 
measuring 9 by 12 feet attached with WC in corner, rounded by a wall of 3’ 
height’.125  The door has iron bars which can be locked and unlocked from the 
outside. Since there are no alarm buttons in the cells, the prisoners are left to their 
own devices when trouble develops. 
On the death row, in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the rhetoric of rehabilitation is 
meaningless: one is there waiting to die, not trying to be improved. All activities of 
life from taking bath to eating food are performed in the cell.  A Home office, United 
Kingdom report on Prisons Conditions in Pakistan reveals that ‘the living condition in 
prisons is reportedly worse for those who on death row’.126 With reference to 
prisoners on death row in Pakistan, the International Crisis Group reported in 2011, 
the conditions under which they are imprisoned are even worse than for other 
detainees’.127The study on the Indian death row, based on interviews of the prisoners, 
reflects: ‘There were no fans in any of the cells because there was a fear among the 
authorities that the prisoners might commit suicide if there was a fan in the cell’.128 
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The prisoners on death row stated that the temperature in the cell was very hot during 
summer, wet during the monsoon and cold during winter’.129 Similar to how Sykes 
describes: like so many animals in their cages, the inmate population would be an 
aggregate rather than a social group, a mass of isolates rather than a society’.130. 
The statistics reveal that death row cells in Bangladesh and Pakistan are highly 
overcrowded. The cells used for the confinement of death row were originally built 
for one person but currently the number of inmates varies from 3 to 11. Amnesty 
International figures show a total 1,425 death row prisoners are confined in various 
prisons in Bangladesh. About 1,200 hundred death row prisoners are confined in 12 
central prisons of the country.
131
 One of the reasons of this overcrowding in 
Bangladesh is a great disparity between the number of death sentences imposed and 
the number carried out. A Report published by Amnesty International suggests that 
there were a minimum of 468 deaths sentences passed and 28 executions from 2007 
to 2012, with at least 1100 on the death row at the end of 2014. According to 
Professor Roger Hood, ‘It appears that in Bangladesh as in many other low execution 
countries, death row is perpetually expanding’.132. 
The reports of different NGOs and government constituted commissions portray that 
most of the death row cells are overcrowded which add to prevailing harsh conditions. 
The Pakistan Law Commission report on Jail Reforms identifies the 3 to 6 prisoners 
are kept in one death cell’.133 According to the Amnesty International Report, 7,000 
death row prisoners are confined in various prisons in Pakistan which is one-third of 
total death row population in the world.
134
 The statistics of Punjab Prisons 
Department reflects 5,153 out of 7,000 prisoners under the sentence of death are 
confined in various jails under the jurisdiction of the province of the Punjab.
135
 The 
death row population is concentrated in seven Central Prisons situated in different 
cities namely, Lahore, Gujranwala, Sahiwal, Sheikhupura, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad 
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and Multan.
136
 The Justice Project Pakistan’s report reveals that ‘extreme 
overcrowding sometime causes nine or more prisoners to be held in each cell’.137 The 
recently published book on death row in Pakistan describes the death row in one of 
the oldest and the biggest prion situated in the city of Sahiwal: ‘Death row consists of 
five wards, or barracks, of around forty-five cells. Although built for one man, each of 
these cells now houses as many as three-making a total of between 400 and 600 
condemned prisoners in Sahiwal’.138 Hands-off Cain Pakistan profile reported: 
‘Prisoners in Pakistan, especially those on death row, live in cramped, overcrowded 
cells and often face abuse’.139 
Overcrowding at death row cells makes the physical conditions horrific. 6 to 9 
persons in a cell provoke scuffle and fighting on petty issues. Especially in the 
summer days, the inmates cannot sleep properly. The daily life at overcrowded cells 
may be a source of pressure, harassment, sometimes violent victimization. Privacy 
concerns are also salient. Unlike solitary confinement, in overcrowded death row 
cells, prisoners are not alone at least and they get ample opportunity to share their 
feeling with other inmates. In fact, congenial conversation with other mates offer only 
limited opportunities for autonomous action or emotional support. It is rightly 
portrayed: ‘In the congregated death row, the prisoner is a kind of leper confined his 
disease –mates to a steel and concrete colony’.140 
On the contrary to conditions of death row in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the death row 
cells are not overcrowded in Indian prisons despite three fold overcrowding in Indian 
prisons. The study conducted by the National Law University, Delhi, reveals that the 
combination of solitary confinement with the sentence of death is particularly 
inhumane and the narratives of prisoners revealed the depth of suffering such 
prisoners undergo.
141
 The empirical study conducted by Reena also noted: 
‘Overcrowding in prison is very common but it was truly unheard of that death row 
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was also overcrowded’.142 But the researcher received complaints of death row 
prisoners about the isolation and solitary confinement. She met a prisoner who was in 
a single cell for over 17 years. In the solitary death row, the prisoner is an outcast who 
feels himself buried alive. Reena quotes the interview of one female death row 
prisoner: ‘During the day she is out with the other women but at night, she is in a 
separate cell and feels very scared. She said that she chanted the name of God at night 
and tried to go to sleep’.143 The Indian Law Commission Report recognizes ‘solitary 
confinement and prevailing harsh conditions’ at the death row’.144 
In short, whether the death row prisoner is confined in an overcrowded cell or alone 
in a cell, life at death row is painful and degrading. The bleak quality of life on death 
row, isolated or congregated, portrays the common goal: human storage. 
 7.4 Denial of Basic Rights in the Name of Safety and Security 
In the name of safety and safekeeping, the basic rights of death row prisoners are 
denied by prisons administration in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Dangerousness, 
discipline and security are palatable expressions for the management of prisoners 
under the sentence of death. 
 7.4.1. Medical Facilities  
The Prisons Act 1894 obliged to establish a hospital inside the jail run by medical 
officers assisted by necessary paramedical staff.
145
 In this regard, practice is different 
from theory. Firstly, hospitals in the jails are not equipped with necessary equipment 
and medicines to treat serious diseases. Secondly, owing to extra security measures to 
prevent any attempt to escape, both the Medical Officer and the Superintendent of 
prisons are reluctant to exercise their power to send death row prisoners to hospitals 
outside the facility. The study on the death row in India reveals that the prisoners have 
to do hunger strike to get the right of treatment. Reena quotes the interview of a death 
row prisoner who suffered from kidney disease and the jail administration did not 
send him to outside the jail hospital despite his repeated requests.
146
 She narrates: 
‘This prisoner became seriously ill one day and still he was not taken to the hospital. 
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So all the prisoners on death row in his particular the prisoner went to a hunger strike 
and the prisons administration shifted the prisoner to the hospital’.147 The National 
Law University, Delhi study also endorses the fact: ‘we came across instances of 
prisoners being denied basic medical attention and even instances of gross negligence 
in the failure to diagnose terminal illnesses until it was very late’.148 The Country 
Report of Bangladesh, prepared and published by the Home Office, United Kingdom, 
reveals poor health and hygiene conditions in all prisons.
149
 
The mental health of death row prisoners is a much ignored area in these countries. 
The prisons administration is pedantic to exercise its power to shift a convicted 
prisoner to mental hospital especially of death row prisoners.
150
 The report says that 
little awareness of mental health issues and psychological illness at death row 
prisoners in Pakistan.
151
 There is no official data of mentally disordered prisoners is 
available in Pakistan but ‘anecdotes from mental health professionals working there 
suggests that psychiatric morbidity in prisons has been steadily increasing’.152 There 
is no credible research on the impact of the death penalty and conditions of 
incarceration on the mental health of prisoners in these countries. A report quotes the 
Inspector General of Punjab Prisons Department, Pakistan: ‘Such prisoners do 
develop psychological issues but most of them are not related to jails as they can’t 
remain detached from the society and the problems that their families face once they 
are incarcerated’.153 The Report of National Law University, Delhi, identified the 
problem of mental health among death row prisoners in India and it showed its 
concern regarding their treatment.
154
 
Even the courts in these countries are reluctant to provide relief to a prisoner under 
sentence of death on the ground of unsound mind.  In 2012, Imdad Ali, convicted of 
the murder of a religious teacher in 2002, was diagnosed as a case of ‘paranoid 
                                                 
147
 Ibid, p.99. 
148
 Centre on the Death Penalty, Death Penalty India Report-Summary (New Delhi: National Law 
University ,2016), p.36. 
149
 Home Office, Country Information and Guidance: Bangladesh (2015), para.2.1.2. 
150
 Prisons Rule allowed Superintend of prison to shift a convict prisoner of unsound mind to mental 
hospital subject to medical certificate under Lunacy Act IV of 1912. 
151
 Irfan Aslam, Caged: Behind the Walls of Pakistan’s Prisons (Sptember,07, 2014,  the Dawn )  
152
 Yasir Abbasi & Khuram Hafeez khan, ‘Forensic Psychiatry- Is There a Role of Psychiatric services 
in Pakistani Prisons (2009) 59(2) Journal of Pakistan Medical Association 116, p.116. 
153
 Irfan Aslam, Caged: Behind the Walls of Pakistan’s Prisons (Sptember,07, 2014, the Dawn). This 
Article quotes Mian Farooq Nazir, Inspector General of Prisons in the province of Punjab. 
154
 Centre on the Death Penalty(n 48), p.37. 
 218 
schizophrenia’ by the Medical Board in Nishtar Hospital Multan, Pakistan.155 On 
October 20, 2016, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Mst. Safia Bano w/o Imdad Ali v. 
Government of Punjab, Pakistan ruled that schizophrenia does not qualify as a 
“mental disorder” as defined in the Mental Health Ordinance, 2001.156 The Court also 
quoted the precedent from  Indian jurisdiction wherein the Indian Supreme Court in 
Amrit Bhushan Gupta v. Union of India
157
 rejected the plea to commute the death 
sentence on the ground of unsound mind suffering from schizophrenia certified by the 
Medical Superintendent and a Senior Psychiatrist, Hospital for Mental Diseases, 
Shahdara, Delhi. The rejection of Imdad Ali’ plea on insanity paved the way for his 
execution because his mercy petition had already been rejected by the President of 
Pakistan. Amnesty International and the UN Human Rights Commission have raised 
their serious concerns. Champa Patel, Amnesty International's South Asia Director 
says: ‘Pakistan is clearly in breach of international human rights standards that protect 
people with mental illnesses and ensure that they are never subject to this cruel and 
irreversible punishment’. 158 
 7.4.2. Humiliation to Relatives and Friends  
To contact with the outside world is one of the basic rights of all persons who have 
been deprived of their liberty.
159
 The treatment of family members of death row 
prisoners is an acid test of prisons administration and it had a direct impact on the 
safety and security of a prison.
160
 In these three countries, visits are not a matter of 
right but rather a privilege. Visit to prisons is a big challenge for families of prisoners 
especially for those having an extremely vulnerable economic status. In addition ‘to 
cost prohibitive of travelling across large distances, families had to encounter mulaqat 
(meeting) conditions ’.161 It is pertinent to mention that visitors of the death row 
inmates have to go inside the prisons facility. When the family members get to the 
prisons they are subject to somewhat degrading checks and searches consistent with 
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the heightened security of death row, which, whilst usually necessary, further ‘add to 
their feelings of guilt and shame’.162 It is rightly depicted ‘the families are hidden 
victims of the crime’.163 For some prisoners, the pain and humiliation engendered by 
such treatment outweigh the pleasure of the visit. The majority of death row prisoners 
are not allowed physical contact with their families. In this situation, managing visits 
from family members are emotionally tough for guards, ‘especially when prisoners 
are banned from touching their visitors and visits take place through glass partitions 
or nets’.164 Unrewarding visits thus reflect and reinforce the prisoners’ basic sense of 
alienation from the world of the living. 
Conclusion: 
The UN Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, Privy 
Council and courts of various countries including India maintain that the death row 
phenomenon constitutes cruel and excessive punishment and is a violation of human 
rights due to an inordinate delay in the execution and hard physical conditions of the 
detention facility. The exact nature of the doctrine varies among the courts but the 
underlying concept of death row phenomenon remains the same.  
Unlike the judiciary in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Indian Supreme Court has issued 
various judgments on the death row phenomenon. Indian Supreme Court recognized 
death row phenomenon as inhuman and degrading on the basis of delay and on 
grounds of hard physical conditions. The Courts have provided relief on the basis of 
inordinate delay treating as ‘supervening circumstance’. In the beginning, the Indian 
Supreme Court’s stance was closer to that of the Privy Council where excessive time 
on death row may in itself be sufficient ground for commuting the sentence. The 
approach of the Indian Supreme Court evolved during the period of time like that of 
the Human Rights Committee. Unlike the Privy Council and the Human Rights 
Committee, the Indian Supreme Court starts the clock of delay once the appeal has 
been rejected by the Supreme Court. In other words, the Indian Supreme Court, in the 
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majority of cases takes into account the executive delay and not the judicial one as a 
valid ground to commute a death sentence into a life imprisonment. 
 In these three countries, the death row prisoners are treated as hard core, most 
dangerous under the logo of discipline, control and silence inherited from prisons 
system of British Rule in India. To exacerbate the pain of prisoners, colonial masters 
introduced prisons labor and physical restraints, solitary confinement in cellular 
prisons or within a prison. To punish the ‘guilty of breaches of jail discipline’ a range 
of solitary cells were in operation; in which offenders might be confined in darkness 
and silence. The Prison Act 1894 authorizes the prison administration to segregate 
prisoners under the sentence of death and confine them into cells under day and night 
vigilance. The Supreme Court of India in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration 
deliberated Section 30 of the Prisons Act 1894 at length and differentiated the 
segregation of prisoners under the sentence of death and solitary confinement. The 
Court did not void Section 30 of the Prison Act 1894 itself but the Court issued 
directions to alleviate the additional hardships due to segregation of death row 
prisoners. The Indian Supreme Court observed that prisons administrations were not 
allowed to keep death row prisoners in conditions of solitary confinement in the name 
of classification and safekeeping. To preserve his flesh and crush his spirit is not safe 
keeping. Safekeeping means keeping in his body and mind in fair conditions. The 
Law Commission of Pakistan indicated that prisoners under the sentence of death 
should not be confined on death row until confirmation of the death sentence from the 
respective High Court and that the prisoner be allowed to walk outside the cell 
without handcuffs. In violation to guidelines of the Indian Supreme Court and the 
Law Commission of Pakistan, death row prisoners are incarcerated under conditions 
like solitary confinement. 
Death row in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh may be categorized as an unreformed 
regime that offers unadorned long term solitary or near solitary confinement. Unlike 
convict prisoners, death row prisoners are not allowed to work inside the facility and 
they spend twenty-two hours a day in small and cramped cells. They were allowed an 
hour's walk in the morning, and another hour in the evening with handcuffs. The 
outdoor recreation takes place in a cage. The daily routine of the death row prisoner is 
a grinding, dull and redundant. Death row in Indian subcontinent reflects the 
observation of Robert Johnson: ‘On death row the allegorical pound of flesh is just 
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the beginning. Here the whole person is consumed. The spirit is captured and 
gradually worn down, then the body is disposed of’.165  
Death row prisoners in Pakistan and Bangladesh suffer due to overcrowding in the 
cells. To perform all activities of daily life with 6 to 9 persons in a cell, not only 
infringed the right of privacy but also a source of harassment and violent 
victimization. On the other hand, death row inmates in India complain about solitude 
and loneliness because death row cells are not overcrowded. The prisoner in the 
condition of solitary confinement feels buried alive. Life at death row is painful and 
degrading whether isolated or congregated. 
To discharge the duty of safekeeping, custodians of death row are unwilling to 
tolerate any act that might be interpreted as disobedience to their authority in India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. Even the basic rights of death row inmates are denied: They 
are allowed restricted family visits, a limited access to recreational and medical 
facilities. The mental health of death row prisoners is much ignored area and there is 
little awareness of mental health issues and psychological illness at death row. The 
mental agony of death row prisoners is intensified in the absence of an effective 
mechanism of legal aid at the state’s expense and they often have little information 
about the progress of their appeals. The families of the death row prisoners not only 
face humiliation but also financial stress. 
The way forward is not to expedite the process of executions. Commutation is one 
way to compensate the miseries of life at death row. The death row phenomenon in 
the Indian subcontinent personifies cruelty of the death penalty apparently and 
egregiously. The analysis in this chapter strengthens the argument of the dissertation 
that the use of capital punishment involves abuses of human rights. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
This research concludes that the application of capital punishment in the Indian 
subcontinent is not only a violation of international human rights law but is also 
contradictory to the domestic constitutional provisions that guarantee the right to life 
and the right to a fair trial. This conclusion is based upon the following three 
arguments: (A) Some provisions of the substantive law of India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh that administer capital punishment are not in conformity with the 
international treaty obligations; (B) Some executions constitute arbitrary deprivations 
of life in violation of  fair trial standards and due process guarantees; and (C) The 
process by which capital punishment is carried out is inhuman and degrading due to 
the death row phenomenon and the methods of execution used. 
Before identifying the glaring gaps in substantive and procedural laws of these 
countries that violate the right to life and the prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
punishment, the thesis gives a historical overview of the criminal justice system in 
general and capital punishment in particular during three different periods of history 
including Ancient India, Medieval India and British India. The overview not only 
helps illuminate common historical similarities in constitutional and statutory texts of 
the Indian-subcontinent as former British colonies but also traces the origin of the 
issues that still surround the criminal justice systems of these countries. Firstly, 
India’s sacred texts and the travel accounts of different travelers during the medieval 
age reveal that capital punishment was not only common throughout the Indian 
history but also was closely connected to caste and creed.  
Secondly, the philosophy of danda (rod of punishment) derived from an ancient 
sacred text, Laws of Manu, is associated with the use of torture to keep man pure and 
righteous. The philosophy of danda provides legitimacy to law enforcement agencies 
to use torture. Thirdly, it also offers some important insight into to the reasons why 
the British in the nineteenth century discarded the prevalent Muslim law of murder 
namely Qisas ص  اصق  (retaliation) or Diyyat ةيد (blood money) in the Indian 
subcontinent. Under the law, the right of legal heirs to pardon by taking Diyyat(blood 
money) was meshed with many social and legal complications, for example, 
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providing easy escape for the powerful and the wealthy. Fourthly, the prison system 
in the Indian subcontinent, as one of the British colonial legacies, uses prisons labour, 
physical restraints, solitary confinement in cellular prisons or within a prison as the 
chief form of punishment. All of which are used to terrorize the wrong-doer. 
8.1 Breach of International Treaty Obligations under Substantive Law 
As State Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have some 
obligations regarding the application of capital punishment in their respective 
jurisdictions. Under international law, treaties are not binding on states unless they 
choose to be bound. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
states that ‘every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith’.1 This includes the rule that a party to a treaty 
cannot invoke provisions of its domestic law to escape the performance of its treaty 
obligations.
2
 The Advisory Opinion of Permanent International Court of Justice in 
Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other
3
 and Article III of the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts reinforce the rule that constitutional mandate is not an excuse for a treaty 
violation.
4
 Amongst the constitutions of the three countries under study, only the 
Indian Constitution, under Article 51(c), obliges the state to ‘foster respect for 
international law and treaty obligation’. 
 8.1 Scope of capital punishment  
In accordance with Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights ‘in countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of 
death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes’. In international human rights 
jurisprudence, the phrase “most serious crimes” has been interpreted as allowing 
capital punishment to be applied only to the crime of murder or intentional killing. 
Despite this interpretation of the phrase “most serious crimes” the penal laws of India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh prescribe capital punishment for offences not involving 
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intentional killings such as crimes related to terrorism, sex, narcotics, military and 
religion. 
The Human Rights Committee suggests that the offences related to a broad definition 
of terrorism
5
 and attacks against the internal security of the state
6
 do not fall under the 
definition of the ‘most serious crimes’. In Pakistan, terrorism related offences that do 
not result in death of victims include airplane hijacking or assisting a hijacking
7
 and 
attempt to harm railway passengers such as by explosion or derailment.
8
 In India 
using any special category of explosives to cause an explosion likely to endanger life 
or cause serious damage to property is punishable by death.
9
 Under Special Laws of  
Bangladesh, it is  a capital offence to ‘intentionally destroy or damage any property, 
whether movable or immovable, belonging to the government’10 and ‘to create, alone 
or in a group, fear, terror, confusion or anarchy by ostentatiously displaying force or 
power at any place’.11  
The Human Rights Committee has also objected to the imposition of the death penalty 
for offences related to sex including homosexual act,
12
 adultery
13
 and illicit sex
14
. 
India is the latest country that has incorporated non-fatal rape as a capital offence. In 
this context, under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, repeat offenders of 
gang rape or rape that causes coma shall be sentenced to death.
15
 Under the penal 
laws of Bangladesh, to commit an offence of rape
16
 and ‘to kidnap a child under the 
age of 10 for the purpose of sexual exploitation’17 are liable to capital punishment. In 
Pakistan, sex related capital offences include assault on a woman, intentional display 
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of her body in a public domain,
18
 rape,
19
 and abduction of a person to submit an 
unnatural lust.
20
 
The death penalty for adultery under Pakistan Hudood Ordinances may be seriously 
questioned because the punishment has not been prescribed in the Quran, the primary 
source of Islamic Jurisprudence. Muslim jurists of the sixth and the seventh centuries
 
developed an Islamic criminal justice system and classified punishments into Hudood, 
Qisas and Tazir. Under the Hudood crimes, the early Muslim jurists categorized 
adultery as a capital offence. In this context, the Quran prescribes 100 lashes to be 
punishment for adultery not death by stoning. 
To conclude, capital offences related to sex and religion can be abolished from the 
penal laws of Pakistan in line with international legal framework without violating its 
constitutional obligations under Article 227 to legislate in accordance with the Quran 
and Sunnah. Moreover, the Holy Quran mentions three offences namely premeditated 
murder,
21
 spreading mischief on the earth(Fasad Fi al Ardh) and war against God 
liable to capital punishment. The current list of 27 capital offences is not in 
conformity with the Quran and the Sunnah. 
The Human Rights Committee does not approve that drug offences meet the threshold 
of the ‘most serious crimes’.22 Affirming the stance of the Committee’ two UN 
Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions in their 
respective reports in 1997 and 2007 state that the death penalty should be eliminated 
for economic and drug related offences.
23
 On the contrary, in Pakistan, illegal 
trafficking of ‘more than one kilogram of a drug is punishable by death’.24 In India, if 
someone commits an offense related to the ‘production, manufacture, trafficking, or 
financing of certain types and quantities of narcotic and psychotropic substances, he 
or she can be sentenced to death’.25 In Bangladesh and Pakistan, capital punishment is 
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prescribed for drug possession of 25g
26
 and 100g
27
 respectively. Figures released by 
the Ministry of Interior in the National Assembly of Pakistan in March 2014 indicated 
that of those sentenced to death, at least 444 persons had been convicted of drug 
related offences. 
 8.1.2 Mandatory Death Penalty 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court in Mithu v. State of Punjab1983 found that a 
mandatory death sentence for murder committed by life-term prisoner while 
incarcerated to be unconstitutional and arbitrary, the Indian Parliament has since 
enacted laws that continue to prescribe the mandatory death penalty under the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the 
Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 by amendment in 1989. With the 
invalidation of, Section 27(3) of the Arms Act and Section 31-A of the Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act of 1985, by the Indian Supreme Court in 
Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012 and the Bombay High Court in Ghulam 
Muhammad Malik v. Union of India, 2011, the scope of mandatory death penalty is 
very much limited. Currently the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention 
of Atrocities) Act of 1989 still has the mandatory death penalty, but only for an 
extremely class of crime that is virtually never prosecuted: false witness or fabrication 
of  evidence that results in the Execution of an innocent person.
28
  
In Bangladesh, the Supreme Court in in Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services 
Trust(BLAST)
29
 repealed mandatory death sentences for murder by a life-term 
prisoner(section 303 of the Penal Code), attempted murder by a life-term prisoner 
(section 307 of the Penal Code) and dowry murder under the Women and Children 
Repression Prevention Act.
30
   
Unlike India and Bangladesh, in 1992, to affirm  the verdict of the  Federal Shariat 
Court
31
  in Muhammad Ismail Qureshy versus Federation of Pakistan,
32
 the 
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Parliament of Pakistan introduced mandatory capital punishment for the offence of 
apostasy under Section 295C of the Pakistan Penal Code. Since its enforcement, no 
one has been executed under this offence but many individuals have been sentenced 
to death and this law has been frequently misused against religious minorities. Despite 
the recommendation of the Second Universal Periodic Review, Pakistan has not 
derogated or repealed the law so far.
33
 The mandatory death penalty for the offence of 
blasphemy is not in line with the international legal framework on capital punishment 
because it does not leave any option for the judge to consider the mitigating 
circumstances of the accused. 
 8.1.3 The Execution of Juveniles 
In violations of their treaty obligations under Article 6(5) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 37(a) of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, the penal laws of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh maintain capital 
punishment for juvenile offenders below the age of eighteen. The Human Rights 
Committee, the UN Human Rights Council and the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child have shown their concern regarding the compliance of these countries to treaty 
law. Pakistan, as a State Party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child passed the 
Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000 (JJSO 2000) that defines the child as a 
person below 18 years of age
34
 and states unequivocally that ‘no child shall be 
awarded punishment of death’.35 In this context, two major issues need to be 
addressed: Firstly, the legal status of the law itself because the ordinance was declared 
null and void by the Lahore High Court in Farooq Ahmad v. Federation of Pakistan. 
The Supreme Court restored the law but the final verdict of the court has been 
pending since 2005; Secondly, the law is not applicable in all parts of the country 
namely the Northern Areas and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 
Contrary to the treaty obligations under the U N Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, in May 2015, the Indian Parliament amended the Juvenile Justice (Care and 
Protection of Children) Act 2000, that allows juvenile offenders between the ages of 
16 and 18, who are charged with the offences of rape and murder, to be treated as 
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adults. The amendment was introduced against the backdrop of the widespread 
outrage over the lighter punishment awarded to one of the culprits of the Delhi rape 
case due to his age, seventeen and a half, at the time of the commission of the crime.  
Article 51 of the Children Act 1974 excludes offenders under the age of 16 from the 
death penalty in Bangladesh. There is no domestic law that fully excludes individuals 
who are under the age of 18 at the time of the crime. The Committee on the Rights of 
the Child has repeatedly expressed concern that Bangladeshi law does not clearly 
preclude the death penalty for offences committed under the age of 18, although 
Bangladesh asserts that in practice such individuals are not executed.
36
  
8.2 Arbitrary Deprivation of Life in Violation of Fair Trial Standards and 
Due Process Guarantees  
Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits 
arbitrary deprivation of life. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has 
consistently held that the imposition of a sentence of death upon conclusion of a trial, 
in which the provisions of Article 14 have not been respected, constitutes a violation of 
the right to life.
37
 This means that deprivation of life is arbitrary if it is made against the 
rules of natural justice, due process of law or fair trial standards. The constitutions of 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh under Articles 21, 9 and 32 respectively, do not allow 
the state to take the life except when due process has been adhered to. 
 
The rigorous and frank evaluation of the criminal justice systems in vogue in India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh recognizes the following incompatibilities with the rules on 
due process of law: (i) the use of torture to extract confession; (ii) an ineffective system 
of legal aid at the state’s expense; (iii) issues related to both prosecution and defence 
witnesses; (iv) counter terrorism and arbitrary application of the death penalty; and (v) 
discriminatory application of the death penalty under Pakistani law of Qisas and Diyat. 
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8.2.1 The Use of Torture or Coercion to Extract Confession 
 
Forcing an individual to make or sign, under duress, a confession admitting guilt 
violates Article 7 (prohibiting torture and inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment), and 
Article 14, paragraph 3(g) (prohibiting compulsion to testify against oneself or 
confess guilt) of the International  Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and it also 
violates Article 15 (statement extracted under torture is not admissible as evidence) of 
the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT).
38
 
The use of third-degree methods(torture) to extract confessions is not only a historical 
fact but it is justified by investigating officers for the performance of role obligations. 
The method of police investigation in the Indian subcontinent is that the investigating 
officer finds rightly or wrongly his suspect, extorts a confession by the use of third 
degree and thus proceeds to search for facts to fit the suspect. Thus, investigating 
officer does not collect evidence but creates it. 
In light of the recommendations of the Madras Torture Commission Report of 1855, 
the Indian Evidence Act 1872 and the Code of Criminal Procedure1898 provided that 
all confessions made to the police or by a person in police custody must be 
inadmissible as evidence. Since the promulgation of the penal laws, this protection 
proved to be less than a complete remedy and custodial violence or torture is still an 
integral part of police operations. Non-governmental organizations’ reports, decisions 
by Supreme Courts and High Courts, Reports of Law Commissions, Police 
Commission Reports and reports of the UN human rights treaty bodies provide an 
important source of information and allow to gauge the prevalence of torture in these 
three countries.  
The research finds three major reasons for the persistence of police torture to extract 
evidence. Firstly, the abuse of police power under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure to arrest without a warrant from the magistrate when there is ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ or ‘credible information’ of the commission of a cognizable offence in nine 
situations. Besides this power, the Police Act of 1861 (along with the Police Rules of 
1934), a colonial legacy that was meant to control people rather than serve them, 
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remained applicable in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as a central law (with very 
minor modifications). Even the courts directions on custodial accountability, namely a 
list of eleven guidelines of the Indian Supreme Court in D.K. Basu v. West Bengal, 
directions of the Lahore High Court in Khizer Hayat v. the State and Allah Rakhi v. 
the State, and the High Court Division of the Bangladesh in BLAST and others v. 
Bangladesh, could not change the deep-rooted practice of police torture to extract 
confession.  
Secondly, Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 provides that a suspect’s 
statement to the police is admissible as evidence if it leads to a ‘discovery of fact. It is 
an indirect route that leads to the police’s reliance on confession. The Indian Law 
Commission Report refers to it as the ‘fruits here posed no problem’.39 Thirdly, 
despite the recommendations of these countries’ police and law commissions to equip 
police with necessary gadgets for an effective investigation, police are quite often 
handicapped in undertaking effective investigation. Owing to a lack of forensic 
support and the proper training of staff, torture is considered a cheap and effective 
means to secure a confession.  
In the majority of cases, the Supreme Courts and High Courts of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh confirmed the death penalty on the accused who had been convicted by 
the trial courts solely based on their confessional statements. Evidence obtained as a 
result of torture, whether the torture generates the ‘lead’ fatally taints the death 
penalty trial. This de facto practice of police torture multiplies the risk of prosecuting 
the weak members of the society where deviance and discrimination are deeply rooted 
in the socio-political milieu. 
 8.2.2. Access to Legal Counsel 
Failure to comply with treaty obligations under Article 14(3) (e) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and political Rights and Safeguard 5 of the Safeguards 
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh could not ensure adequate legal counsel during all stages of 
capital trials to the indigent. To uphold the principle of equality of arms in criminal 
proceedings, this right acquires more significance in the context of these developing 
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countries due to higher levels of poverty and socio-economic inequalities. Many are 
unable to meet their lawyers and are not informed about the status of proceedings. 
They borrow money or sell their assets like houses, land, jewelry, livestock, or other 
belongings, to afford private legal representation.  
In light of recommendations of the 14
th
 Report of the Law Commission,
40
 India 
accorded constitutional sanctity to free legal aid in 1976 by incorporating Article 39-
A which obligates the state to provide free legal aid by a suitable legislation.
41
 To 
improve the performance of  the Legal Services Authorities Act 1987, in 2010, the 
Indian Government promulgated the National Legal Services Authority Regulations. 
The Regulations empower the Legal Service Committees of the Supreme Court, High 
Courts, the Districts and Talukas to specially engage experienced and competent 
lawyers for the indigent accused in matters where life and liberty are at risk.
42
 It is 
appreciable that India at least has established an organized aid structure as compared 
to that of Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, two major challenges hamper the 
trickling down of the fruit of the legal aid system to the poor facing the charges of 
capital offences. Firstly, the fee for state’s appointed lawyers is not enough to attract 
the services of competent and experienced lawyers. Secondly, the number of lawyers 
is not in proportion to the number of indigent accused facing capital charges. 
In Pakistan, free legal aid for the weaker segment of society is an even more 
neglected area. In violation of its constitutional obligations under Article 37(d) 
(inexpensive and expeditious justice), Article 25, (equality before law), and statutory 
binding under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no 
comprehensive system for adequate legal aid at the state’s expense. Firstly, the laws 
and rules governing the legal aid system are scattered and not administered by a 
single body. The three different systems of free legal aid work under the command of 
three different entities: the High Court, the Pakistan Bar Council and the Law and 
Justice Commission of Pakistan. Secondly, sate appointed counselors are poorly paid. 
Thirdly, the rules dealing with legal aid in Pakistan lack sufficient details and 
guidance on the criteria and methods for selecting cases and screening deserving 
litigants. 
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Bangladesh is the only country in the region that has made reservations to Article 
14(3) (d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that the state 
could not ensure its compliance to provide legal aid due to lack of financial resources. 
In recognition of the legal aid as a right under Article 27(equal protection of the law) 
and Article 35(3) (speedy and fair trial) of its constitution, the Government enacted 
the Legal Service Act 2000 to empower disadvantaged and vulnerable people but it 
has many shortcomings. The Act does not spell out the procedure for the selection of 
needy applicants and the financial resources of the District Legal Aid Committee are 
solely responsible to provide legal aid at the grass roots level. The Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh Appellate Division in Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust and 
others v. State defended the power of the Superintendent of Jail to prefer appeal as an 
arrangement of legal aid at the state’s expense.43 But the Superintendent of Jail has 
had no funding at its disposal to engage legal counsels for those who are indigent, this 
office is authorized to file appeal only. On 8 September, 2015, the Supreme Court 
Legal Aid Office was established with the collaboration of USAID’ Justice for All 
programme to provide legal aid in both civil and criminal cases. It has an organized 
structure under the watch of the `Supreme Court but it is too early to evaluate its 
performance. 
 
 8.2.3 Issues Related to Witnesses 
Contrary to Article 14(3)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are unable to facilitate testifying by both 
defense and prosecution witnesses in an atmosphere free of intimidation. The issues 
related to witnesses namely, refusing to appear due to fear of reprisal and witnesses 
turning hostile under threats, intimidation or any inducement incapacitate the interest 
of justice by causing inordinate delay and providing immunity from prosecution to the 
powerful. The judgments of Supreme Courts and Reports of Law Commissions in 
these countries have enumerated it as one of the reasons for the backlog of cases and 
failure of the criminal justice system to prosecute the powerful and the terrorists. 
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 8.2.4 Counter Terrorism and Arbitrary Application of the Death Penalty 
The trial of civilians by military or special courts is not strictly prohibited by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, the Human Rights 
Committee underlines that ‘the trials of civilians in military or special courts may 
raise serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent 
administration of justice is concerned’.44 The Committee  further explains that the 
guarantees of a fair trial cannot be derogated from due to emergency or the special 
character of the court. Similarly, Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1456 require 
appropriate measures to combat terrorism in conformity with international standards 
of human rights.
45
 
Contrary to the international legal framework, the special laws in these three countries 
to counter different types of terrorism including religious militancy and separation 
movements lowered the general standards of due process and envisage special powers 
of arrest and detention; give validity to confessions made under police custody and 
reverse the presumption of innocence. Since 1985, India has promulgated three main 
anti-terrorist laws. The incompatibility of the currently enforced special laws with the 
presumption of innocence transpires clearly from Section 43E of the Unlawful 
Activities Prevention Act 1967 (UAPA), amended in 2004 and 2008, which 
empowers the court to presume the accused guilty of terrorism if arms or explosives 
were recovered from his or her possession.
46
 Moreover, under this law, the accused 
has to prove his or her innocence when ‘the evidence of the expert including the 
finger prints of the accused or any other definitive evidence suggesting the 
involvement of the accused’ is found at the crime scene.47  
Prior to the current anti-terrorist legislation, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 
(Prevention) Act, 1985 (remained in force until 1995) and the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2002, (remained enforced until 2004), admitted confessions before police officers 
as evidence, shifted the burden of proof on the accused, and gave the police special 
powers of arrest and detention. It is ironic that the death sentence of Afzal Guru, 
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charged with complicity and conspiracy in committing an attack on the Indian 
Parliament in December 2001, was upheld and imposed in February 2013 under 
TADA which was allowed to lapse in the face of criticism for not respecting fair trial 
guarantees and amidst widespread allegations of abuse. Similarly, Yaqub Mamon, 
executed in July 2015, was charged with providing logistic and financial support to a 
perpetrator of the Bombay bombings in 1993. He was tried under POTA which was 
repealed because it led to human rights abuses. 
Despite the fact that Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 cites the right 
to a fair trial as fundamental and inviolable, the special courts and the military courts, 
which do not meet the threshold of the recognized standards of due process, are 
empowered to sentence to death on little evidence. In light of the Supreme Court 
direction given in Mehram Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan the provision that 
made confessions under police custody admissible as evidence was deleted. However, 
the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 still admits the confession as an evidence under police 
custody under certain conditions. In the name of speedy and effective justice, the 
Government of Pakistan established courts under the Military Act 1952 amended in 
2015 through Constitutional Amendment for a period of two years. The military 
courts in Pakistan lower the general standards of due process namely to be heard in 
public by an impartial and independent tribunal. Instead of strengthening the criminal 
justice system it is a renewed reliance on crude instruments of coercion and military 
might. In District Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan,
48
 the Supreme Court 
validated the establishment of military courts, Justice Ejaz Afzal in his dissenting 
opinion termed military courts as  a ‘short cut’ and ‘palliative’ to the problem.49 
No one including the relatives of the accused were allowed to attend the proceedings 
of the 11 Military Courts. A precise statement issued by the army press wing is the 
only source of information regarding the military court proceedings. During the year 
2015, military courts concluded the trials of 64 suspects, out of which 36 were 
sentenced to death and four were given life imprisonment. All of them were convicted 
on the basis of the confession. The veracity and voluntariness of confessions can be 
called in question in the absence of an independent review mechanism in military 
court proceedings. The elicitation and use of such confessions to award capital 
sentence multiply the risk of arbitrariness under military justice. Similarly, in 
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Bangladesh, the special courts established under the Special Powers Act of 1974 and 
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009, lower the standards of due process and provide an 
unaccountable power of arrest to law enforcement agencies. 
The dissertation recommends that these three jurisdictions learn from the experience 
of other countries of the world, especially Sri Lanka
 
and Nepal, who faced far more 
protracted and deadly insurgencies and acts of terrorism but who never invoked 
capital punishment to protect national security. 
 
8.2.5 Discriminatory Application of the Death Penalty under Pakistani Law of Qisas and Diyat 
 
The Quran and Sunnah enunciate that the death penalty must not be invoked in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the principle of equality and due 
process. According to the Quran ‘take not life, which has made sacred, except by way 
of justice and law’.50 This thesis agrees that the Holy Quran prescribes capital 
punishment for the offence of pre-meditated murder (qatle amad). At the same time, 
the Quran categorically denounces the killing of an innocent person as tantamount to 
killing the whole humanity and saving a life ‘would be as if he saved the life of the 
whole people’.51 That is why the Islamic Criminal Justice System shows concrete 
concerns over the authenticity of evidence and the legality of pre-trial investigation.  
The majority of contemporary Muslim jurists support the principles and techniques of 
avoidance of Hudood and Qisas penalties through doubts(Shubhat) to save the 
innocent. Moreover, these ideal penalties were considered only by an ideal authority 
in an egalitarian Muslim society.  
In 1990, Pakistan incorporated the Islamic law of murder and bodily harm, abandoned 
for two hundred years under the British colonial rule in India, to bring the penal laws 
of the country in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah under the direction of the 
Federal Shariat Court. According to Quranic verses, the compounding of the offence 
of murder should be voluntary without any element of coercion or pressure of any 
kind and it must be accompanied by an admission of guilt or assumption of 
responsibility by the perpetrator.
52
 In fact, the Pakistani version of the Qisas and Diyat 
Law was grafted into the penal system without taking into   account contemporary 
                                                 
50
Al Quran, Surah Al-An’am, 6:151. 
51
Al- Quran, Surah Al-Maidah, 5:32. 
52
 Al-Quran, Surah Al Baqara, 2:178-179. 
 236 
thinking and the social matrix of the society. The amendment had far-reaching 
consequences for the legal prosecution of homicide. The law privatizes justice by 
shifting the emphasis from homicide as a crime against the state to a private offence 
against the victim. The power of legal heirs to enter into a compromise at any stage 
from investigation to the time of executions has not only marred the process of 
investigation but also gives an ample opportunity to the powerful and wealthy to 
coerce the legal heirs to enter into a compromise. The application of the law in the last 
twenty- five years catalyzed the discriminatory cultural practice of honor killings that 
is contrary to the tenants of Islam and the spirit of the Constitution of Pakistan.  
The research recommends that the application of capital punishment for the offence of 
pre-meditated murder both as a hadd or Tazir should be avoided due to the persistent 
occurrences of injustices in Pakistani society as a whole and inherent flaws in the 
criminal justice system in particular to minimize the risk of implicating the innocent.  
 
 8.3 The Application of the Death Penalty is Inhuman and Degrading  
 
 8.3.1 The Death Row Phenomenon 
The death row phenomenon has been explicitly recognized as a violation of human 
rights by the UN Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Privy Council and courts of various countries including India due to the element 
of delay, the harsh conditions of life on death row or the cumulative effect of both. 
The exact nature of the doctrine varies among the courts but the underlying concept 
remains the same. The research has explored the legal and physical problems of one 
third of the world’s death row population who are languishing in cells of overcrowded 
prisons for years under harsh physical conditions. 
In contravention with the directions of the Supreme Court of India in Sunil Batra v 
Delhi Administration and the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan in its report on 
Jail Reforms, death row prisoners are segregated under section 30 of the Prison Act 
1894 before the confirmation of the death sentence from the respective High Court. 
The Indian Supreme Court lamented in Shatrughan Chauhan & Another v. Union of 
India & Others about the widespread use of solitary confinement for prisoners on 
 237 
death row and urged the prison authorities to implement the Sunil Batra decision in its 
letter and spirit’.53 
Incompatibility with the obligations of the state under Article 10(3) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Rule 92 of the UN Nelson 
Mandela Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the death row prisoners in the Indian 
subcontinent are not held for reformation and rehabilitation but categorized as hard 
core and most dangerous. Unlike the convict prisoners, death row prisoners get a 
limited access to recreational and rehabilitative activities. The prisoners under the 
sentence of death are confined in cells segregated from the other prison population 
and kept under unadorned long term solitary or near solitary confinement. Death cells 
operate on the “22+ 2” system: 22 hours locked in a cell, followed by 2 hours of 
recreation out of the cell with hand cuffs. 
In the name of safekeeping and discipline, death row prisoners are allowed restricted 
family visits and a limited access to medical facilities. The mental health of death row 
prisoners is a much ignored area and both prison administration and the judiciary not 
only have a little awareness of mental health issues and psychological illnesses but 
they also do not give due importance. On October 20, 2016, the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan in Mst. Safia Bano w/o Imdad Ali v. Government of Punjab, Pakistan
54
 did 
not recognize paranoid schizophrenia as a mental disorder and rejected the plea to 
commute the death sentence on the ground of insanity. The Court followed the suit of 
Indian Supreme Court in Amrit Bhushan Gupta v. the Union of India.
55
 In these three 
countries, visits are not a matter of right but rather a privilege. The pain of death row 
is further intensified due to the humiliation of their visitors who have to undergo 
somewhat degrading checks and searches due to the heightened security of death row. 
In most of the prisons, the visits take place through glass partitions or nets and 
prisoners are not allowed physical contact with their families. In fact, death row is the 
place where fundamental and inviolable rights are constantly denied. 
The comparative analysis of death row in these three countries show that death row 
prisoners in Pakistan and Bangladesh suffer due to overcrowding in the cells. To 
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perform all activities of daily life with 6 to 9 persons in a cell, not only infringes the 
right of privacy but is also a source of harassment and violent victimization. On the 
contrary, death row cells in Indian prisons are not overcrowded and inmates suffer 
from solitude and a long period on death row. In this regard, the longest recorded 
period of incarceration (death row + trial) was 25 years. The life at death row is 
painful and degrading whether it is spent isolated or congregated. The period of death 
row in India is longer than in Pakistan and Bangladesh, but the physical conditions are 
equally bad in these countries. 
Unlike the judiciary in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Indian Supreme Court has 
recognized the death row phenomenon as inhuman and degrading and a violation of 
Article 21(right to life) and Article 14(equality before law) of the Constitution of 
India on the ground of inordinate delay. Like the Privy Council, the Supreme Court in 
its various judgments accepted inordinate delay itself as a ‘supervening circumstance’ 
to commute capital punishment. Unlike the Privy Council and the Human Rights 
Committee, the Indian Supreme Court starts the clock of delay once the appeal has 
been rejected by the Supreme Court. In other words, the Indian Supreme Court in the 
majority of cases takes into account the executive delay and not the judicial delay as a 
valid ground to commute a death sentence into life imprisonment. It counts the delay, 
but not the hard physical conditions, as a mitigating factor to commute a death 
sentence. 
To conclude, the death row phenomenon in the Indian subcontinent personifies the 
cruelty of the death penalty. It strengthens this dissertation’s argument that the use of 
capital punishment involves human rights abuses. 
8.3.2. Methods of Executions 
The prohibition of torture under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects against aggravated 
methods of execution such as stoning to death, death on wheel and through being 
trampled by elephants. In light of its own guideline to carry out  the death penalty 
with ‘the least possible suffering’,56 the Human Rights Committee in Kindler v. 
Canada and Keith Cox v. Canada arrived at the conclusion that execution by means 
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of lethal injection is below the threshold of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment.
57
 
Since the British rule in the Indian Subcontinent, executions are conducted behind the 
four walls of prisons by hanging as prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure 
1898. In Pakistan, under the Offence of Zina(Enforcement of Hudood) 
Ordinance,1979, the act of adultery could be punished by stoning to death.
58
 In 2009, 
Bangladesh Supreme Court ruled that execution by a firing squad was permissible 
under the constitution. Neither stoning to death nor a firing squad was ever used for 
execution in Pakistan and Bangladesh respectively. 
The Indian Supreme Court in Deena@ Deena Dayal ETC. v. Union of India
59
 
examined other means of executions such as electrocution, lethal gas, lethal injection, 
and shooting and concluded that none of these methods had a distinct advantage over 
hanging which is not a degrading method of execution. In fact, the court endorsed the 
standpoint of the Royal Commission 1953 that hanging under the drop system as a 
‘most humane method of execution’.60  
In fact, the pain, violence and inhumanity cannot be disassociated from known 
methods of judicial executions. The torture and horror associated with the process of 
execution in the Indian subcontinent include executions by prison guards in the 
absence of a professional executioner, the involvement of other prisoners in rope 
testing rehearsal using a sand bag of more than the prisoner’s weight, measuring the 
height and weight of the death row prisoner the day before the execution to find out 
the drop, and solitary confinement (kalkothri) of the condemned prisoner on the 
issuance of a black warrant. The executions are conducted under a prescribed 
procedure but the probability of botched executions cannot be ruled out. The instances 
of botched executions involve inaccuracy of the drop that causes death due to 
suffocation or decapitation rather than a broken spine, the breaking of the rope and 
shifting the prisoner to a standby rope. It is rightly said killing with kindness is an 
oxymoron. 
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Suggested Topics for Future Research: 
To conclude the author would like to suggest topics for future research. Mental health 
of prisoners especially prisoners under the sentence of death is the most neglected 
area of research in the Indian subcontinent. Empirical research to determine the 
impact of the death row phenomenon on the mental health of death row prisoners in 
Pakistan is highly recommended. The empirical research would not only help to 
gauge the inhuman aspect of the death row but will help the judiciary and prisons 
administration to achieve more humane treatment. 
The second proposed area is empirical research to determine the level of deterrence 
created by death sentences awarded by military courts and the use of executions to 
counter suicide terrorism in Pakistan.  The study would help establish a relationship 
between the use of executions and counter-terrorism. The Government of Pakistan 
can benefit from the outcome of the proposed research to chalk out public policy to 
counter terrorism. 
 241 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of International Instruments 
 
International Conventions 
Charter of the United Nations, and Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.  
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 
December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 
217A (III) of 10 December 1948, UN Doc A/810 (1948).  
Geneva Conventions for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 
1950) 75 UNTS 31. 
 242 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into 
force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85. 
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 
1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135. 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287. 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 
1 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 222.  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity (adopted 26 November 1968, entered into force 11 
November 1970) 754 UNTS 73.  
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331.  
American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into 
force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123.  
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid (adopted 30 November 1973, entered into force 18 July 1976) 1015 UNTS 
243.  
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered 
into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3.  
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, 
entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609.  
 243 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into 
force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217.      
International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 
1987) 1465 UNTS 85. 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (adopted 20 December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010) 
2716 UNTS 3.  
Table of Statutes 
Bangladesh 
The Army Act, 1952 
The Air Force Act, 1952. 
The Children Act, 1974.  
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. 
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. 
The Explosive Substances (Amendment) Act, 1987.  
The Oppression of Women and Children (Special Provisions) Act, 1995. 
 The Penal Code, 1860  
The Suppression of Terrorist Offenses Act, 1992. 
India 
The Army Act, 1950. 
The Air Force Act of India, 1950. 
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. 
The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973. 
The Constitution of India,1950.  
 244 
Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Act 1992. 
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children Act), 2000  
The Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act of India,1985.  
The Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA), 2002. 
The Prison Act, 1894. 
The Terrorism and Disruptive Activities Act(TADA),1987. 
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Ordinance, 2004. 
 
Pakistan 
The Army Act, 1952. 
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997.  
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,1973  
The Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000. 
The Offense of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 
The Penal Code, as amended by Criminal Laws Amendment Act of 2006, 1860. 
The Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006.  
The Public Defender and Legal Aid Office Ordinance, 2009. 
 The Railways Act, as amended through 1996, 1890. 
Table of Cases 
 
The Human Rights Committee  
Albert Wilson v. Philippines (Communication No. 868/1999), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/D/868/1999 (2003). 
 245 
Dennis Lobban v. Jamaica (Communication No. 797/1998), (2004) UN. Doc. 
CCPR/C/80/D/797/1998  
Eustace Henry and Everald Douglas v. Jamaica (Communication No. 571/1994 )  
(1996)U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/571/1994. 
Francis v. Jamaica (Communication No.606/1994), (1995) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/54/D/606/1994.  
Hervin Edwards v. Jamaica (Communication No. 529/1993) (19 January 1993), 
CCPR/C/60/D/529/1993, para. 8.3  
 Kindler v. Canada (Communication No.470/1991), (1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/48/D 
1470/1991.  
Lloyd Reece v. Jamaica (Communication No. 796/1998), (2003) U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/796/1998.  
Munguwambuto Kabwe Peter Mwamba v. Zambia (Communication No. 1520/2006), 
(2010) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1520/2006, para. 2.5 
Nathaniel Williams v. Jamaica (Communication No. 609/1995) U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/61/D/609/1995 (4 November 1997)  
Raymond Persaud and Rampersaud v. Guyana, (Communication No. 812/1998), 
(2006) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/812/1998, para.7.3  
Sandy Sextus v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 818/1998, (2001) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998  
 
The Privy Council 
Dwight Lamott Henfield v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas 
[1996] UKPC 4  
Pratt v Attorney General for Jamaica and others [1993] UKPC1 
Lincoln Anthony Guerra v. Cipriani Baptiste and Others[1996]UKPC 3 
 
Domestic Courts 
Bangladesh 
Blast v. Bangladesh, 55 DLR (2003) 363. 
 246 
Sukur Ali, Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust and others v. The State, Civil 
Appeal No. 116 of 2010 with Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 374 of 2011, 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh, May 5, 2015  
India 
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684. 
Daya Singh v. union of India and Others AIR 1991 SC 1548  
Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State of N.C.T of Delhi (2002) 5 SCC 234  
Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v State of NCT of Delhi, WP(Crl) D No 16039/2011 
D.K. Basu v State of West Bengal AIR(SC) 610 
Mahendra Nath Das v. The Union of India and others, writ petions crl no. 35/2011, 
Gauhati High Court. 
Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCR 413. 
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCR 621. 
Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCR 690. 
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v State of Maharashtra & Anr. Order dated 
30/3/2007 passed by the Bombay High Court in PIL No.17/2007 
Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan (2011)3 SCC 685.  
Rajesh Kumar v. State of Delhi, Crim. App.Nos.1871-2 of 2011(Sept 28, 2011).  
Rajenda Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 3 SCR 78. 
Shatrughan Chauhan & Another vs. Union of India & Others (2014) 3SCC1. 
Sher Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCR 582. 
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1979) SCR (1) 392. 
Triveniben V. State of Gujrat (1989) 1SCC 678. 
Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu (1983) 2 SCR 582. 
 
 
 247 
Pakistan 
Farooq Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2005, Lahore 15. 
Faqir Ullah Vs. Khalil-uz-Zaman, 2000 PSC (crl. ) 252 
Khalil-Uz-Zaman Vs. Supreme, Appellate Court, Lahore & 4 Others, PLD 1994 SC 
885 
Mohammad Rafique v. State, 1993 PCr. LJ 1403  
Muhammad Siddique v. The State, PLD 2002 Lahore 444. 
Muhammad Akram Khan v. The State, 2001PLD SC 96. 
Ashiq Hussain Vs. Abdul Hamed, 2002 PCr L. J J 859 (Lahore) 
Muhammad Saleem Vs. State, PLD 2002 SC 558  
Law Commission Reports 
Bangladesh law Commission Report 
The Law Commission of Bangladesh, Final Report on the Evidence Act, 1872, 
Relating to Burden of Proof in Cases of Torture on Persons in Police Custody (Law 
Com No 17,1998)  
Indian law Commission Report 
Indian Law Commission, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 vol1(Law Com No 
41, 1969). 
Indian Law Commission, Report on Law Relating to Arrest (Law Com No.177, 
2001). 
Law Commission of India, Expeditious Investigation and Trial of Criminal Cases 
against Influential Public Personalities (Law Com No 239, 2012). 
Law Commission of India, The Death Penalty (Law Com No 262,2015) 
Law Commission of India, Law Relating to Arrest (Law Com No 177,2001). 
Law Commission of India, Report on Article 20(3) the Constitution of India and Right 
to Silence (Law Com No.180,2002). 
The Law Commission of India, Review of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 (Law Com 
No.185, 2003).  
Law Commission of India, Custodial Crimes (Law Com No 152, 1994)  
 248 
Indian Law Commission Report, Reforms of Judicial Administration vol. 1(Law Com 
No. 14, 1958).  
Pakistan Law Commission 
Pakistan Law and Justice Commission, Annual Report 2012-14(Islamabad: Pakistan 
Law Commission, 2014). 
Pakistan Law Commission, Examination of Sections 54&167 of Code of Criminal 
Procedure 1898 (Law Com No 49). 
National Judicial (Policy Making) Committee, National Judicial Policy 2009 
(Revised in 2012) (Islamabad: Law Justice Commission of Pakistan, 2012)  
Pakistan Law Commission, Jail Reform (Law Com No 23, 1997) 
Pakistan Law Commission, Criminal Justice System (Law Com No 22,1997) 
Pakistan Law Commission, Expediting Trial Proceeding (Law Com No 60, 2003). 
Pakistan Law Commission, Amendment of Section 11,13 and 14 of the Offence of 
Zina (Enforcement of Hudood Ordinance,1979) (Law Com No 78, 2005) 
Pakistan Law Commission, Jail Reforms(Revised) (Law Com No 80, 2005) 
Bibliography 
 
Books 
Abbott G, The Book of Execution: An Encyclopedia of Methods of Judicial Execution 
(London: Headline, 1994).  
Abdulrahman A N, Capital Punishment for Drug Offences in Islam and its 
Application in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (London: University of London, 2000). 
PhD Thesis. 
Abubakar M U, Gender Justice and Islamic Laws of Homicide and Bodily Hurt of 
Pakistan and Nigeria: A Critical Examination (Warwick: University of Warwick, 
2012). PhD Thesis 
Ahmad M T, The Truth About the Alleged Punishment for Apostasy in Islam (Surrey: 
Islam International Publications, 2005). 
Ali S A, The Spirit of Islam: A History of the Evolution and Ideals of Islam with a Life 
of the Prophet (London: Chatto & Windus,1922). 
 249 
 Ali B D, The Hedàya, or guide; a commentary on the Mussulman Laws: translated 
by order of the Governor-General and council of Bengal, by Charles Hamilton 
(London: T. Bensley,1791). 
Amerasinghe, A R B. ‘Relief and Remedies for the Infringement of the Rights of the 
Personal Security and Physical Liberty in Sri Lanka ’in Commonwealth Secretariat 
(eds.), Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence Volume 8: Eighth Judicial 
Colloquium on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms 
(London: INTERIGHTS & Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001), pp-85-115.  
Armytage L, Reforming Justice: A Journey to Fairness in Asia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012)  
Amnesty International, Death Sentences and Executions2015(London: Amnesty 
International Publications, 2016).  
Amnesty International India &People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Lethal Lottery: The 
Death Penalty in India part II (London: Amnesty International, 2008). 
Amnesty International, Pakistan: Protection of Juveniles in the Criminal Justice 
System Remains Inadequate (London: Amnesty International, 2005) 
Amnesty International, When the State Kills: Death Penalty V. Human Rights 
(London: Amnesty International Publications, 1989). 
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report for 1988(London: Amnesty 
International,1988)  
Anderson N, Law Reform in the Muslim World (London: Athlon Press, 1976)  
Arnold D, Police Power and Colonial Rule (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
Asad M, the Message of the Quran (Gibraltar: Dar Al-Andalus,1980). 
Asian Centre for Human Rights, India: No Defense for Retention of Death Penalty 
(New Delhi: Asian Centre for Human Rights, 2015). 
Asian Centre for Human Rights, The Right to Life: Death Penalty and the UN Human 
Rights Committee (New Delhi: Asian Centre for Human Rights, 2015). 
 250 
Asian Human Rights Commission, The State of Human Rights in Ten Asian Nations-
2011(Hong Kong: Asian Human Rights Commission, 2012).  
Ashraf M I, Islamic Philosophy of War and Peace (Bloomington: I Universe, 2008). 
Audah, Abdul Qadir, Islamic System of Justice translated S.M. Hussain (Karachi: 
International Islamic Publishers,1982). 
Bae S, When the State no Longer Kills: International Human Rights Norms and 
Abolition of Capital Punishment (New York: State University of New York Press, 
2008). 
Bayley D H, The Police and Political Development in India (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press,1969).  
Banerjee S, The Wicked City: Crime and Punishment in Colonial Calcutta (New 
Delhi: Orient Black Swan, 2009). 
Barbour R, Introducing Qualitative Research: A Student’s Guide to the Craft of 
Doing Qualitative Research (London: Sage, 2008). 
Barnett, Lionel D, Antiquities of India: An Account of the History and Culture of 
Ancient Hindustan (London: Philip Lee Warner, 1913) 
Bassiouni M C, The Shari a And Islamic Criminal Justice in Time of War and Peace 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014)  
Baxi U, The Crisis of the Indian Legal System (New Dlhi: Vikas Publishing House, 
1982). 
Beccaria, C, On Crimes and Punishment (London: Pearson Education,1963). 
Bedau H A, The Death Penalty in America: Current Controversies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,1997). 
Bentham J, The Rationale of Punishment: Book II (London: Heward, 1830). 
Bentham J, To His Fellow Citizens of France, on Death Punishment (London: 
Heward, 1831) 
 251 
Bentham J, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and legislation (Collected 
works of Jeremy Bentham) (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1996)  
Bowers, William J., Glenn L. Pierce, and John F. McDevitt, Legal Homicide: Deaths 
Punishment in America,1864-1982 (Boston: Northeastern University Press,1984). 
Bruke R H, Criminal Justice Theory: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2012). 
Buchanan I, Trials: on Death Row in Pakistan (London: Jonathan Cape, 2016)  
Campbell G, Modern India: A Sketch of the System of Civil Government, with Some 
Account of the Natives and Native Institutions (London: John Murray, 1853). 
Camus A, Reflections on the Guillotine (Indiana: Fridtjof-Karla Publications, 1960). 
Camus A, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death (New York: A Knopf, 2012). 
Chailley J, Administrative Problems of British India, Translated by Sir William 
Meyer (London: Macmillan, 1910). 
Chaturvedi J. C, Police Administration and Investigation of Crime (Delhi: Isha 
Books, 2006).  
Chaudhry M.A. K, Policing in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1997). 
Choudhuri M, Languishing  for Justice: Being A Critical Survey of The Criminal 
Justice System (Nagpur: Dattsons, 1995).  
Colebrooke J E, A Digest of the Regulations and Laws Enacted by the Governor 
General in Council for the Civil Government of the Territories under the Presidency 
of Bengal Arranged in Alphabetical Order vol. I (Calcutta: n. p., 1807). 
Campbell G, Modern India: A Sketch of the System of Civil Government, with Some 
Account of the Natives and Native Institutions (London: John Murray, 1853) 
Colebrooke J E, A Digest of the Regulations and Laws Enacted by the Governor 
General in Council for the Civil Government of the Territories under the Presidency 
of Bengal Arranged in Alphabetical Order vol. I (Calcutta: n. p. ,1807). 
Coulson, Noel James, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press, 1999). 
 252 
Cowell H, The History and Constitution of the Courts and Legislative Authorities in 
India (London: W. Thacker, 1872). 
Das R M, Crime and Punishment in Ancient India: with a Particular Reference to the 
Manusmrti (New Delhi: Kanchan Publications,1982)  
Das S, Crime and Punishment In Ancient India: C.A.D. 300 to A.D. 1100 (New Delhi, 
Abhinav Publications, 1977)  
Dharker, C D, Lord Macaulay’s Legislative Minutes (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1946). 
Drapkin I, Crime and Punishment in the Ancient World (New York: Lexington 
Books,1989). 
Duff R A, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
Dunn J, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument 
of the Two Treaties On Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 
Durkheim E, De La Division Du Travail Social (Paris: Felix Alcan,1922). 
Duxbury A & Mathew Groves, Military Justice in Modern Age (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee, Its Role in the Development of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press,1994). 
Evans R J, Ritual of Retribution: Capital Punishment in Germany 1600-1987 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press,1966)  
European Parliament, Enhancing EU Action on the Death Penalty in Asia 
(Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union, 2012). 
Ferri E, Criminal Sociology (New York: Agatha Press,1967). 
Fisch J, Cheap Lives and Dear Limbs: The British Transformation of the Bengal 
Criminal Law, 1769-1817 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983). 
Foster W, Early Travels in India,1583-1619 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921). 
 253 
Foucoult M, Discipline and Punishment, Translated by Sheridan, A. (Paris, 
Gallimard,1975)  
Firišta M Q, History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India, Till the Year AD 
1612, Vol.1, Translated by John Briggs (London: A. & R Spotiswoode, 1829). 
Fyzee A, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
Gandhi V H, Judicial Approach in Criminal Justice System: An Experience of India 
(New Delhi: Readworthy, 2010). 
Garland D, Peculiar Institution: America's Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
Garofalo R, Criminology (London: William Heinemann,1914)  
Gerber R J & Johnson J M, The Top Ten Death Penalty Myths: The Politics of Crime 
Control (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007). 
George R M, Prisoner Voices from Death Row: Indian Experience (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2015).  
Ghazi M A, Muswwada Qanun-e-Qisas and Diyat (Draft) (Islamabad: Idara Tahqiq-
e-Islami, 1986). 
 
Ghosh S, Torture and Rape in Police Custody (New Delhi: Asish Publishing 
House,1993) 
Ghoshal U N, History of Indian Political Ideas: The Ancient Period and the Period of 
Transition to the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1959) 
Grant C, Observations on the State of Society Among the Asiatic Subjects of Great 
Britain: Particularly with Respect to Morals: and on the Means of Improving it. 
Written Chiefly in 1792 (London: House of Commons, 1813). 
Gupta A, The Police in British India1861-1947(New Delhi: Concept Publishing 
Company,1979). 
 254 
Habbash M & Michael Mumisa, Sharia Law and the Death Penalty: Would abolition 
of the Death Penalty Be Unfaithful to the Message of Islam (London: Penal Reform 
International, 2015). 
Hallaq W B, Sharia: Theory, Practice, Transformation (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
 
Hamidullah M, Muslim Conduct of State (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1945). 
 
 Hanif N Islamic Concept of Crime and Justice, volume 2 (New Delhi: Sarup & Sons 
1999). 
Hannikainen L, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law (Helsinki: 
Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Co., 1988).  
Harington J H, An Analysis of the Laws and Regulations Enacted by the Governor 
General in Council: At Fort William in Bengal, for the Civil Government of the 
British Territories Under that Presidency vol.1 (London: A. J. Valpy,1821). 
Hasan I, Central Structure of the Mughal Empire and Its Practical Working up to The 
Year 1657 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1936). 
Hifnawi Mansour Mohamed, al-Shubhat wa Atharaha fil ‘Uquba al-Jinayeeya fi al-
Fiqh al-Islami Muqarna bil-Qanun (The Impact of Suspicions on Criminal Penalties 
in Islamic Jurisprudence Compared to Law) (Cairo: al-Amana Press,1986). 
Hood R & Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008)  
Hood Roger & Surya Deva, Confronting Capital Punishment in Asia: Human Rights, 
Politics and Public Opinion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
Human Rights Watch, Broken System: Dysfunction, Abuse, and Impunity in the 
Indian Police (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009).  
International Federation for Human Rights(FIDH) & Odhikar, Bangladesh Criminal 
Justice Through the Prism of Capital Punishment and the Fight against Terrorism 
(Dhaka: FIDH & Odhikar, 2010). 
 255 
Iqbal M, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (London: Oxford 
University Press,1934). 
Jahangir A & Hina Jilani, The Hudood Ordinances: A Divine Sanction? (Lahore: 
Sang-e-Meel publications, 2003). 
Jain M P, Outlines of Indian Legal History (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi,1966). 
 Jilani H & Asma Jahangir, The Huddod Ordinance: A Divine Sanction (Lahore: 
Rhotas Books,1990). 
Johnson D T & Franklin E. Zimring, The Next Frontier: National Development, 
Political Change, and the Death Penalty in Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
Johnson R, Death Work: A Study of the Modern Execution Process (Belmont CA: 
Wadsworth, 1998). 
Johnson R, Condemned to Die: Life Under Sentence of Death (NewYork: Elsevier 
North Holland,1981). 
Johnson, R, Death Work: A Study of the Modern Execution Process (Belmont CA: 
Wadsworth, 1998). 
Jolly J, Crimes and Punishment(Hindus)’, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics Vol. 
IV (1908). 
Kelkar R.V. Outlines of Criminal Procedure (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 
2001). 
Kramer M H, The Ethics of Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Investigation of Evil 
and its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
Lahiri T, Crime and Punishment in Ancient India (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 
1987). 
Lau M, The Role of Islam in Legal System of Pakistan (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2006). 
Lombroso C, Crimes, Its Causes and Remedies (Montclair: N J Patterson 
Smith,1968). 
 256 
Macaulay T B, Speeches of Lord Macaulay (London: Longman Green, and Co. ,1886)  
Mackarness F.C, Methods of the Indian Police in the Twentieth Century (London: the 
National Press Agency, 1910). 
Masud M S, A Critical Report on Hudood Ordinance 1979 (Islamabad: Council of 
Islamic Ideology, 2007) 
Maududi A, Maududi, Islamic Law and its Introduction in Pakistan, trans. Khurshid 
Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited,1970). 
Mahmoud M E, Criminology and Penology in Islamic Jurisprudence (Lewiston: The 
Edwin Mellen Press, 2015). 
Mahmoud, Mahgoub El-Tigani, The Sources of Islamic Jurisprudence: Justice and 
Law in Islam (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2014). 
Mishra P, Death Penalty and Social Justice (New Delhi: Regal Publications, 2016). 
Mishra P, Human Rights in South Asia (New Delhi: Kal Paz Publications, 2000). 
McGoldrick D, The Human Rights Committee, Its Role in the Development of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994). 
Moreland W H, India at the Death of Akbar (London: Macmillan, 1920). 
Mukherjee R, Women, Law and Free Legal Aid in India (New Delhi: Deep and Deep 
Publications,1998). 
National Commission on the Status of Women(NCSW) & UNDP, The Concept of 
Justice in Islam: Qisas and Diyat Law (Islamabad: NCSW, 2006). 
Niazi, I A, Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 2000). 
Noorani A G & South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, Challenges to Civil 
Rights Guarantees in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
Novak A, The Global Decline of the Mandatory Death Penalty: Constitutional 
Jurisprudence and Legislative Reform in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2014). 
Nowak M, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary (Kehl: N. 
P. Engel, 2005).  
Owen S J, The Fall of the Mogul Empire (London: John Murray, 1912). 
 257 
Penal Reform International, Access to Justice and Penal Reform: Review and 
Recommendations (London: Penal Reform International, 2003). 
Penal Reform International, Access to Justice and Penal Reform Conference Report 
(London: Penal Reform International, 2003). 
Peters R, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the 
Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century (Vol. 2) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
Potter H, Hanging in Judgment: Religion and the Death Penalty in England from the 
Bloody Code to Abolition (London: SCMP,1993) 
Prejean H, Dead Man Walking (London: Fount Paperbacks,1993). 
Qadri T, Islamic Penal System and its Philosophy (Lahore: Minhaj-ul-Quran, 1995) 
Quinney R, The Social Reality of Crime (Boston: Little &Brown, 1970). 
Rabb I, Doubt in Islamic Law: A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and 
Islamic Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2015).  
Radelet M, Facing the Death Penalty: Essays on a Cruel and Unusual Punishment( 
Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 1990) 
Radzinowicz, L A, Adventures in Criminology (London: Routledge, 2002) 
Radzinowicz LA, History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750: 
The Movement for Reform, 1750-1833 (Vol. 1) (Oxford: Macmillan, 1948), pp.389-
91. 
Rahman A M M, ‘Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms and 
Access to Justice: The Bangladesh Experience’ in Commonwealth Secretariat (eds.), 
Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence Volume 8: Eighth Judicial Colloquium on 
the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms (London: 
INTERIGHTS & Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001) 
Rabb Intsar A, Doubt in Islamic Law: A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and 
Islamic Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).  
 
 258 
Rahim A, The Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence: According to The Hanafi, 
Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali Schools (London: Luzac & Co, 1911). 
Ramakrishnan N, In Custody: Law, Impunity and Prisoner Abuse in South Asia (New 
Delhi: SAGE, 2013). 
Raman M and K.V. Sreemithun, Legal Aid: Catalyst for Social Change (New Delhi: 
Satyam Law International, 2012). 
Ranjit K, Research Methodology: Step-by-step Guide for Beginners (London: Sage, 
2005). 
Rankin, G C, Background to Indian law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1946). 
Rehman, S A, Punishment of Apostasy in Islam (Lahore: Institute of Islamic 
Culture,1972). 
Rizvi A B and Basham A L, The Wonder that was India: A Survey of the History and 
Culture of the Indian Sub-continent from the Coming of the Muslims to the British 
Conquest, 1200-1700. Vol. 2 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1987). 
Ross W D, The Right and The Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930). 
Ruthven M, Torture: The Grand Conspiracy (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson,1978)  
Sangar S P, Crime and Punishment in Mughal India (New Delhi: Reliance Publishing 
House, 1998). 
Sarat A, ‘Capital Punishment as a legal, Political, and Cultural Fact’ in Sarat A. 
(eds.), The Killing State: Capital Punishment in Law, Politics, and Culture (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press,1999). 
Saul B, Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2014).  
Schabas A W, Death Penalty as Cruel Treatment and Torture: Capital Punishment 
Challenged in The World’s Courts (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1996).  
 259 
---The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
Schacht I, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1964). 
Scherdin L, Capital Punishment: A Hazard to a Sustainable Criminal Justice System 
(Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009).  
Scott G R, The History of Capital Punishment: Including an Examination of the Case 
for and Against the Death penalty (London: Torchstream Books, 1950). 
 Scott J A, Lectures on Practical Police Work (Amritsar: Wazir-i-Hind Press : s.n., 
192-?]  
 
Sel-Awa, M Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative Study (Indianapolis: 
American Trust Publication,1982) 
 
Sellin T, The Penalty of Death (London: Sage,1980). 
 
Sen S, Disciplining Punishment: Colonialism and Convict Society in the Andaman 
Islands (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
Shankardass R D, Punishment and the Prison: Indian and International Perspective 
(New Delhi: Sage,2000) 
Sharp S, Hidden Victims: The Effects of the Death Penalty on Families of the Accused 
(New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 2005)   
Solomon R C, A Passion for Justice: Emotions and the Origins of the Social Contract 
(London: Rowman & Littlefield,1995). 
South Asian Human Rights Documentation Centre, Handbook of Human Rights and 
Criminal Justice in India: The System and Procedure (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
Simonovic I, Moving Away from the Death Penalty: Arguments, Trends and 
Perspectives (New York: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner, 2015) 
 Sindhi G H, Honour Killing and The Status of Women in Pakistan (Islamabad: 
National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 2007)  
 260 
Smith R K, Textbook on International Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012)  
Smith V, The Oxford History of India: from the Earliest Times to the End of 1911 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920)  
Spellman J, Political Theory of Ancient India: A Study of Kingship from the Earliest 
Times to Circa A.D.300 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1964). 
Stokes W, The Anglo-Indian Codes, vol1(Oxford: Clarendon Press,1887). 
Terry E, A Voyage to East-India1655(London: J. Wilkie,1777). 
Thomas E J, The History of Buddhist Thought (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 
& Co.,1933). 
United Nations Development Programme, Towards Police Reform in Bangladesh 
Needs Assessment Report (Dhaka: Strengthening Human Security in Bangladesh, 
2004).  
Unnithan N P, Crime and Justice in India (New Delhi: Sage, 2013) 
Vadackumchery J, Indian Police and Miscarriage of Justice (New Delhi: Alpha  
Publishing Corporation,1997). 
Verma A, The Indian Police: A Critical Evaluation (New Delhi: Regency 
Publications, 2005). 
Vikor K S, Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law (London: Hurst 
and Company, 2005). 
 
Walter C. Long & Oliver Robertson, Prisons Guards and the Death Penalty (London: 
Penal Reform International, 2015) 
 
Wasti T, The Application of Islamic Criminal Law in Pakistan: Shariah in Practice 
(Leiden: Brill, 2009). 
Weissbrodt D, The Right to a Fair Trial under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001).  
West R and Arthur Koestler, Reflections on Hanging (New York: Macmillan,1957) 
 261 
Wiener M J, Reconstructing the Criminals: Culture, Law and Policy in England, 
1830-1914(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
Yasin M, District and Police Systems in Pakistan (Islamabad: Vanguard, 1999). 
York J, Against the Death Penalty: International Initiatives and Implications 
(London: Routledge, 2016). 
 Zwemer S M, The Law of Apostasy in Islam (London: Marshal Bros,1924). 
 
Chapters from Edited Books 
Al-Hewesh, M I I ‘Murder and Homicide in Islamic Law: Textual Foundations’ in 
Tahir Mahmood et al, (eds.) Criminal Law in Islam and the Muslim World: A 
Comparative Perspective (New Delhi: Institute of Objective Studies, 1996) pp-151-
163. 
 
Barends M G,, ‘Shari’a in Pakistan’ in Paul Marshal’ (eds.), Radical Islam’s Rules: 
The Worldwide Spread of Extreme Shari’a Law (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2005), pp.65-85. 
Bassiouni M C, ‘Death as a Penalty in the Shari’a’ in Hodgkinson P & Schabas W A 
(eds.) Capital Punishment: Strategies for Abolition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004).), pp.169-185. 
 
Batra B, ‘Do Not Be Cruel: The Death Row Phenomenon and Indi’s Delay 
Jurisprudence’ in Roger Hood & Surya Deva (eds.), Confronting Capital Punishment 
in Asia: Human Rights, Politics and Public Opinion (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013) 
Bentley D and Richard Thomas, ‘Fair Trial’ in Madeleine Colvin and Jonathan 
Cooper (eds.), Human Rights in the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Berween M, ‘International Bills of Human Rights: An Islamic Critique’ in Abdullah 
Saeed (eds.) Islam and Human Rights Vol. I: Key Issues in the Debate (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2012), pp-111-121. 
 262 
Bindal A & C Raj Kumar, ‘Abolition of the Death Penalty in India: Legal 
Constitutional, and Human Rights Dimensions’ in Roger Hood and Surya Deva 
(eds.), Confronting Capital Punishment in Asia: Human Rights, Politics, and Public 
Opinion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
Bhatia K. L. ‘Fair Trial in Criminal Proceedings in India’ in David Weissbrodt & 
Rudiger Wolfrum (eds.) The Right to a Fair Trial (Berlin: Springer,1998). 
Boubakri, A & Nadia Bernaz, ‘Transitional Processes and the Death Penalty in North 
Africa’ in Madoka Futamura and Nadia Bernaz (eds.), The Politics of the Death 
Penalty in Countries in Transition (Oxon: Routledge, 2014). 
Chattha, Z N & Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, ‘Police Misconduct: The Pakistani Paradigm’ 
in Carl B. Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic and M.R. Haberfeld (eds.), The Contours 
of Police Integrity (London: Sage, 2004). 
Cody A and Dominique Day, ‘Afghanistan: Death Penalty at the Crossroads’ in Peter 
Hodgkinson (eds.), Capital Punishment: New Perspectives (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013). 
 Davis S S, ‘A Woman Honour and a Nation’s Shame: Honour Killing in Pakistan’ in 
Jackie Jones, Anna Grear, Rachel Anne Fenton and Kim Stevenson(eds.), Gender, 
Sexualities and Law (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), pp.188- 200. 
Deb, R, ‘Police Investigation: A Review’ in P.J. Alexander (eds.) Policing India in 
the New Millennium (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2002). 
Giarratano J M, ‘The Pains of Life’ in Michael L. Radelet (eds.), Facing the Death 
Penalty: Essay on a Cruel and Unusual Punishment (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1989).  
Haleem M A, ‘Compensation of Homicide in Islamic Shari a’: in Mohammad Abdel 
Haleem, Adel Omar Serif and Kate Daniels (eds.), Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial 
Procedure in the Sharia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), pp.97-108. 
 
Karan, Vijay, India’s System of Policing: Need for Urgent Reforms in P.J. Alexander 
(eds.), Policing India in the New Millennium (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2002)  
 263 
Kaufman-Osborn, T. V ‘The Death of Dignity,” in Austin Sarat & Jurgen 
Martschukat (eds.), Is the Death Penalty Dying? European and American 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2011). 
Knopf J W, ‘Terrorism and the Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research’ in Wenger A & 
Wilner A, (eds.) Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2012)  
Lambrix C M, Isolation of Death Row in Michael L. Radelet (eds.), Facing the Death 
Penalty: Essay on a Cruel and Unusual Punishment (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1989)  
Michael H. Reggio, ‘History of the Death Penalty’ in Laura E. Randa(eds.), Society’s 
Final Solution: A History and Discussion of the Death Penalty (New York: 
University Press of America,1997)  
Mahmood T, ‘Law Code in the Holy Qur’an’ in Tahir Mahmood et al (eds.), Criminal 
Law in Islam and the Muslim World: A Comparative Perspective (Delhi: Institute of 
Objective Studies, 1996). 
Mustafa F, ‘Offence of Adultery under Islamic and Some Other Law: A Comparison’ 
in Tahir Mahmood et al(eds.), Criminal Law in Islam and the Muslim World: A 
Comparative Perspective (New Delhi: Institute of Objective Studies, 1966) pp-242-
255. 
Nowak M, ‘Is the Death Penalty an Inhuman Punishment?’, in Theodore S. Orlin, 
Allan Rosas & Martin Scheinin (eds.), The Jurisprudence of Human Rights Law: A 
Comparative Interpretive Approach (Turku, Finland: Institute for Human Rights, Åbo 
Akademi University, 2000). 
Passi S K, Judicial Activism and Legal Aid-An Access to Qui Approbat non 
Reprobate in Muzafer Assadi eds. Social Justice, Law and Human Rights (New Delhi: 
Serials Publications, 2012). 
Prokosch E, ‘The Death Penalty Versus Human Rights’ in the Council of Europe 
(eds.), The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
Publishing, 1999). 
 264 
Ramdan T, ‘A Call for a Moratorium on Corporal Punishment: The Debate in 
Review’ in Kari Vogt, Lena Larsen and Christian Moe(eds.), New Directions in 
Islamic Thought: Exploring Reform and Muslim Tradition (London: I. B. Tauris, 
2009), pp.163-74. 
Ravaud C and Stefan Trechsel, The Death Penalty and the Case Law of the 
Institutions of the European Convention on Human Rights’ in the Council of Europe 
(eds.), The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
Publishing,1999), pp.79-90. 
Schacht J ‘Pre- Islamic Background and Early Development of Jurisprudence’ in 
Khadduri, M. & Liebesny, H. (eds.), Law in the Middle East (Washington: Middle 
East Institute, 1995). 
Sarat, A. ‘Capital Punishment As a legal, Political, and Cultural Fact’ in Sarat, A. 
(eds.), The Killing State: Capital Punishment in Law, Politics, and Culture (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press,1999). 
Schabas W A ‘International Legal Aspects’ in Hodgkinson, P. & Rutherford, A. 
(eds.), Capital Punishment: Global Issues and Prospects Volume II (Winchester, 
Waterside Press, 1996). 
Schmidt M G, ‘The Death Row Phenomenon: A Comparative Analysis’ in Theodore 
S. Orlin, Allan Rosas and Martin Scheinin (eds.), The Jurisprudence of Human Rights 
Law: A Comparative Interpretive Approach (Turku, Finland: Institute for Human 
Rights, Åbo Akademi University, 2000).  
Stein J G, “Deterring Terrorism, Not Terrorists,” in Wenger, A., & Wilner, A. (eds.) 
Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2012). 
Nsereko D D, ‘Arbitrary Deprivation of Life: Controls on Permissible Deprivations’ 
in Bertrand G. Ramcharan (eds.), The Right to Life in International Law (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff ,1985). 
Walker C, ‘Terrorism Prosecution and the Right to a Fair Trial’ in Ben Saul, Research 
Handbook on International Law and Terrorism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014). 
 265 
Warriach, S A, ‘Honor Killings and the Law in Pakistan’ in Lynn Welchman and Sara 
Hossain (eds.), Honour: Crimes, Paradigms, And Violence Against Women (London: 
Zed Books, 2005). 
Research Journals 
Abd-Elrahim G M, ‘The Concept of Punishment in Islamic Law in Relation to 
Contemporary Legal Trends’ (1990) 7(1) American Journal of Islamic Social 
Sciences124. 
Alarid L. F., & Wang, H. M ‘Mercy and Punishment: Buddhism and the Death 
Penalty’ (2001) 28(1) Social Justice 231. 
Antoine, R. M. B, ‘International Law and the Right to Legal Representation in Capital 
Offence Cases-A Comparative Approach’, (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
284. 
--- The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council-An Inadequate Remedy for Death 
Row Prisoners’, (1992) 41 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 179. 
Anderson J ND, ‘Homicide in Islamic law’ (1951) 13(4) Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies 811. 
 
Azmeh W, ‘Corporal Punishment Verses in the Quran are to be Reinterpreted to 
Counter Violent Extremist Practices from within the Islamic Juristic Tradition’ 24(2) 
Digest of Middle East Studies 161. 
 
Bedau H A, ‘Capital Punishment and Right to Life’ (2011) (3) Michigan State Law 
Review 505. 
 
Berns W, ‘Defending the Death Penalty’ (1980) 26(4) Crime and Delinquency 503. 
Bowers W J & Pierce G L, ‘Deterrence or Brutalization What Is the Effect of 
Executions? (1980) 26(4) Crime & Delinquency 453. 
Brogden, Michael E., ‘The Emergence of Police-The Colonial Dimension’ (1987) 
27(1) British Journal of Criminology 4. 
Brooks T, ‘Retributivist Arguments against Capital Punishment’ (2004) 35 Journal of 
Social Philosophy 188. 
 266 
Cochra J K & Chamlin M B, ‘Deterrence and Brutalization: The Dual Effects of 
Executions’ (2000) 17(4) Justice Quarterly 685. 
Collins D P ‘Islamization of Pakistani Law: A Historical Perspective’ (1987) 24 
Stanford Journal of International Law 511. 
Chaudhry, M A, Waseem Haider, A.H. Nagi, Zia- Ud-Din, & Z. Parveen, ‘Pattern of 
Police Torture in Punjab, Pakistan’ (2008) 29 (4) The American Journal of Forensic 
Medicine and Pathology309. 
Danielle M, ‘Symposium: Death Penalty from an International and Human Rights 
Law Perspective’ (2002) 42 Santa Clara Law Review1031. 
Dass, D K. & Arvind Verma, ‘The Armed Police in the British Colonial Tradition’ 
(1998) 21(2) Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies &Management 
354. 
Donlu T, ‘Mst Asia Bibi v The State’ (2015) 4(1) Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 147. 
Risinger, D Michael, ‘Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual 
Wrongful Conviction Rate’ (2007) 97(3) The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 76. 
Filler L ‘Movements to Abolish the Death Penalty in the United States’ (1952) 284 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 124. 
Findley K A, ‘Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence 
Movement Mergers Crime Control and Due Process’ (2008) 41 Texas Tech Law 
Review 133. 
Forte D F, ‘Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan’ (1995) 10 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law27. 
 
Ganapathy N and Balachandran L., ‘Crime and Punishment in Asia’ (2016) 32(3) 
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 196.  
 267 
Ghodsi E, ‘Murder in the Criminal Law of Iran and Islam’ (2004) 68(2) Journal of 
Criminal Law 160. 
Gottesman E, ‘The Re-emergence of Qisas and Diyat in Pakistan’ (1992) 23(2) 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 433.  
Gross S R & Matheson D J, ‘What They Say at the End: Capital Victims' Families 
and the Press’ (2002) 88 Cornell Law Review 486. 
Healey M, ‘Enhancing Counter Terrorism in South Asia’ (2008) 18 Journal of 
International Service 125. 
Hillman H, ‘The Possible Pain Experienced during Execution by Different Methods’ 
(1993) 22 Perceptions 745.  
Horigan D P, ‘Of Compassion and Capital Punishment: A Buddhist Perspective on 
the Death Penalty’ (1996) 41 American Journal of Jurisprudence 271. 
Hudson P ‘Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner's Human Rights 
under International Law?’ (2000) 11(4) European Journal of International Law 833. 
Jackson J, Muhammad Asif, Ben Bradford and Muhammad Zakir Zakria, ‘Corruption 
and Police Legitimacy in Lahore, Pakistan’ (2014) 54British Journal of Criminology 
1067 
Jayewardene C H S, ‘The Death Penalty in Ceylon’ (1960) 3(2) Ceylon Journal of 
Historical and Social Studies166.  
Kamali M H, ‘Punishment in Islamic Law: A Critique of The Hudud Bill of Kelantan, 
Malaysia, (1998)13(3) Arab Law Quarterly203.  
Lambert E G et al, ‘Views on the Death Penalty among College Students in India’ 
(2008) 10(2) Punishment and Society: The International Journal of Penology 207. 
Lau M, ‘Twenty-Five Years of Hudood Ordinances-A Review’ (2007) 64Washington 
and Lee Review1291. 
 
Lillquist E ‘Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty’ (2005) 42 American Criminal 
Law Review 45. 
 268 
Mehta R N ‘Crime and Punishment in the Jatakas’ (1936) XII(3) Indian Historical 
Quarterly 432. 
Mitterrand D, ‘Symposium: Death Penalty from an International and Human Rights 
Law Perspective’ (2002) 42 Santa Clara Law Review1031. 
Modarressi, H ‘Early Debates on the Integrity of the Quran: A Brief Survey’ (1993) 
77 Studia Islamica 5. 
 
Peers, D M., ‘Torture, the Police, and the Colonial State in the Madras Presidency’ 
1815-55, (1991) 12 Criminal Justice History 29. 
Radelet M L, ‘Role of the Innocence Argument in Contemporary Death Penalty 
Debates’ (2008) 41 Texas Tech Law Review 199. 
Radelet M L & Lacock T L, ‘Recent Developments: Do Executions Lower Homicide 
Rates?: The Views Of Leading Criminologists’ (2009) 99(2) The Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 489. 
Risinger D M, “Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful 
Conviction Rate,” (2007) 97(3) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology76. 
Russels C.W and Maj. Smith, ‘The use of Torture in India’ (1856) 103 Edinburgh 
Review 78  
Russell G. Murphy and Eric J. Carlson, ‘Like Snow [Falling] on a Branch...: 
International Law Influences on Death Penalty Decisions and Debates in the United 
States’ 2009(38) Denver Journal of International Law & Policy115. 
Schabas W A, ‘Islam and the Death Penalty’ (2000) 9(1) William & Mary Bill of 
Rights Journal 223. 
Shodhan A, ‘The East India Company’s Conquest of Assam, India and Community 
Justice: Panchayats in Translation’ (2015) 2(2) Asian Journal of Law and Society 357. 
Smith A, ‘Not Waiving but Drowning: The Anatomy of Death Row Syndrome and 
Volunteering for Execution’ (2008) 17 The Boston University Public Interest Law 
Journal 237.  
 269 
Truskett J P, ‘The Death Penalty, International Law, and Human Rights’ (2003-4) 
11(2) Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law 557. 
Waseem M, ‘Judging Democracy in Pakistan: Conflict between the Executive and 
Judiciary’ (2012) 20 Contemporary South Asia 19. 
 Xingliang C, ‘Opinions on Retention versus Abolition of the Death Penalty’ (2005) 
36(3) Spring Contemporary Chinese Thought 26. 
Yang A, ‘Disciplining Natives: Prisons and Prisoners in Early Nineteenth Century 
India’ (1987) 10(2) South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 29.  
Zimring F E & Johnson D, ‘Executing Kasab: The End of India’s Death Penalty?’  
(2012) 47(52) Economic and Political Weekly10. 
 
